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The Special Economic Zones Act 2005, a critical infrastructure model, was enacted in India in two 
days amid total political consensus. Within two years, intense conflicts over land and resources 
erupted in SEZ areas across the country between corporate developers, the state, and peasants’ and 
citizens’ groups. In the ensuing furor, several SEZs foundered and Goa state unprecedentedly 
revoked its SEZ policy, suspending 15 SEZs, some with construction underway. Amid raging 
debates and accusations of corrupt real estate deals over SEZs and other “infrastructure” and 
urbanization investments, the central (federal) government attempted to redraft land acquisition 
policy, eventually enacting a new law in 2013. This legal anthropological study of land and resource 
conflicts over “growth infrastructures” and urbanization in India examines the emergent Indian 
jurisprudence around land and resources; the policy genesis and evolution of Indian SEZs; the 
growth of India’s real estate economy; and successful peasant and citizens’ resistance to 
“infrastructure” and urbanization policies in Goa. Using ethnographic and archival research, it 
contributes to anthropological studies of law as process, and law contextualized in its broader social 
setting. It locates conflicts over land and resources challenging “state sovereignty” and capital 
accumulation at the center of India’s economic growth story. It analyzes contemporary processes of 
capital accumulation, relationships with land and resources, social movements, and negotiations of 
“citizenship” and “the state” refashioning the “rule of law” in India’s liberal democracy. It concludes 
that  India’s   growth  is  unfolding   with  recurrent  conditions  of   “impasse”   and   resistance. 
Contradictory policy and legal provisions, interests within the state, and oppositional social alliances 
have reopened a fundamental historical impasse over relationships with land and resources that 
underlines how critical access to land and resources are to a large number of people. It argues for a 
legal framework for land- and resource-use that is locally determined, egalitarian and ecologically 










A new government is in power in India from May 2014. With discontent high over living standards 
and several high-level corruption scandals that rocked the previous center-right Congress Party-led 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, the Hindu-right Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP)-led 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has secured a 62 percent majority in the Lower house of the 
Parliament. For the first time in 30 years, a single political party, the BJP, has won over 50 percent of 
Parliamentary seats. Despite a 39 percent overall vote share, the newly formed NDA government 
wields considerable mandate. 
The new Prime Minister (PM) of India, Narendra Modi, is projected by his supporters as 
“clean” (corruption-free) and pro-business, and by his critics as authoritarian and intolerant of 
dissent. He is particularly controversial because of the anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002, and 
is accused of abetting and overseeing the mass murder of about 2000 Muslims in 2002 as Chief 
Minister of the state.1 Modi enjoys the support of major Indian business houses which have received 
favorable treatment in Gujarat state, where he was Chief Minister for nearly 14 years before his 
elevation as Prime Minister. Many Indian capitalists publicly endorsed him as an ideal Prime 
Ministerial candidate from 2010, when some major controversies implicating the UPA government 
and high-profile Indian businesses struck national headlines (such as the Commonwealth Games and 
Radiagate scams; see Varadarajan 2014). Indian business tycoons like the Ambani brothers were 
special invitees for his swearing-in. His public relations firm curated a Presidential-style election 
campaign highlighting his personality and oratorical skills over and above his Party, the BJP. Private 




1 For this, he was denied a US visa in 2005 and has been unable to enter the US since. He is scheduled to make his first 
official trip to the US in September 2014 and the US administration is said to be keen to make amends for lost time. In a 
recent interview to a prominent Indian English news channel, NDTV, previous US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 








(presumably sponsored by his capitalist supporters) carried his message widely. The cadres of the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Patriots Organization) also threw themselves into his 
campaign nationally, invoking Hindutva (Hindu supremacist nationalist ideology) to garner Hindu 
votes. PM Modi is himself an ex-RSS mukhya pracharak (chief full-time worker and campaigner); the 
RSS assigned him to the BJP in the early 1980s. 
As the Hindu-right and capital ascend under Modi, Muslims, so-called “anti-development” 
activists and organizations, and those opposing religious violence and hatred are already being 
targeted. I highlight some immediate incidents below to signal the potent mix of capitalist and 
Hindu supremacist ideology consolidating under the Modi-led NDA. 
On June 3rd, a 24 year old IT professional, Mohsin Sadiq Shaikh, was bludgeoned to death by 
 
30 activists of the Hindu Rashtra Sena (Hindu National Army) in Poona city because he sported a 
“Muslim” beard (the general stereotype is a long and pointed beard). The immediate provocation 
had been some Facebook posts that put up “derogatory” pictures of a Hindu iconic warrior from 
the region, Shivaji. The murdered Muslim youth had nothing to do with the posts and was merely 
heading home after work. Such random (and organized) acts of religion-based violence have 
historically served to foment religion-based hatred and polarize people along religious sectarian lines 
in India. 
Next, on June 9, an Intelligence Bureau report to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) was 
“leaked” to the media, naming “foreign-funded” Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as 
Greenpeace, “a threat to national economic security” and blaming them for derailing “economic 
growth” to the tune of three to four percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The 
“leak” was unusual. Regardless of whether it is acted upon, the “leak” is a message regarding what 







movements and organizations, of which there are many, challenging the paradigm of “economic 
growth” currently underway. 
In another far-reaching development on June 12, the Narmada Control Authority headed by 
the Secretary to the Union Ministry of Water Resources, sanctioned the raising of the height of the 
Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River in Gujarat from 121.92 meters to 138.68 meters. This 
will submerge a few thousand hectares of land and displace an additional 250,000 indigenous people, 
peasants and other rural residents along the Narmada valley in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and 
Maharashtra states. By law, a decision to raise the height of the dam can only be taken once the 
rehabilitation of those already and those anticipated to be displaced is complete. Several thousand 
previous dam “oustees” are still awaiting rehabilitation. This move seems a retaliatory blow to the 
Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save Narmada Campaign) that has opposed the construction of the 
Sardar Sarovar Dam in Gujarat for over 25 years. 
On June 26, ex-Solicitor General of India, Gopal Subramaniam, withdrew his nomination 
for appointment as Supreme Court Justice and publicly slammed the government for slandering his 
reputation. He claimed that the new government was trying to “rake up dirt on him,” and indirectly 
prevent his appointment. News items in national dailies in the days preceding his withdrawal had 
“leaked”  details  regarding  Subramaniam’s  nomination,  alleging  “controversial links”  during  his 
tenure. As Solicitor General, Subramaniam had taken a principled stand barring Modi’s henchman 
Amit Shah from entering Gujarat, following the latter’s implication in the “false encounter killings” 
(by the police) of two Muslim unarmed youth from the state, after terming them “terrorists.” Shah 
was prevented from entering the state so he would not influence the legal proceedings of the case 
that is under investigation. Shah has reportedly been Modi’s closest aide going back over a decade 
and was his key campaign strategist in the 2014 elections. He is credited with the critical BJP victory 







incidentally saw a series of brutal episodes of religious violence targeting Muslims). On July 9, Shah 
was elected the BJP national party president, consolidating Modi’s power within the party. 
Top Commerce Ministry bureaucrats have of late been reportedly requesting changes in the 
recent land acquisition and tax laws enacted by the Congress-led UPA government to ease the woes 
of business and “build confidence in the market,” including revisions to consent and compensation 
provisions of the recently enacted land acquisition law. The representatives of the ruling NDA 
coalition, industry representatives and pro-business media have regularly claimed in media 
interactions that the Congress-led UPA, in power for a decade, brought the Indian government to 
“policy  paralysis.”  Their  discontent  is  rooted  in  the  corruption  scandals  implicating  several 
businesses in the UPA years and some progressive legislative gains made by left party-social 
movement coalitions with the UPA’s nod to “inclusive growth” (rights to information, rural 
employment guarantee, food security, forest dwellers rights and provisions of the new land 
acquisition act). The NDA may not immediately risk paring down these measures, but its large 
electoral mandate and configuration of support enables it to further capitalist agendas with greater 
intensity. Disregard to dissent is implicit in the rhetoric of “policy paralysis.” 
In his national address on Independence Day (August 15) 2014, PM Modi announced the 
end of the Planning Commission of India, marking the end of an “epoch,” arguably long defunct. 
“Minimum Government Maximum Governance” is the slogan that PM Modi promoted in his 
election  campaign  and  the  axing  of  the  Planning  Commission  is  an  immediate  instance  of 
minimizing government. “Speed, Skill and Scale” with the “growth infrastructures” to facilitate 
them, and  “Dedication, Discipline  and  Development” in  the  mold  of  Hindu  nationalism,  are 
mantras of the NDA. 
Modi  has  historically  dealt  with  contestations  in  Gujarat  with  authoritarianism  and 







Jaffrelot 2012 for an analysis of the “saffronization” of state apparatuses in Gujarat). The Hindu- 
right has historically alternated violent religious majoritarianism (Muslims are about 13 percent of 
the  Indian  population)  and  nationalist  jingoism  with  Pakistan  to  foment  Hindu  supremacist 
ideology. Indeed, a series of “cease-fire violations” along the Indo-Pak border allegedly by Pakistan 
in August have recently escalated into diplomatic belligerence between the two countries. 
Fractured electoral results for previous right-wing governments have significantly staggered 
the course of economic liberalization and allowed for some gains for the left in India. While this 
study reflects developments that unfolded under the previous government, the current government 
is unrestrained by the messiness of coalition politics, and is far more coherently organized with a 
historic mandate and powerful reach. As “the great transformation” of India is now enacted in 
Hindutva’s saffron hue, and the drama of its violence unfolds, resolutions to recurring conditions of 
impasse and resistance that this study documents could in time assume authoritarian, even fascist 
character (see also Desai 2014). Corruption, coalition politics and a fundamentally divided policy and 
political orientation under the UPA have created the political opening for the Modi-led NDA 
government and the peculiar convergence of authoritarian capitalist and Hindu-nationalist ideology 
it represents. This study is in the spirit of contributing towards strengthening very different 
trajectories of “development” based on locally determined, egalitarian and ecologically appropriate 
relationships with land and resources, mindful of the challenges that pursuing such trajectories could 
entail in the time to come. 










A doctoral dissertation is as much a collective process as it is the fruit of individual labor, although 
its character obscures the collective efforts that go into making it possible. When I started toying 
with the idea of applying to doctoral programs in mid-2006, I knew I had to overcome tremendous 
internal and collective resistance as a social movement activist surrounded by the sometimes healthy 
and  other  times overly skeptical proclivity  in  Indian  social movements, bordering  on  disdain, 
towards academics who “abandon politics for the easy life of abstraction.” Thanks to Jean Dreze, 
Usha Ramanathan, S. Muralidhar and Philippe Cullet for early inspiration; to Jean for unsuspectingly 
posing the critical question at a critical time; to Murali for warning against “pull-back to comfortable 
stasis” as I inched forward; and especially to Usha for the unfailing “You are coming back.” Ali Mir, 
Biju Mathew, Reinhard Bernbeck, Mahua Sarkar and Jason Lapham held out helping hands at critical 
points as I plunged into US academia. Biju Mathew hosted my transition and oversaw my initiation 
into diaspora activism in New York, which became an important avenue for my political 
engagements in the New York years. 
The initial months felt stormy and I struggled with my new avatar as a graduate student after 
some years of work as a rural activist in India. Despite my middle-class background that should have 
prepared me for consumerist display, but perhaps because of my activist background, I felt a rage 
each time I walked along 34th  Street to reach the CUNY Graduate Center, passing all the massive 
apparel stores along the way. I had turned some labels and seen the names of the Southern countries 
where the products on display were made. In the dramatic simplification that is the wont of such 
states (in my case amplified by my social distance from my immediate setting), I thought, more than 
once, “this is what they want our people to do, produce their clothes and shoes.” In those days I 
read Marx’s Capital Volume I directly for the first time in David Harvey’s course. I can still recall a 







David in class. In those days of rage, the two hours of Capital weekly were like a music concert 
(think deeply evocative Hindustani classical or semi-classical folk and Sufi free park concerts). 
Thanks to David Harvey for teaching with grace and letting me do my own thing, but always 
“hovering in the background” when needed. Thanks also to Donald Robotham for what I perceived 
as immediate Southern solidarity and ease, clarifying animated discussions and unstinting support, 
advice and guidance through the years. As I prepared for my second exam, I had two vivid dreams 
in succession, one in which David and Don were chatting at a table as I gently fell asleep; and 
another in which I had swum deep into the sea and as I made my way back, was pulled to the shore 
by David and Don; my sincere thanks to both for being there, willy nilly. I read Peasants Against 
Globalization (Edelman 1999) as a MA student in anthropology in 2000 and was immediately inspired 
by its empathy, engagement and integrity. As I made my transition to academia, I hoped to emulate 
that spirit of engagement. Thanks to Marc Edelman for inspiration, insights and guidance through 
the doctoral years. I encountered Jeff Maskovsky late in my doctoral process and was inspired by his 
fresh and sharp insights into developing the potential insights of my work; thanks to him for 
consistent and valuable support in the writing process. Thanks also to Philippe Cullet, my external 
reader, for reading and commenting on chapter and dissertation drafts, and for especially sharing 
valuable legal and policy insights. 
My dissertation fieldwork was supported by the National Science Foundation and the 
Wenner-Gren Foundation. The Land Deal Politics Initiative also partially supported fieldwork in 
Goa. As I made my way through state bureaucracy and industry representatives during fieldwork in 
Delhi I was greatly aided by affiliations with the Center for Policy at the Indian Institute of 
Management (IIM), Bangalore and by the Institute of Economic Growth (IEG), Delhi University. 
Thanks to Professors Rajeev Gowda and Trilochan Shastri of IIM and Professors Bina Agarwal and 







make crucial initial connections with bureaucrats and SEZ developers. The Tata Institute of Social 
Sciences (TISS) in Mumbai has always been an institutional home and special thanks are due to the 
Director Professor S. Parasuraman, my earliest mentor, and the Assistant Registrar Roja Pillai for 
making TISS and its various resources and facilities so accessible to me. 
In Delhi, Neetu Bawa and her family generously sustained me through fieldwork travails 
with their care, affection and time. Thanks are also due to Philippe Cullet and Zain Bhana for 
making a “home” that a woman on her own in Delhi could safely escape into (and that is high 
praise). In Mumbai, Simpreet Singh, brother-in-struggle, sustained me. The support of Soumya Sen 
and his family were on more than one occasion a welcome reprieve. My fieldwork in Goa would not 
have been possible without the gracious support and invaluable advice of Pravin Sabnis, Albertina 
Almeida, Franky Monteiro, Charles Fernandes, Agnel and Maria (“Emy”) Fernandes, Peter and 
Luizinha Gama, Swati Kerkar, Ramkrishna Zalmi and Solano Da Silva. Special thanks to Albertina 
Almeida for her generosity with time, effort and care as I struggled to make sense of my fieldwork 
settings and informants. Usha Ramanathan, Albertina Almeida, K.B. Saxena, Sudhir Krishnaswamy 
and several legal experts I consulted were especially helpful in my struggles with Indian laws and 
judgments. Many others in Goa, Mumbai and Delhi also generously gave me their time and shared 
precious insights and experiences. 
Writing support was provided by the Center for Humanities Andrew Mellon Dissertation 
Fellowship, the  Writing  Across  the  Curriculum At-large Fellowship and  the  Center for  Place, 
Culture and Politics Dissertation Fellowship. The two dissertation fellowships involved weekly 
multi-disciplinary seminars that offered valuable insights, helped clarify and articulate my ideas, and 
strengthened my writing. My dissertation group helped rescue protagonists’ voices from drowning in 
empirical details and helped strengthen my own voice as I struggled to make sense of my material. 







Maggie Dickinson, Nazia Kazi, Risa Cromer and Michael Polson for detailed scrutiny and feedback. 
 
Over the years I have come to greatly appreciate my fellow students at the CUNY Graduate 
Center (and some from other graduate schools in New York) for easy solidarity and friendly 
support. Special thanks to Sahar Sadjadi, Saygun Gokariksel, Manissa Mcleave Maharawal, Ana 
Vinea, Zoltan Gluck, Ahilan Kadirgamar, Andrés León, Sophie Statzel, Mariya Radeva and Hiroyuki 
Shibata for sharing comradely highs and lows over food, drink, films and other “cultural” forays, 
panel discussions and public protests. The Graduate Center Marxist Reading Group and the Anti- 
Capitalist Strategies Reading Group were excellent havens for wide politically engaged readings and 
discussions. Thanks to organizers of both groups, Mark Drury and Saygun Gokariksel for the 
former and Zoltan Gluck for the latter, for inviting me into these enriching collective spaces. 
Outside of the graduate student setting, Vinod Menon and Svati Shah helped at important junctures 
of the doctoral process. 
To my parents, quick to support when needed who I suspect are rather bewildered with my 
choices but graciously let me be, and to all my comrades and friends who inspire and sustain me, I 
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Land and resources are once again at the center of accumulation strategies for capital globally.2 
 
Agribusiness corporations, food insecure governments (often as they lose their own farmlands to 
industrial development) and global finance are brokering land deals in fertile land for agricultural 
production, notably in sub-Saharan Africa.3  Structural adjustment, privatization and bilateral trade 
agreements are facilitating investments in land and fueling large-scale dispossession.4  Within so- 
called “emerging” economies however, “land-grabs”5  by (largely though not only) domestic capital 
for “industry, infrastructure and urbanization,” facilitated by policy, form dominant “economic 
growth” strategies. These have received inadequate attention in the discussion on contemporary 
“land-grabs.”6 
In India, concerted policy emphasis aiding accumulation is exemplified in the new land 
acquisition law7  that deems investments in industry, infrastructure and urbanization “public 
purpose,”8  facilitating forcible acquisition of land and resources for them. A slew of measures like 
the  National  Manufacturing  Policy  2011,  Public  Private  Partnerships  Policy  2011,  Petroleum 
Chemical and Petrochemical Investment Regions 2007 and the SEZ Act 2005 undergird these 
 
 
2 See Kameri-Mbote 2004; Grain 2008; White et al. 2012; Margulis et al. 2013; Borras et al. 2013. 
3 See UNEP 2011; Deininger and Byerlee 2011. 
4  See White et al. 2012; Borras et al. 2013. Indian agribusiness too has been investing in food production through 
bilateral agreements. Land Matrix data show that 1,289,000 hectares have been acquired in 39 deals by Indian companies 
for agriculture in Africa and Asia (Rebello 2013; Grain 2008). 
5 White et al. (2012) describe “land-grabs” as the large-scale acquisition of land or land-related rights and resources by 
corporate (business, non-profit including pension funds, or public) entities. They highlight the “dispossession of land, 
water, forests and other common property resources; their concentration, privatization and transaction as corporate 
(owned or leased) property; and in turn the transformation of agrarian labour regimes” (ibid: 620) generated by “land - 
grabs.” Subsequent conceptual refinement has led some to describe “land-grabs” as only those land deals that are 
executed through “extra-economic force” (see Borras and Franco 2013; Levien 2012; also Hall 2013 for an overview). 
My preference here is to go along with Adnan (2013) in contextualizing “land-grabs” within “capitalist-facilitating 
accumulation,” that encompasses broader forces facilitating dispossession (see explanation below). I find the distinction 
between “extra-economic” and “economic” coercion unhelpful in the processes I describe and prefer to think of 
“coercion” as the political aspect in political economy that may be deployed by “the state” or “the market.” The 
distinction between extra-economic and economic coercion then emerges from a forced distinction between the “the 
state” and “the market” that under conditions of capitalism is only heuristic. 
6 For exceptions see Walker 2006; Levien 2012 and Sampat 2013a. 
7 The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 
was enacted in September 2013. 
8  Pubic purpose is generally defined as any purpose leading to the general benefit of the public and is a narrower 







emphases. Other Market Led Agrarian Reforms (Borras and Franco 2010) like the Land Titling Bill 
 
2013 additionally promote regularization of land holdings to facilitate market transactions (Sampat 
 
2013b). The scale of the appropriation of land and resources for “economic growth” ranges from a 
few hundred or thousand acres for Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to over 60,000 acres for 
investment regions of growth corridors (comprising multiple projects for industry, infrastructure and 
urbanization). While the individual scale of these projects is relatively small compared to global land 
deals elsewhere (see UNEP 2011 for some figures), their scale of dispossession of people and 
livelihoods is significant. On aggregate, these projects also amount to a massive transfer of land and 
resources to capital. Official data thus reveal that from 2007-11, the area of cultivable land in India 
has shrunk by 790,000 hectares, largely attributed to diversion for non-agricultural purposes like 
construction, industries and other “development” activities (Mohan 2013).9 Transfer of land and 
resources by force or market transactions towards industry, infrastructure and urbanization, with 
conflicts over such transfer, have consequently seen phenomenal rise in recent years (see Banerjee- 
Guha 2008; Levien 2012; Podur 2013; Chakravorty 2013; Sampat 2013b). 
Dispossession has historically been resisted in India, but the SEZ model introduced in 2005 
marks a turning point. Many SEZs set forth a wave of conflicts over land and resources across the 
country, sundering alliances between “the state” and capital, creating divisions within the state, 




9 A recent federal Committee on Land Reforms has decried growing corporate investment in indigenous areas “as the 
biggest land grab of tribal lands since Columbus” (GoI 2009a). 
10 While peasants includes rich farmers, my use of the term “peasants’ groups” specifically refers to small and marginal 
land-owning farmers with less than ten and two acres of land respectively, landless agrarian workers, pastoralists, 
fisherfolk, forest dwellers and other petty commodity producers. Peasants are also further stratified along ethnicity, 
religion, caste and gender lines. Indigenous and dalit (previously so-called untouchable) communities and religious 
minorities, particularly Muslims, as well as other backward castes (OBC) among Hindus, and gender variations among 
these groups, form critical axes of social inequality in India. Where necessary to distinguish, I use the term big farmers to 
refer to the rich peasantry. 
11 “Citizens’ groups” here refer to coalitions of individuals, often concerned professionals and representatives of Non- 
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that coalesce around contentious issues. They are not NGOs in themselves, as 
they often do not take institutional funds or salaries or run projects, but groups of concerned people working voluntarily 






“rule of law” through revisions and reversals. As we discover below, the recurring conditions of 
“impasse” that these conflicts have generated continue to emerge along other infrastructure and 
urbanization projects. Their recurrence opens possibilities for political and legal resolutions to the 
conflict  over  land  and  resources.  Such  resolutions  can  take  the  form  of  repression  under 




“The Life of the Law”12 
 
 
This project was conceived as an ethnographic and archival study of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) in India. From their inception under the SEZ Act 2005, Indian SEZs have generated 
immense controversy over land and resource acquisition. Largely promoted by Indian capital (that is 
also increasingly transnational), SEZs have pitted capitalists and their allied interests within the 
Indian state against peasants and citizens groups (see note five above) resisting dispossession and the 
takeover of lands and resources. When I began my research in the wake of the SEZ controversies, 
the questions that interested me included: the processes and actors involved in the legal genesis and 
evolution of the SEZ Act 2005; the role of domestic capital in the institution of Indian SEZs; the 
evolving  jurisprudence  around  land  and  resource  rights  and  SEZs;  their  implications  for 
relationships with land and resources; the successful resistance to SEZs in Goa (with a synoptic 
study of successful resistance in Raigad in Maharasthra that was dropped after preliminary research); 
and the implications of such resistance for the relationship between the Indian state and capital, 
citizenship and democracy, and contemporary capitalist accumulation in India. Through my 
investigations in these various settings around SEZ infrastructures, my intention was to analyze their 




12  “The Life of the Law” is the title of a book by Laura Nader (2002) discussing the historical development of legal 






Over the course of research and writing, my questions broadened into an inquiry of two 
critical interventions in India’s “economic growth”13  and their implications for relationships with 
land and resources14—growth infrastructures, and urbanization projects. Growth infrastructures 
include SEZ enclaves and growth corridors like the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). 
Urbanization projects create new or renew existing urban areas that are “smart,” “world-class” or 
“global” through the confluence of urbanization policy and real estate transactions and are fueling a 
gradually consolidating Real Estate Economy (REE; see chapter five). Several of these urbanization 
projects are within SEZs and growth corridors, which also explains investments in these growth 
infrastructures by real estate developers. 
These investments are aimed at transforming the predominantly rural agrarian Indian 
economy into an advanced capitalist one. In policy-speak, policy and legal interventions facilitate 
these investments to free land and resources for their best uses, improve the countryside and 
unleash India’s economic growth, eventually integrating the country’s economy more fully with the 
global economy. The dispossessed population, if acknowledged, and the already poor, will then 
(presumably) be efficiently absorbed into the employment generated by these investments. Growth 
will continue ad infinitum. 
Manufacturing and industrialization are low on the radar of capital in India however; 
manufacturing has stagnated over two decades of reforms as investments are overwhelmingly 
directed towards service, extractive, “infrastructure” and  real  estate sectors. In  the absence of 




13  Official accounts of “economic growth” measure it specifically in terms of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). 
14 By “relationships with land and resources” I refer to relationships around (in ownership and use entitlement) and to 
(in actual uses they are put to) land and resources (cf. Escobar 2008). 
15  Hirschman defines “linkage effects” as “investment-generating forces that are set in motion, through input-output 
relations, when productive facilities that supply inputs to that line of utilize its outputs are inadequate or nonexistent. 
Backward linkages lead to new investment in input-supplying facilities and forward linkages to investment in output- 






infrastructures and urbanization are unlikely to lead to productive linkages. Instead, they assume the 
form of “plunder” of land and resources aided by “rule of law” (Mattei and Nader 2008), generating 
classic “primitive accumulation” (Marx 1990) and/ or “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 
2005),  the  simultaneous  contemporary  existence  of  which  Adnan  (2013)  terms  “capitalism- 
facilitating accumulation.”16 
These dispossessions are intensely and widely contested, and underline that access to land 
and resources are critical to the survival and interests of a large number of people. Big farmers 
(owning 10 hectares of land and above) are arguably better positioned to transition in the changing 
landscape (Magarpatta City near Poona in Maharasthra state is a case in point),17 and recent demands 
for higher compensation for land acquisition have come predominantly from the rich northern 
“green revolution” agrarian belt. It is the small peasants that bear the worst brunt of dispossession, 
who do not want to give up land and resources, risking lives fighting for them (for instance violence 
in Nandigram in West Bengal against the Indonesian owned SALEM SEZ or in the controversial 
South Korean-owned POSCO SEZ area in Odisha has resulted in the killings of several people 
resisting dispossession but has not suppressed the resistance). The dispossession of small peasants 
already living under conditions of formal subsumption18 is not only about their real subsumption. In 
its indifference to dispossessed populations, “capitalism-facilitating accumulation”  for growth threatens to render 








16   Adnan  (2013)  offers  this  as  a  generic  concept  for  transnational,  domestic  and  local  processes  of  primitive 
accumulation and accumulation by dispossession, distinguished as distinct phases that often coexist in different regions 
of the global South, through direct and indirect mechanisms and institutions. 
17 Magarpatta City is a new township with mixed residential and commercial real estate on the outskirts of Poona city in 
Maharashtra. Over 120 big farmers from the area pooled together 400 acres of land to create their own cooperative 
urban township, replete with an IT SEZ. Small peasants and other rural residents dependent on the lands were 
dispossessed of their homes and livelihoods as a result of this transformation. The farmer’s cooperative now undertakes 
the development of similar township projects elsewhere in the country (see http://www.magarpattacity.com/). 






Peasants are thus creating a non-negotiating “counterpolitics” 19  (Smith 2011) with respect to land 
and resource rights and generating conditions of impasse for economic growth. 
In India they are critically joined by citizens’ groups threatened with immiseration, some at 
risk of losing a measure of landed security and others concerned about growing inequalities, local 
resource and infrastructure burdens and environmental protections. Such groups comprising allied 
middle-class professional residents in project areas (see note five above) provide necessary skills and 
resources  (such  as  accessing  critical  information,  creating  campaign  materials  or  contributing 
financial resources) to wage campaigns and legal battles. Cutting across class, caste, ethnicity, gender and 
religion, these alliances between peasants’ and citizens’ groups defy their categorization as the “environmentalism of the 
poor” (cf. Martinez-Alier 2002; see also Baviskar 2005). The role of information emerges critical in 
catalyzing resistance, forging alliances, and challenging “legality” and “state sovereignty.” 
“The state” (at the center, in the states and across parties) is compelled to respond with 
reversals to prevent major electoral fallouts (the case of West Bengal is particularly relevant here 
given that the fallout of agitations over land acquisition led to the ouster of the Communist Party of 
India [Marxist] after nearly 35 years of rule), and is constantly revising the legal frameworks of these 
infrastructures. The revisions notwithstanding, it is the unwillingness of peasants and citizens groups 
to give up land and resources, irrespective of the forms that growth infrastructures take (land 
acquisition is equally fiercely resisted in the industrial corridor areas in Gujarat and Maharashtra), 
that is at the heart of these conflicts. Despite the rule of law skewed in favor of capital, there is 
pitched resistance on the legal front as well. Ongoing conflicts over land and resources are creating 
radical assertions over state sovereignty and challenging the state’s power to determine “public 
purpose.” Legality, or “rule of law” is unsettled, and social alliances across classes and communities are opening 
possibilities for fundamental “reconstitution from below” (cf. Barker et al. 2013). 
 
 
19  Smith (2011) argues that the growing impoverishment of people confronted with capitalist growth is creating an 






While the scope of this work has widened from an inquiry about SEZ infrastructures, the 
study at the same time contextualizes SEZs in their broader social context. To the extent that it 
offers a lens to apprehend India’s growth story, the dissertation indicates next steps for a larger 
project, with deeper theoretical and historical treatment. To the extent that it captures the broad 
social context of SEZ infrastructures and their implications for dispossession, resistance and rights 
to land and resources, the dissertation contributes to studies of “law as process” (Nader 1969a; 
Gluckman 1969; Bohannon 1969; Moore 1978). The social field of this study covers the complex, 
inter-related and often overlapping but heuristically distinct domains of the state; capital; and 
resistance in India.20 Its scale ranges from national policy-making arenas; transnational and domestic 
capital; and rururban21 social movements contesting dispossession, with SEZs and their implications 
for relationships around and to land and resources as the central (though not the only) theme. 
Anthropological studies of disputes to discover the rules that maintain order (Radcliffe- 
Brown 1933) developed and underwent significant revision with the study of disputing processes 
and  the  political  and  economic  interests  of  litigants  (see  Nader  1969a;  2002).  Keeping  the 
importance of “the disputant” in view in the broader context of policy, my study identifies three 
broad sets of protagonists in the struggles over land and resources around growth infrastructure and 
urbanization  projects;  although  each  of  these  sets  of  protagonists  have  considerable  internal 
variation. 
One is the domestic and transnational capitalists (many also of Indian origin) who seek 
greater access to land and resources for investment, extraction or rent. This group includes SEZs 




20 These are heuristic distinctions made for ease of analysis. As will be evident from the chapters, these “domains” and 
the research materials, actors, processes, and/ or institutions they each refer to (explained in the next section), intersect 
and overlap, not least in the chapters themselves. 
21 Rururban here indicates both a mix of rural and urban settings, as well as those rural settings, like in Goa, that have 
urbanized amenities not common to many Indian rural areas, like better power and water supply, and transport and 






national and transnational scales. While the role of foreign-origin capital is certainly important, and 
global genealogies shape growth models, my dissertation emphasizes the centrality of domestic 
capital in these processes; investments in zones, corridors and urbanization emerge as a critical “spatial fix” (cf. 
Harvey 2001) for the growth of Indian capital, and as corollary, the growth of the Indian economy. 
Another set is the politicians and bureaucrats occupying different roles within the central 
(federal) and state governments who often facilitate land transfers to capital, making money from 
such deals for themselves, their political parties, or for state revenue through corrupt or otherwise 
biased deals. This also includes interests within the state, like officials of the Finance Ministry that as 
we discover below, resist certain growth infrastructure models out of differing conceptions of the 
role of the state, desirable infrastructures and visions of “inclusive growth.” “The state” appears 
here less as a “cunning” protagonist (cf. Randeria 2003), or “vertical and encompassing spatiality of 
power” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), or (more specifically) as a “speculative” (Goldman 2011) or 
“land-broker” state (Levien 2012); “the state” emerges instead as an arena rife with competing ideologies and 
interests, in turn shaped by historical legacies and immediate contingencies. 
The third are the growing alliances of peasants and citizens groups asserting control over 
land and resources to prevent their take-over by the state and/ or capitalists. The latter are typically 
not part of policy-making arenas, but through their struggles have come to influence policy and 
collectively articulate very different development needs. That peasants and allied professionals, 
despite their different class positions and the variations between them are consistently challenging 
the  institution  of  growth  infrastructures  and  urbanization  in  alliance,  signals  the  scale  of 
dispossession (see also discussion of resistance in chapters five and six); it also opens interesting 
questions for the resolution of recurring conditions of impasse their struggles have generated. 
The struggles between—and sometimes among (particularly in the case of state 






and resources are at the same time contests over livelihoods, the scale of policy interventions, and 
processes of policy-making. The disputants in this story may not articulate explicitly “anti-capitalist” 
politics, but that also does not take away from their discerning critique of capitalist growth processes 
underway in India. Anthropological studies have shown that legal orders incorporate inequality and 
law is not neutral; that conflict, and not consensus, is an enduring aspect of any legal order (Starr 
and Collier 1989; Nash 1989; Collier 1989; Vincent 1989). As a study of SEZ policy, and of 
economic growth policy interventions, the dissertation contributes to historically informed analyses 
of power relations in the study of legal systems that use political economic analysis to show power 
struggles  and  conflict  between  and  among  different  classes.  As  a  specific  model  of  the 
infrastructures of growth, I treat the SEZ Act 2005 as a dynamic “force field” (Foucault 1990) that 
relies upon several interests (particularly the bureaucracy, the political establishment and capital) 
coming together in its enactment; and contesting its implementation (largely but not exclusively, 
peasants and citizens groups). SEZs thus reveal the contested trajectory of liberalization in India—a 
dynamic interplay of forces in an ongoing contest of power. 
In the legal framework of SEZs, tax, duty, environment and labor concessions (see chapter 
three)  along  with  land  and  resources  appropriated  for  them  appear  to  represent  “spaces  of 
exception” (cf. Ong 2006). However, in the comprehensive inclusion of economic activities 
(manufacturing, services, agriculture and mining) of SEZs and their approvals without any limits on 
numbers and sizes, in other words in their scale and scope, and the broader field of policy 
contextualizing them, SEZs represent a normative model of “development,” that post-liberalization is increasingly 
conflated with economic growth. 
The “juridical” (self-restraining; as when the state restrains itself from forcibly acquiring land 
in the face of opposition) and “cognitive” (deliberative; as the law gets reinterpreted and altered in 






and Nader 2008) are important in the existing political framework.22 Contestation on the ground by 
peasant and citizens groups has led to significant “stalemates,” changes and reversals in the 
implementation of the SEZ Act 2005, the implementation of other growth infrastructures like the 
DMIC or provisions of the new land acquisition law. In the balance of ongoing struggles against 
dispossession, these are small but important legal “concessions” to dissent. 
In a recent volume, Corbridge et al. (2011) discuss three critical transformations in India’s 
political economy since the 1980s: the institution of liberal economic reforms; the rise of the Hindu 
right; and the popular democratic mobilizations of the historically subordinate classes. Taken 
together, these phenomena amount to “a great transformation” in the Indian economy, referencing 
Polanyi’s (2001) “double movement,” as “the attempt to create a market-oriented society from 
above compels a movement from below to moderate its severely dislocating effects” (Corbridge et 
al. 2011: 2). As interests within the Indian state allied with transnational and domestic capital attempt 
to effect policies for greater economic growth, there is significant resistance from below. Conditions of 
impasse and resistance are becoming a central leitmotif of India’s “economic growth.” 
The recurrent conditions of impasse point to possibilities for “locally determined egalitarian 
and ecologically appropriate rights to land- and resource-use.” Legal frameworks in themselves 
guarantee little, and require powerful social forces that can effect fundamental “reconstitution from 
below.” Such reconstitution can only emerge from struggle; a framework for “locally determined 
egalitarian  and  ecologically  appropriate  rights to  land-  and  resource-use” then,  can  potentially 
become a worthwhile tool in the dialectical counter to dispossession from economic growth. My 




22 These rule of law questions exercised Frankfurt School legal theorists Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann as they 
countered Carl Schmitt’s political and legal theory. Concerned with the place of ethics in law, Kirchheimer argued that 
the Weimar’s collapse was not inevitable as Schmitt maintained, because its positivist “jurists were afraid to distinguish 
between ‘friends and foes,’” but because administrative and judicial actors in Weimar hostile to democracy 











The rest of the chapters are organized as follows. Chapter one begins with a broad historical account 
of the political economic transformations in India since independence influencing the current 
conjuncture. It then highlights some key historical developments in Goa that have bearing on the 
successful resistance to urbanization (understood here in relation to real estate development) and 
SEZ policies. The last section then traces the global genealogies of zone and corridor infrastructures 
and their relation to economic growth. 
Chapter two analyzes the colonial doctrine of “eminent domain” (the sovereign power of the 
state to forcibly acquire land for “public purpose”) in relation with land and resource policies in 
India, and the complicated questions of sovereignty embedded in it. Eminent domain is consistently 
used to “overproduce” state sovereignty over “citizens” arbitrarily (see Ramanathan 2010). Its dual 
nature, as an instrument for facilitating capitalist accumulation, or as an instrument for redistributive 
justice, constitutes grounds for dilemma. The trajectories of the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) 1894 
and land reforms legislation in the post independence period in India capture this dilemma. Existing 
legal provisions for decentralized local development planning that foreground community and 
individual rights challenge the application of the doctrine, or pose significant limits to it. Judicial 
interventions  over  the  application  of  eminent  domain  have  challenged  the  procedure  and 
applicability of “public purpose” in development projects, but have not gone so far as to scrutinize 
the doctrine itself. An expanded scope of the doctrine then, engenders “economic growth” and 
dispossession by invoking “state sovereignty.” 
Chapter three traces the evolution and critiques the provisions of the SEZ Act 2005 and the 
 
2013 Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and 
 






against the Mumbai SEZ in Maharashtra (that influenced the provisions of both laws), it then 
emphasizes the perspective of the “stake-losers” (Iyer 2007) of these laws. 
Chapter four is termed the “domain of ‘the state,’” by which I refer to specific bureaucratic 
practices and institutions related to SEZ law-making processes. The chapter examines 
“infrastructures of growth” and their policy-making arenas, focusing on SEZs. The SEZ law-making 
process sheds light on the role of allied and opposed interests within the state, in particular the 
significant differences over SEZs between the Ministries of Finance and Commerce. “Soft law”23 
settings around formal ministerial and bureaucratic negotiations significantly impacted the law- 
making process. Shadowing formal and soft law settings, gossip and rumor point to ministerial 
rivalries, bureaucratic turf wars and high-level corruption. These are the settings of the “corridors of 
power.” Other extra-legal settings influencing the law-making process include the struggles of 
peasants and citizens groups resisting SEZs; I juxtapose the skewed power of “stake-holder 
consultations” with “stake-loser repression.” I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the 
“infrastructures of growth,” and some observations on the emergence of DMIC as another “fix” in 
the making. 
Chapter five is termed the “domain of capital” and analyzes capitalist enterprises and their 
processes of consolidation. The chapter maps the growing consolidation of the “Real Estate 
Economy” (REE) in India, as a prime driver of SEZ and industrial corridor infrastructures and an 
intensifying source of accumulation as the Indian economy grows. The REE is largely domestic 
(mainly because foreign investments in real estate are regulated), but its consolidation is seeing the 
emergence of transnational players and the involvement of global finance. The growth of the REE, 
its  connections  with  extractive  industries  (such  as  stone  and  sand  quarries,  or  ground-water 
 
 
23  Zerillo (2010) refers to “soft law” as those non-binding but coercive processes of closed-door consultations and 
recommendations that inevitably come to be enacted as law. While the use of coercion arguably renders these processes 
more appropriately in the realm of “mixed law” or “private governance,” here I use the term soft law to discuss non - 






exploitation), its extreme exploitation of labor and its dependence on monied upper classes, raise 
questions regarding its linkages with productive investments and sustainability. At the same time 
market- and state-led land acquisition for these infrastructures is dispossessing rural populations. I 
discuss in particular the anti-Regional Plan (RP) 2011 agitation in Goa as a specific instance of 
successful resistance to the growing REE in Goa. While historically rooted in the Goan political 
economy, the RP 2011 agitation resonates elsewhere in the country. The anti-RP 2011 agitation 
highlights the need for state backing of decentralization initiatives that the agitation struggled 
towards. 
Chapter six is the “domain of resistance,” by which I refer to specific “repertoires of 
protest” (Tilly 1973) coalescing in the wake of struggles against dispossession in India. The chapter 
focuses on the resistance to SEZs in Goa by a broad alliance of social forces that came together, and 
created an impasse on the ground for SEZs and their developers. This “Goan Impasse” reflects a 
deeper historical impasse over equal rights to land and resources. The anti-SEZ agitation in Goa also 
follows on the heels of other successful environmental agitations in the state. The ongoing nature of 
such conflicts in Goa opens up the questions of locally determined egalitarian, decentralized and 
environmentally appropriate development, and I discuss potential resolutions of the Goan Impasse 
emerging from the anti-SEZ resistance. The resonance of the Goan anti-SEZ agitation with other 
anti-SEZ  or  infrastructure-  and  urbanization-related  agitations  elsewhere  in  the  country  is 
significant, especially in the alliances between peasants and citizens groups, their “repertoires of 
protest” and legal actions. The Goan Impasse poses a critical historical challenge over land and 
resources and points to the necessity of programmatic social movements that can effect fundamental 
“reconstitutions from below.” 
In conclusion, I discuss the widely recurrent impasse over land- and resource-use rights in 
 






appropriate and democratically determined rights to land- and resource-use for all. This requires a 
fundamentally different and differently determined “development” paradigm that pushes back on the 
capitalist offensive, and goes beyond the tenuous compromises of “inclusive growth.” I conclude 
the  dissertation  with  a  preliminary  discussion  of  relevant  constitutional  principles  and  legal 




A Note on Methodology 
 
My research has mapped a diverse terrain, primarily in bureaucratic, corporate and activist settings 
across Delhi, Mumbai and Goa. It has also traversed ethnographic and archival methods. I 
interviewed actors in all of these settings as well as legal experts, journalists, academics and especially 
in the SEZ areas in Goa, peasant and middle-class (mostly professionals) residents in villages. I 
attended bureaucrat-developer conclaves in Delhi and Mumbai and activist meetings in Goa. I began 
my research with mapping developments in the land policy framework. Work for this was largely 
archival, as reflected in the chapters on “eminent domain” and the “bare laws.” I studied Indian legal 
historical developments, case law, and the evolution of land policy and the doctrine of eminent 
domain. I also consulted legal experts, bureaucrats and academics to develop insights into legal 
developments. 
For the SEZ law-making process, I conducted interviews with senior and mid-level 
bureaucrats24 in the Commerce and Finance Ministries and within SEZ administrations directly 
involved in SEZ law-making or implementation processes. While senior bureaucrats shed light on 





24  A senior bureaucrat would typically be any bureaucrat in a ministry (state or central) at a senior secretary or 
department director’s level at state and federal levels, members of the SEZ Board of Approval (BoA) or SEZ 
Commissioners responsible for the jurisdiction of several SEZs across one or more states. A mid-level bureaucrat is 
typically a lower rank official between a clerk and senior bureaucrats, typically with specific departmental functions, such 







decision-making processes. I also interviewed several senior representatives of SEZ developers in 
Delhi and Mumbai.25  I traced archival records within the Ministries and in media and corporate 
archives. Some critical bureaucratic and Ministerial paper trails proved very difficult to access and I 
discuss my travails with them in the chapter on infrastructures. I attended four industry-bureaucrat 
conclaves on SEZs in Delhi and Mumbai and visited three operational SEZs to interview businesses 
operating in SEZs. While my attempts at participant observation were significantly limited by issues 
of access (see section on “the challenges of studying up”), the industry-bureaucrat conclave settings 
helped develop insights regarding “soft law.” I also interviewed academics, journalists and legal 
experts working on SEZ-related issues to gain wider understanding of the SEZ law-making process. 
To understand the developments in real estate, I interviewed several senior representatives 
real estate developers in Goa, Mumbai and Delhi (a few of them were also SEZ developers), 
scrutinized developer business reports, Red Herring Reports,26 and media archives. I interviewed 
activists and residents in Goa opposing real estate development and urbanization policy (in the form 
of the RP 2011) in their villages. Journalists writing on real estate in state and national dailies were 
particularly insightful and pointed to relevant sources and contacts. 
To map the Goan anti-SEZ agitation I spent six months in Goa (it was also in the course of 
this period that I interviewed Goan real estate developers and anti-RP 2011 activists), with several 
weeks each in Kerim and Loutolim villages, key sites of the anti-SEZ agitation in the state. I 
interviewed  activists  from  the  agitation  and  allied  organizations,  local  peasant  and  resident 







25  A senior industry representative would typically be at the Chief Executive Officer or Vice President level of a 
company. 
26 These reports are submitted by public limited companies to the Securities and Exchange Board of India before any 
new public stock issue. Several large real estate developers have public issues and these are available online from the 







priests of the Diocesan Church. The state is relatively small and this enabled access as I could easily 




The Challenges of “Studying Up”27 
 
Through the course of my research and in my various research settings, my focus was (initially) on 
investigating the institution of SEZ infrastructures and the contestations around them. As I 
broadened my investigations to the larger social field of SEZs, and especially as I studied settings of 
power,  my  access  was  uneven  and  checkered.  Interviews  were  often  one-off  “hit  or  miss” 
encounters, where I had to make the best of the time given to me. Some times I was able to carry 
out follow-up interviews, but my attempts to get closer to the settings of power were curtailed partly 
by the unwillingness of my “powerful” interviewees to entertain too many probing or critical 
questions, partly by bureaucratic discretion (I was refused permission to observe SEZ Board of 
Approval  meetings), and  partly  by gendered dynamics (it is difficult to  find opportunities for 
informal social interactions with developers and bureaucrats and at least on a couple of occasions an 
excessive interest in my personal well-being sent me packing after the first interview). Added to this, 
representation of details was curtailed as a lot of my informants “spoke” on condition of anonymity, 
especially if revealing potentially critical insights or information. In attempting to capture the scale of 
institution of SEZ infrastructures and then of “infrastructure” and “urbanization” policy, 
ethnographic intimacy with my informants and the spaces they inhabited was either not possible or 
curtailed (see also my discussion on “corridors of power” in chapter four). 
The only settings that allowed for ethnographic proximity with greater ease were the villages 
in Goa where I studied the anti-SEZ resistance and was perceived as a sympathetic researcher by 
activists and resident communities opposed to SEZs and the RP 2011. However, mine was not a 
 
 
27 In her classic call to anthropologists to “study up,” Nader (1969b) discussed the need to study spaces of privilege and 







village, community or social movement ethnographic project. In the villages, I was interested in the 
specifics of how my informants “spoke to power” and what they could tell me about power. Their 
wider social settings appear as a background in my dissertation. Given the sensitivities around caste 
inequalities that I account for in the chapter on the resistance to SEZs in Goa, I have also not made 
caste backgrounds of my informants in the villages explicit. I have however, provided general 
discussion of these social variations in the following chapter to facilitate a more nuanced 
understanding of the anti-RP 2011 and the anti-SEZ campaigners. What my project could not 
approximate in ethnographic depth, I attempt to make up with the breadth and diversity of sources, 
materials and settings around the institution of growth infrastructures and urbanization projects in 
India and the resistance against them in Goa. 
In researching the project, my fieldwork often took me to areas outside my comfort zone, 
meeting senior bureaucrats and developers. I had to step into a role and “perform,” as the 
opportunities were privileged and I had to make use of them as they arose. Each time I had to make 
that call, I had to overcome internal resistance. For a large part this had to do with the feeling that I 
was deceiving my interviewees and being dishonest, or that I was spying. I observed in mortified 
fascination as my phone contacts shored up numbers of developers and industry representatives 
from Mumbai, Delhi and Goa. Each meeting felt like an encounter and I did a little internal skip and 
grin when I walked away. 
One of the first such encounters drove home to me my own privilege. It was a conclave on 
SEZs organized by the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCHAM) at the five-star Le 
Meridien hotel in July 2011. As I left for the hotel that morning, I felt a fair bit of trepidation at the 
possibility of  being  “caught” as  an  “interloper” or  “outsider” at  the  meeting, although I  had 
registered beforehand, citing my academic credentials and reference letters. I needn’t have worried; 







mostly representatives of SEZ developers and units, and legal and accounting firms. My middle-class 
privilege allowed me to blend in as “a researcher from New York,” and even make some SEZ small 
talk. 
For the record, I never lied by commission regarding my affiliations or positions, and only 
once by evasion. The developers and bureaucrats were simply not interested in my background or 
positions, most assumed “New York” could only mean “agreement,” and were happy to talk, some 
more insightfully, others cagily as my questions probed. I have protected most of their identities. I 
learned in the course of my research that “studying up” is a challenge in ethics and responsibility. It 




Situating the “Researcher from New York” 
 
I began my doctoral program at the Graduate Center CUNY, in the fall of 2007. In November that 
same year, news of violence in Nandigram in West Bengal state over land acquisition for a Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) developed by the Indonesian Salem Group erupted all over the Indian 
media. In March that year 14 people had died in police gunfire while protesting the notification 
(official declaration) of 25,000 acres of land (under the LAA 1894) for the SEZ. Unrest had been 
festering for some while. I followed the news in growing horror (partly amplified by the physical 
distance from activist responses in India) at what emerged as a complex of violence between the 
ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Trinamool Congress Party and protesting peasants 
and citizens groups allied with the Bhumi Uchhed Pratirodh Committee (BUPC; Committee Against 
Land Evictions). Things reached a violent climax as political factions and the BUPC struggled to 
assert control over the area and the region became a battlefield of sorts when a non-violent protest 
march of around 15,000 people led by the BUPC was met with violence by various political party 







thousand houses were damaged or burnt down. As investigations and fact-finding missions to 
Nandigram were underway, the state government, under enormous pressure then, moved the 
controversial SEZ to a less fertile and cultivated stretch of land in Nayachar village.28 
The Nandigram episode bore out along with other controversial land acquisitions. By the 
 
end of 2007 (literally on New Year’s Eve), the Goan government also canceled all 15 approved 
SEZs in the state under sustained agitation from peasants and citizens groups. The agitations in the 
Mumbai SEZ area were also brewing and news of resistance to SEZs from other states was also 
gathering steam. These episodes together underscored the little regard by the political establishment 
(irrespective of ideology) for dissent and rights of “citizens” to determine their own development 
needs. 
In the Summer of 2008 I then conducted a preliminary study in the Mumbai SEZ area on 
the outskirts of Mumbai city in the Raigad district of Maharashtra. This was to be the largest SEZ in 
the  country, covering  an  area  of  11,300 hectares  (roughly  27,923 acres)  over  45  villages and 
promoted by one of the biggest Indian transnational corporate houses, Reliance Industries Limited. 
It had become a site of intense resistance from 2006 when the plans for the SEZ were first unveiled. 
The agitation over the MSEZ became instrumental in influencing several changes in the policy 
framework for SEZs (like the withdrawal of forcible acquisition of land for SEZs; increase in the 
processing area of the SEZs and a ceiling on the extent of land acquired for SEZs, albeit the ceiling 
was later removed). In April 2008 (before my fieldwork), under immense pressure from the peasant 
and citizens group coalitions, the district administration of Raigad conducted an unprecedented 
referendum over the MSEZ. The results of the referendum were never officially released, although 
independent records of those opposing the MSEZ claimed that 96 percent of the nearly 6000 people 
who participated in the Referendum voted against it. This figure cannot be verified, but it appears 
 
 
28 For more details see Basu 2007; Chenoy 2007; EPW 2007; Gandhi 2007; Independent People’s Report 2007; Patnaik 







vindicated in that the peasant and citizens coalitions eventually ousted the SEZ by 2009 as its 
developers failed to acquire even 25 percent of the land originally sought. 
That summer, through deliberations with other activists, Simpreet Singh of the Ghar Bachao 
Ghar Banao (Save the Home Make a Home) anti-slum demolition campaign in Mumbai and I 
resolved to bring together national and regional social movement coalitions29  to consolidate 
experiences and insights from groups struggling against SEZs across the country. Other such 
initiatives had been undertaken and we hoped to build on their efforts to initiate a collective national 
process of scrutinizing SEZs. Over the course of the next several months we reached out through 
social movement networks and by the summer of 2009, secured the agreement of the National 
Alliance of People’s Movements, the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information and the 
Tata Institute of Social Sciences to convene an initial national meeting on SEZs in June 2009. 
The first meeting was held in early June. Representatives from nearly all the major struggles 
against SEZs (in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, West Bengal, 
Gujarat) that we could reach out to attended the meeting, at their own expense. This underlined 
support for a national coalition formation around SEZs. A decision to initiate People’s Audits of 
SEZs was arrived at, borrowing a format of accountability enforcement developed by the Right to 
Information (RTI) campaign.30  It was also resolved that all organizations would raise resources 
through local donations for the process, with the Tata Institute and another research and advocacy 
 
 
29  Many social movement coalitions in India describe themselves as non-party political movements and do not take 
institutional funds, but run on members and supporters donations (possibly an organizational relic from the 
Independence movements that were similarly supported by popular donations). These are not Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), although coalitions align with NGOs as well. 
30 The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (Peasant and Workers Solidarity Collective) is widely credited with pioneering 
the Right to Information (RTI) movement in India for over two decades now, and founded the National Campaign for 
People’s Right to Information. The movement developed a format of public hearings or people’s audits of state-led 
development works in rural Rajasthan where the organization is based. Given large-scale embezzlement of rural workers’ 
wages, details of public works expenditures on labor and materials were campaigned for. With door-to-door wage 
verifications in villages where aggrieved workers sought full wages risking backlash from officials and elected 
representatives siphoning development funds, the movement unearthed massive embezzlement of development funds 
each year in development works. A series of local mobilizations took shape and the collective built a state and then 
nation-wide campaign demanding the RTI for all information affecting public interest. The campaign was ultimately 







organization, the National Centre for Advocacy Studies providing resources for travel across states 
for organizers and audit panelists who required support (panelists were to be mostly nationally and 
regionally known senior lawyers, retired bureaucrats, retired judges, journalists, academics, artists and 
activists). The first People’s Audit of SEZs was to be held in Maharashtra in the Mumbai SEZ area 
in September that year. Consultations for similar processes were to be initiated in the other states 
and pending the Maharashtra audit, groups in other states were to take the decision to proceed with 
devising their own formats for audits, or not. 
Six People’s Audits of SEZs were eventually conducted from September 2009 to April 2010. 
I stayed in India for fall 2009 to help with organizing the People’s Audit process on behalf of the 
three convening organizations. Over the next 11 months, eight of which I stayed in India for, 
People’s Audits were organized in Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Goa and 
Delhi states, the final audit in Delhi included representatives from anti-SEZ struggles in states that 
could not organize audits. Each audit format was locally arrived at and involved scrutinizing details 
of several SEZ projects, their social, economic and environmental impacts, their implementation 
methods and testimonies from residents. 
This process underscored for me the scale of SEZs and their implications for dispossession 
of lands, resources and livelihoods, their environmental implications, and the endemic corruption in 
the land deals for SEZs. To end a long story, I was not unbiased when I started my dissertation 








































In this chapter I begin with a brief overview of historical political economic developments relevant 
to the current conjuncture of “liberalization” and “growth” (significant historical social, political and 
institutional transformations such as those around caste and gender inequalities are minimally 
addressed in the interests of the focus on economic policy). I then provide a similar overview of 
developments in Goa; discuss indigenous relations with land and resources and the gaonkaris 
(collective ownership of land and resources) codified as Comunidades by the Portuguese; and give an 
overview of the main economic activities in the Goan state that have also contributed to popular 
discontent regarding their environmental impacts; and give an overview of Goa’s significant history 
of environmental activism. The third section then traces the global genealogies of SEZs and 




Broad Historical Context 
 
India is a fairly late entrant into the SEZ model for export promotion and global integration. While 
Export Promotion Zones (EPZs) were introduced from the late 1960s in the country (see section on 
SEZs below), several internal factors constrained industrialization and export promotion in India. 
Under the import substitution-led industrialization model adopted in the post Independence period, 
Chibber (2003) argues that Indian capitalists successfully carved out concessions and subsidies from 
the state and enjoyed “protection” from international competition without disciplinary state 
oversight. For a successful shift to a globally competitive export-led industrialization strategy, a 
consensus between the state and capital over export development would have been crucial. In South 
Korea, he points out, disciplinary oversight by the state with targeted incentive structures enabled 
production for the rigors of the global market. The promotion of particular industries, quality 
control and production targets for export with the added advantages of Japanese investments and 







regime, relatively low inequality, redistributive measures and policies geared to stimulate domestic 
demand also helped create a dynamic domestic market.31 
In India on the other hand, the import substitution model and the “conciliatory politics” of 
the Congress leadership “locked in place” a pattern of Indian capital wresting concessions from the 
state without disciplinary oversight (cf. Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Chibber 2003). Nehru’s 
conciliatory vision of the Congress Party sought to balance industrial development with centralized 
planning (Corbridge and Harriss 2000). The anti-capitalist (if romantic) Gandhian ideal of self- 
sufficient village republics had been unanimously set aside within the party after Gandhi’s death, as a 
larger consensus over industrialization prevailed. The combination of mixed economic objectives 
and conciliatory politics: a) trumped avowed socialist objectives by derailing redistributive land 
reforms; b) encouraged institutional reforms in farming over targeted infrastructural investments so 
that expanded cooperative farms and decentralization of power to Panchayats (village institutions) 
reinforced the power of landed and “upper-caste” elites; and c) accentuated the growth of industrial 
monopolies reliant upon protectionist policies and public investment as stimuli (ibid.). The effects of 
conciliatory politics on planned development enhanced the power of the (largely “upper-caste”) 
significant holders of property rights—the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, rich peasantry and 
bureaucratic office holders whose discretionary powers were increased with the greatly expanded 
role of the bureaucracy as a whole. 
The power of the bourgeoisie and of the rich peasantry also mapped on to the relations 
between the central (federal) and State governments. The bourgeoisie was influential in the center 
(despite  an  adverse  socialist  leaning  political  culture),  and  the  rich  peasantry  was  increasingly 




31 In Taiwan as well, Corbridge and Harriss (2000) point out that the Kuomintang government undertook redistributive 
land reforms in the 1950s and built on Japanese colonial investments in agrarian infrastructure. Taxation and favorable 







…the strangulating embrace of the bourgeoisie and the rich peasantry created a political 
context in which it became impossible for the regime at the centre to continue to implement 
the Nehru-Mahalanobis planning model [with redistributive land reforms and agrarian 
restructuring] because it could no longer mobilize the public investment resources to do so 
(ibid.: 65-66). 
Centralized planning had concentrated on supply-side development but failed to enable 
commensurate demand-side expansion through redistribution and appropriate infrastructure. State 
revenues began to dry up as “productive linkages” between agriculture and industry (cf. Hirschman 
1981) could not  be established within  the  economy.  After  Nehru’s death in  1964, conditions 
 
worsened. The currency was devalued in 1966, and the country became increasingly dependent on 
conditional aid (including the US Public Law 480 food aid). It also became susceptible to growing 
pressures from the US and the Bretton Woods institutions to initiate capitalist agrarian reforms in 
the form of the “green revolution,” to increase the role for global and domestic capital, and reduce 
state control and planning. Agrarian reforms then enabled rich “upper-caste” peasants with the 
advantages of scale and resources to invest in modern seeds and fertilizers with mechanized farming 
(see also Gupta 1998). At the same time, industrial growth stagnated. While the wide range of 
controls on industrial expansion did not constrain some business houses from emerging as 
monopolies, the overall controls on business during the much maligned “license raj” combined with 
demand-side constraints, decreasing public investment and infrastructural bottlenecks to create 
overall stagnation in the economy. By the mid 1960s, the Planning Commission was reduced to an 







unrest and popular discontent (the Naxalbari revolt of 1967 that resulted in the political formations 
of “Naxalites,”32 also occurred at this time). 
Political infighting between Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi and the Congress old guard 
split the Congress Party in 1969. Gandhi’s political trajectory then steered a path between left and 
right, making populist promises to secure support while doing little to implement them, even as she 
rejected the politics of class struggle represented by the Marxists (Corbridge and Harriss 2000). Her 
positions in many respects were a reprise of Nehru’s conciliatory politics, but in a much more 
politically fragile environment; which she then sought to consolidate with the imposition of 
“emergency rule” in 1975-77 (ibid.). 
Anti-emergency agitations united under the leadership of socialist Jaiprakash Narayan to 
form the Janata Front (People’s Front). The Janata Party, as it was named after it came to power, 
included a coalition with the rich and largely “upper-caste” peasantry from the northern states and 
the Hindu nationalists (then organized as the Hindu Mahasabha, which emerged as a major political 
force  with  over  30  percent  vote-share  in  the  “anti-Indira”  wave  after  the  Emergency).  The 
immediate post-Emergency period thus signaled the rise in power of the Hindu right on the one 
hand and the rich peasantry on the other (rallying with Charan Singh who briefly became Prime 
Minister with Indira Gandhi’s support when the Janata Party government fell). 
This rise in the power of large landlords sealed the decline of the socialist agenda of agrarian 
reform (ibid.). The rich peasantry by this time had reaped the rewards of commercialized agriculture, 
with significant state subsidies for fertilizers, pesticides, high-yield variety seeds and mechanized 
production. Motiram and Vakulabharnam (2011) argue that market-dependence had ramifications 




32  The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) that had initiated the revolt subsequently splintered into several 
groups through the 1970s. Some of these splinter groups have merged recently and are organized as the Communist 







farmers (owning less than two acres) too became increasingly dependent on market-oriented input 
and price subsidies without the advantages of scale. 
In 1980, Indira Gandhi returned to power but did not address the “structural issues” behind 
economic stagnation. After her assassination in 1984, her son Rajiv Gandhi, then at the helm of 
affairs and under the influence of the liberal global orthodoxy introduced the “new economic 
policy” in 1985 in an attempt to “liberalize” the economy. The turn towards liberalization was not 
inevitable but emerged as a response to internal pressures building up as the “crisis in public 
investment” rather than any external pressure (Corbridge and Harriss 2000). Monopolistic business 
houses saw opportunity in liberalization, but many small Indian capitalists felt threatened by the 
dismantling of the controls protecting them from “global competition” (ibid. 2000). Reform 
initiatives slowed down in the face of opposition and intensified the “underlying tendencies” of the 
Indian economy towards public expenditure, imbalance in taxation, and commercial borrowing 
(ibid.: 103). 
During this time, debt grew, despite the economy growing at about five percent per annum 
(Harriss-White 2003) and manufacturing at eight percent. From 1982 to 1990 India’s public debt 
jumped from 7.94 billion dollars to 70.12 billion dollars (11.4 percent of the Gross Net Product to 
27.6 percent). The green revolution had increased rural wages to an extent in northern states and 
also benefited “lower-caste” peasants (see Jaffrelot 2003). Official figures showed a reduction of 
rural poverty from 57.3 percent of the population in 1970 to 35 percent by 1990-91 (Corbridge and 
Harriss 2000). India’s fiscal deficit however, precipitated the economic crisis of 1991 and became the 








The social and political elites who had consolidated their power in the preceding decades 
moved in to carve out their share and exert pressure on the reforms processes. After nearly a decade 
of reforms in 2000, Corbridge and Harriss contended: 
A new dialectic of centralization and decentralization in the country is allowing New Delhi 
and the States to regulate in favour of capital in the formal economies of India (often to 
good effect), even as an ideology of deregulation is encouraging certain ‘intermediate classes’ 
to seize command of an ‘informal state’ at the local level, there to enforce a form of ‘actually 
existing Indian capitalism’ that is based on ‘primitive accumulation’ or ‘accumulated cruelty’ 
(ibid.: 146). 
Since the 2000s to the present, the pace of “structural reforms” has intensified. As Indian 
capital has sought to make gains, the established pattern of wresting concessions from the state 
without disciplinary oversight has continued (the SEZ model is an example of such “concessions” at 
a large scale, see also chapters three and four). Manufacturing is low on the priority of capital 
however, and has stagnated since the 1980s at 15-16 percent of the GDP (GoI 2011a), employing a 
mere 12.6 percent of the workforce in 2011-12 (Rangarajan et al. 2014). Services have grown to 51 
percent of the GDP (Banga 2005) and employed 26.9 percent of the workforce in 2011-12 
(Rangarajan et al. 2014). The share of agriculture reduced from 35 percent of the GDP in 1983 to 14 
percent in 2011-12 (Thomas 2014) although it still employed 48.9 percent of the workforce in 2011- 
12 (including forestry and fishing; see Rangarajan et al. 2014). Agrarian distress among small and 
marginal farmers has grown acutely in this period. As input and price subsidies have declined, 
market dependence, environmental stress and growing indebtedness, among other reasons, has led 
to the phenomenon of farmers’ suicides in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh (Motiram and 







in the services and construction sectors, with construction employing 10.6 percent of the workforce 
in 2011-12 (see also chapter six). 
Growing discontent from the 1970s has also given rise to significant non-party social 
movements (referred to as “jan sangathans” or “people’s movements” in India). These agitational 
movements share affinities with left parties but have created their own structures and idioms. They 
are often simultaneously “red and green” in ideology (Guha 1990) and have sought to compel state 
and  central  governments  towards  egalitarian  and  democratically  determined  “development” 
policies.33  They have also emerged at the intersections and coalitions of “class” and “identity” (cf. 
Edelman 1999). For instance, some of these are the mine and cement workers Chhattisgadh Mukti 
Morcha (Chhattisgadh Liberation Front) in the central adivasi (indigenous) areas (see PUDR 1991); 
the anti-dam struggle along the Narmada river valley, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save Narmada 
Campaign; see Fisher 1995; Baviskar 2005); the National Fishworkers Forum (see Sinha 2012); or 
the Mazdoor Kisan Shankti Sangathan (Peasants and Workers Solidarity Collective) in north-western 
central plains (see Jenkins and Goetz 1999; Ray and Katzenstein 2005). These social movements 
have mobilized a wide array of agitational modes (or “repertoires”), including legal recourse, to 
interrupt processes of dispossession and have also won important rights-based entitlements in 
alliance with left-parties such as the rural employment guarantee, right to information, forest rights 
and food security laws. 
These developments form the backdrop for the current “reform dirigisme” on 
“infrastructure, industrialization and urbanization” in India and the consequent conflicts over the 
appropriation of land and resources from agriculture and allied uses. I turn below to some historical 





33 These movements should not be confused with Non Government Organizations (NGOs), they rely on membership 







Some Goan Developments 
 
 
Figure 1: District and Taluka* Map of Goa 
 
*Note: Taluka refers to a district administrative 
block. Names in Italics are major cities and towns 
or Taluka headquarters. 
 




With a total area of about 1429 square miles and a population of 1.46 million (GoI 2011b; the state 
is very small relative to other Indian states), Goa has a unique history in South Asia as a Portuguese 
colony for 451 years until 1961. Goa’s “merger” with the Indian union was “facilitated” by the 
Indian military (that then ruled the state for six months), and was not without controversy and 
allegations of one imperial rule being replaced by another. In 1961 it was made a Union Territory34 
of India and became a separate state only in 1987. Campaigns in the initial years by neighboring 
Indian states Maharashtra and Karnataka (then Mysore) to acquire Goa as “their territory” found 
 
 
34  The Constitution of India of 1950 did not make reference to the Portuguese colonies, hence the status of Goa, 
Daman, and Diu after their merger into the Indian Union was defined by the Government of the Union Territories (UT) 
Act of 1963. The powers of a UT are constrained in comparison to that of a state, particularly with regard to financial 
matters. A UT is further under the administration of the Home Ministry of India and the GoI’s ability to intervene or 







support among prominent sections of Goans (who leaned towards Maharashtra), and the issue of 
“merger” deeply divided Goans, also along religious communal lines. In 1967, after much unrest, a 
Goa-wide “opinion poll” was conducted by the central Government of India (GoI) on the issue of 
merger with Maharashtra. A majority of Goans voted against the merger, consolidating Goa’s status 
as a distinct political entity within the Indian union. Debates around the opinion poll articulated and 
mobilized a distinct “Goan identity” needing protection, and brought sections of the Hindu and 
Catholic populations together that felt threatened by a merger with Maharashtra (Rubinoff 1992). In 
later years and more recently, demands for “special status” for Goa to disallow purchase of lands by 
non-Goans in the state have arisen from this complex political history of a distinct “Goan identity” 
and this frame has been an important historical refrain in social movements in Goa (also mobilized 
in the anti-RP 2011 and anti-SEZ agitations). 
Over the years a syncretic culture has evolved in Goa; “upper-caste” Christian converts from 
Hindu backgrounds formed a powerful minority under the Portuguese and there has historically 
been minimal communal strife between Christians, Hindus and Muslims.35 The latest census figures 
giving religious break-up of the population were unavailable until January 2014, but inferring from 
the 2001 census figures, Hindus are about 65.8 percent, Christians 26.7 percent, Muslims 6.6 percent 
(GoI 2001) of the state’s population. Inferring from a Government of Goa (GoG) survey of 2004, 
indigenous Scheduled Tribes (ST)36  are over 12 percent of the state’s population (including 36.58 
percent of ST Christians)
37 




35  In this regard, despite coming to power, the Hindu-right in Goa has failed to incite religious hostility despite some 
early efforts and has had to make its peace with the local Catholic and Muslim communities to survive politically. They 
have however, portrayed immigrant Muslim communities as more orthodox than “Goan” Muslims instead to further 
communal politics. 
36 Scheduled Tribes (STs) are indigenous communities that have their own nature-based religious practices. While these 
are non-Hindu communities, the Hindu right has been making an effort to bring them within the Hindu religious fold. 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) are communities that the Hindu caste system deemed “untouchable” and hence kept outside the 
caste system. SC and ST communities were codified by the post-independence Constitution of India that recognized 
both communities as historically oppressed and marginalized by Hindu upper-caste and non-Hindu communities in a 







The per capita annual income in the state according to 2009-10 figures stood among the 
highest in India at approximately $2500 (or $6.8 per day at then prevailing conversion rate of Rs. 45 
to 1$;38 PTI 2011). The human development indicators in the state are high; the female sex ratio in 
the state is relatively high at 968 women to 1000 men (940 in India overall); the literacy rate 
(percentage of literates to population above seven years) is very high at 87.4 percent (74 percent in 
India overall; GoI 2011b); the literacy rate among ST communities is extremely high at 71.7 percent 
(47.1 percent in India in 2001) and the ST communities’ female sex ratio is high at 1017 females to 
1000 males (GoG 2004).39 These indicators, along with the state’s size, are important factors when 
 
considering social mobilizations in the state, as many campaigns quickly coalesce into state-wide 
agitations. High indicators and income ratios also attract migration to the state across all classes and 
have notably attracted metropolitan investment into real estate, cumulatively adding to existing 
resource and “infrastructure” (implying here services like water and electricity supply, garbage 
disposal and roads) burdens for residents. 











“broken” people but the term dalit may also be used to include ST communities by some given their historical 
oppression. 
37   Depending  on  the  locality  of  a  Catholic  person’s  origin,  their  “original” caste  can  be  determined  and  often 
corresponds with their socio-economic status such that the Brahmin and upper-caste Christian converts are generally 
better off than SC and ST Christians. Before 2004 ST communities were not officially recognized in Goa, hence earlier 
census figures do not reflect the presence of these communities accurately. All indicators for ST communities used in 
this paper are from a survey of three ST communities conducted in the state by the GoG (2004). 
38 All $ rates in this section are calculated at then prevalent rate of Rs. 45 to 1$, for 2009-10. 
39 While the socio-economic indicators of the so-called “lower-castes” and indigenous communities in Goa are higher 
compared to the rest of India, caste hierarchies and discriminatory practices persist in Goa even among Christians. As a 
result I found in the context of my field study that people across castes may eat at each others’ homes indicating a 
relaxation of the rules of “pollution,” but marriage alliances are seldom, made across these lines. As explained below, 
traditional patterns of land ownership and access to resources are also determined to significant extent by caste and 
community status. In the context of this study, Brahmins followed by Marathas (warrior caste) form the so-called upper- 
castes; Other Backward Castes (OBCs) and SCs form the so-called “lower” castes. STs have also been traditionally 







Under Portuguese rule and patronage, mercantile capital relations dominated in Goa (Trichur 2013). 
Traditionally,  gaonkars  were  considered the  original  inhabitants  of  a  village and  the  lands  and 
resources of the village were held collectively by them and distributed for cultivation (including 
khazan lands,40  grazing lands and plantations) to “users” by lease through auctions and the income 
from auctions was equitably distributed among gaonkars. The gaonkari was considered a village 
republic with ownership of all land and resources; the land could not be sold, nor could it be 
converted for non-agricultural purposes. A system of share-holders also incorporated members who 
were not gaonkars by lineage. The fisherfolk were also organized in collectives according to fishing 
zones (see D’Cruz and Raikar 2004), and supplied gaonkars and the rest of the community with fish, 
in return for market areas. The gaonkari also assigned lands to those providing services to the village 
like washermen, barbers and gravediggers. Lands were zoned for crematoriums, housing and for 
agriculture by the gaonkari and the protection of fields, bunds, sluice gates and other structures were 
also their responsibility. They also built and maintained village temples and later churches. 
The Portuguese retained and codified the gaonkari legally in the form of Comunidades. While 
first mention of the rules of Comunidades are found as early as 1526, the Codigo das Comunidades (Code 
of Comunidades) was officially gazetted by the Portuguese in 1961, the year that Portuguese rule over 
Goa ended. There were in 1961 223 Comunidades in Goa that owned a majority of the state’s land and 
resources (see Sridhar 2010). Anti-caste activists point out however, that members of dalit, other so- 
called “lower” caste and tribal (indigenous) communities and women were not members of the 
Comunidade and it is unclear whether traditional gaonkaris were inclusive of all castes, communities 
and women and hence more egalitarian than the Comunidades. 
Portugal was a poor country towards the end of its colonial rule, and had neither the capital 
 
to invest in Goa nor the industrial output to supply to the colony’s needs; it was only after its merger 
 
 
40 Khazan lands are low-lying coastal lands reclaimed from marshy mangroves by construction of dykes and sluice gates 







with  the  Indian  union  that  the  state’s  capitalist  transformation  took  place  (Newman  1984). 
Intensified mining in the post-1961 period by Goan “big families” (influential mercantile families) 
who had been granted mining concessions by Portuguese patronage, introduction of fishing by 
trawlers, the dilution of the traditional Comunidade systems through partial land reforms, and the 
vigorous promotion of tourism meant that capital in Goa increasingly came from the “destruction” 
of land (Newman 1984; Trichur 2013). The combination of ecological, socio-economic and 
institutional changes without effective state support in turn adversely affected the management of 
common property resources like khazan lands (Sonak et al. 2006). Lands and resources held by 
Comunidades reduced considerably with rising incidence of privately owned property, including fields, 
forests and orchards. Commons have been acquired by the state and also transferred to industry. 
More recently, at least in some villages like Loutolim and Verna, ST members also reportedly 
have shares in Comunidade lands and resources, as do some women, depending on their economic 
status and ability to buy shares. Given their historical exclusion from ownership of lands and 
resources however, people from the SC and ST communities in Goa, Catholic or otherwise, are 
often landless and/ or landed peasants with small holdings, cultivating rice, tending coconut and 
arecanut (beetle nut) groves, growing fruits and vegetables, producing coconut oil and farming 
prawns  and  other  shellfish through  the  year.  They  may also  cultivate lands  acquired  through 
purchase of shares in a Comunidade or tend to the lands of “upper-caste” Catholics and Hindus who 
traditionally have larger land holdings including paddy fields and orchards. According to a GoG 
(2004)  survey,  20.39  percent  ST  heads  of  households  are  cultivators  and  18.46  percent  are 











In this section I give an overview of the main economic activities impacting relationships with land 
and resources in the state, and their relative shares in the state’s political economy. Physically, Goa is 
marked by three broad geographical divisions: the Western Ghats mountain range, the midland 
plateaus and the coastal areas, apart from nine river systems of which the river Sal originates in the 
Verna plateau, near the site of five SEZs that were to come up on the plateau. Each of these 
physical divisions has their own significant ecological and cultural characteristics that are inter- 
related in complex ways and impact the political economy of the state. Traditionally, Goan villages 
have congregated either in the plains, the undersides of plateaus or the coastal stretches, with no 
settlements on top of the plateaus and sparse settlements in the mountainous Ghats (Alvares 2002). 
Goa’s total Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) in the financial year April 2009-March 2010 was 







The overall significance of agriculture has gradually declined in the state with the transformation of 
the economy. According to official figures, of the total area of 361,113 hectares of the state, the total 
cropped area in Goa was estimated at 167,607 hectares in 1960-61 (GoG 1960), declining marginally 
to 160,320 hectares for 2009-10 (GoG 2009a) and to 159,916 hectares in 2010-11 (44.28 percent of 
total  land  available;  GoG  2010).  Cashew,  paddy  and  coconuts  respectively  form  the  major 
agricultural produce in the state. The overall dependence on agriculture however, has declined; the 
NSDP from agriculture, forestry and fishing in 2009-10 stood at $325.54 million, merely 6.6 percent 











There is extensive laterization in Goa because of its tropical moist climate. Laterite caps extend over 
mountains, plateaus and plains. These are rich in iron ore deposits that give the earth in the region 
its deep red color and also store water (see Alvares 2002; GSI 1985). In recent years, iron ore mining 
has grown immensely in the state with over 50 million tons of India’s iron ore exports annually 
mined from Goa alone, making it the country’s top iron ore exporter. Rampant “illegal” and “legal” 
mining41    has  destroyed  the  ecology  of  these  areas,  causing  environmental  hazards  and  the 
destruction of water resources. In 2009-10 the officially reported NSDP from mining stood at $628 
million  or  12.7  percent  of  the  NSDP  (GoG  2012).  Mining  has  become  hugely  controversial 
especially since a judicial commission into illegal mining appointed by the central Government of 
India (GoI 2012a) submitted its findings of rampant legal violations. The commission’s report noted 
that most mining companies encroached upon agricultural lands and water bodies, that mining areas 
were overburdened, and operators did not pay due royalties (Chakravarty 2012). The BJP-led 
government that came to power in 2012 announced the suspension of all mining operations in 
August 2012, pending review of licenses. The Supreme Court of India in an order in October 2012 
recommended an interim ban on transportation (including export) of all illegally mined iron and 
manganese ore from the state. However, the Supreme Court recently issued notice to the state 
government over reports that ore mined from Goa is being illegally exported under the claim that it 





Trichur (2013) points out that tourism in Goa in the 1960s-80s catered to low-budget tourists and an 
alternative hippie culture, becoming part of peasant livelihood strategies along the coast. In an effort 
to remake her image and promote foreign relations after the Emergency rule episode, then Prime 
 
 
41 Anti-mining activist Ramesh Gauns points out that this division is arbitrary since the “legal” mines were operated by 







Minister Indira Gandhi promoted Goa as a global tourist destination from the 1980s (Trichur 2013). 
This changed the nature of tourism in the state and brought in capitalist hotels catering to “high- 
end” tourists. These concerns not only exploited local labor, but also took over large areas of land, 
guzzling resources and violating coastal protection laws with impunity. 
The estimated tourist inflow ratio into the state is now extremely high. In 2009-10 the 
domestic and foreign tourists in Goa were 2.15 million and 371,951 respectively and the total NSDP 
from trade, hotels and restaurants was $721.3 million or 14.6 percent of the NSDP (GoG 2012). 
Policy interventions frequently reflect the concerns of pressure groups interested in more returns 
from tourism. Alvares (2002) points out that the government machinery is often rewarded for non- 
enforcement of rules or their misinterpretation, leading to violations of coastal zone regulations, 
building height regulations, untreated sewage release in the sea and extraction of groundwater 
causing the salinization of aquifers. 
In their study analyzing the changes in three coastal systems in Goa over five villages, sand 
dunes, mangroves and khazan lands Kazi and Siqueira (2006) point out that given the attractive 
returns from tourism, sand dunes were either denuded or razed for unhindered views of the sea; 
interest in khazan lands has waned; and more land was sought to be converted for beachfront hotels, 




d. Real Estate: 
 
The real estate economy in Goa is deeply implicated in the state’s promotion as a tourist destination. 
The emergence of Goa as a tourist destination has raised the demand for “holiday homes” in the 
state from the metropolitan upper classes from other states. These “second homes” are locked up 
for most of the year and are the cause of much local resentment. Such investments have led to a rise 







other activities. The price of property has risen so that there are frequent complaints of how new 
homes are no longer within the reach of local Goans but people from other states invest in them. 
More land is converted into “settlement areas,” and building regulations are turning lax. Real estate 
construction has also increased as the Goan population itself expands and there is migration from 
the villages to towns for occupational reasons. Figures for the number of housing units and the rate 
of increase in built-up area are hard to come by (see discussion in chapter five); the NSDP from real 
estate construction for 2009-10 was reportedly $270.8 million or 5.5 percent of the NSDP (GoG 
2012).  Both,  anti-RP  2011  and  anti-SEZ  agitations  in  the  state  reflected  the  growing  local 
resentment regarding the stresses on land, resources and infrastructure as a result of the growth in 




e. Industrial Estates: 
 
The Goa Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) was established in 1965 to assist small-scale 
industrialization, and acquires land, develops infrastructure like roads and water and power supply 
and ensures services like post, banks, etc. within an estate. The land is owned by the GIDC and 
initially allotted on a 30-year lease (with the option to sub-lease or transfer the plot), extendable to 
95 years on easy installments. There are currently 21 Industrial Estates in Goa with 1555 units 
employing 38540 persons (figures obtained from GIDC in April 2012). While the NSDP originating 
in the Industrial Estates is unavailable, the total NSDP from manufacturing in Goa in 2009-10 was 
$956.15  million  or  19.3  percent  of  the  NSDP  (GoG  2012).  The  GIDC  is  also  the  main 
governmental body implicated in the irregular transfers of land and resources to SEZs. 
Most  Industrial  Estates  are  located  on  or  around  the  plateaus  as  these  are  officially 
considered “barren” lands. These lands have been acquired from Comunidades at low rates by the 







villagers as grazing land and some plateaus also have cultivable fields. The plateaus are catchment 
areas for water for the villages, fields and orchards around them. Industrial Estates have depleted 
water sources by excessive use of bore wells and wastes generated from industry have in some 
instances polluted the ground water sources and fields and orchards around plateaus (a Coca Cola 
plant on the Verna Industrial Estate is particularly notorious among locals).42 Many of the jobs 
generated by Industrial Estates have not gone to locals from the area, but have attracted migrants, 




A Living History of Environmental Activism 
 
It is relevant to note here that a significant tradition of “natural worship” of flora and fauna in the 
region  has  fostered  a  reverence  for  the  environment,  forming  an  eco-theological  basis  for 
biodiversity conservation (Borkar 2006). For instance, “sacred groves” that vary in size and extent 
have residing deities with entry into them marked by strict taboos and codes of conduct (ibid.). 
Many of these are also located in and around the midland plateaus. Tree worship, worship of termite 
mounds (as the popular Goddess Santeri) and animal worship of crocodiles, turtles, snakes, dogs and 
lions by various communities are commonly prevalent. Christian ST communities who are 
predominantly peasants also perform rice rituals, taking a few ears ceremonially to the Church after 
prayers in the field, and to their homes to be tied on the doors. An intuitive concern for the 
environment shaped by local religious practices thus informs relations with the environment and the 
repertoires of protest in Goa. 
The period of post-1961 capitalist transformation of Goa, has seen a rich and significant 
history of agitation against environmentally destructive projects. Some of the earlier movements 
coalesced around Zuari Agro Chemicals in Sancoale in the 1980s, the Konkan Railway agitation 
 
 
42 The company has ironically pledged its commitment to protect rights and resources of communities where it operates 







along the coastal areas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Nylon 6,6 agitation against the Du Pont 
plant in Bhutkhamb plateau at Kerim (where one of the three notified SEZs was to come up) in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s and the Meta Strips agitation of the late 1990s (in the vicinity of the Verna 
Plateau and involving some of the villages and residents also affected by the SEZs). Along with 
these there have been numerous smaller local actions and legal activism by concerned individuals 




a. Zuari Agro Chemicals: 
 
Zuari Agro Chemicals (now Zuari Industries Limited) set the precedent on the Sancoale plateau in 
the  early  seventies, and  introduced  Goans  to  environmentally destructive impacts  of 
industrialization. The wastes and effluents from the industry leached into the valleys below and 
polluted the springs, sweet water bodies and other water bodies. Mass fish mortality and pollution of 
fields and groundwater in the mid-70s earned Zuari’s fertilizer plant enduring notoriety. The plant 
was eventually forcibly closed by the courts. However, repeated citizens’ complaints to various state 
authorities and eventual legal action with the support of the non-profit Goa Foundation in the 




b. Konkan Railway: 
 
The Konkan railway project also saw huge protests in the state. While initially welcomed as it was to 
be aligned through the midlands of the state, the new alignment in 1990 through khazan lands saw 
increasing opposition. People protested the destruction of khazan lands and mangroves, hills razed 
to the ground or left collapsing and choked paddy fields. By 1993, things reached a head with the 
Prime Minister of India issuing stop work orders. An inquiry commission set up subsequently to 







made its journey on the route from Mumbai to Margao on the Republic day of India in 1998 (ibid.). 
 
These  were  both  “unsuccessful”  environmental  movements,  but  they  engendered  a 
significant environmental awareness among people who participated in them and in the state 
generally. They also fostered a culture of protest and a relationship of confrontation with the state. 
Some senior activists in the anti-RP 2011 and anti-SEZ agitations directly drew their lineage from 
these struggles. The two following struggles were “successful” and were on the sites where two of 
three SEZs in Goa would receive final approval (notification). They thus directly impacted the living 
history of struggles in the SEZ areas and some of the participants in the ant-SEZ agitations had also 




c. Nylon 6,6: 
 
Bhutkhamb plateau near Kerim village (site of Meditab SEZ) is traditionally used for grazing and has 
religious significance for local communities with designated worship areas. The plateau serves as 
water catchment area for the groves and farms around it. In the late 1980s, the GIDC acquired land 
on Bhutkhamb for Nylon 6,6 production by (transnational) Du Pont in collaboration with (Indian) 
Thapars. Despite using two highly hazardous chemicals (adipic acid and Hexamythelene Diamine), 
Nylon 6,6 was officially declared pollution free. As residents discovered its environmental hazards, a 
long drawn-out agitation spanning several years catalyzed across the state. The final showdown came 
in 1995 when the police opened fired at protesters and one ST youth, Nilesh Naik from Kerim 
(whose Samadhi43 lies across Bhutkhamb today), was killed. In retaliation, protestors beat up the 
police, stripping some and chasing others into the woods and proceeded to the company’s office in 
nearby Ponda town, burning everything they could find, including cash. Thapar-Du Pont found no 











protesters on account of the industry’s pollution generating potential. The company eventually shut 
shop and relocated to Tamil Nadu (see Alvares 2002; Sadhle 2000). This significant living history 
fundamentally shaped local relationships with the plateau; while a largely younger generation 






The Meta-Strips agitation of the late 1990s was around the Sancoale plateau (site of Peninsula SEZ). 
Meta-Strips was to import and process scrap from Europe to send valuable metals back and dispose 
the waste in Goa. The project got GoG’s clearance in 1996 in a record six days. While an 
Environmental Impact Assessment was conducted to preempt opposition, it obfuscated potential 
hazards of the industry that included unacceptable levels of toxic and carcinogenic metal fumes and 
groundwater pollution (Alvares 2002). Residents from surrounding villages, including the Verna 
plateau area (Sancoale and Verna are 10 kilometers apart), organized a campaign with road blockades 
and sit-ins that met police repression resulting in serious injuries and the death of a policeman. 
Meta-Strips retaliated by booking cases against activists in different states to harass them. By May 
2000, with intense agitation on the streets, and the company’s electricity and water supply cut, the 
High Court refused to entertain the company’s applications for continued electricity and water 
supply citing environmental concerns. The GoG finally ordered the plant shut and constituted an 
expert committee that confirmed the project’s environmental hazards but did not recommend 
closure, suggesting instead costly investment in pollution control. The plant operates today but its 








A mixed social base of caste, class, gender and community identities has thus been a historical 
feature of environmental struggles in Goa. These agitations comprised men and women; 
professionals  and  peasants;44    educated,  semi-literate  and  nonliterate  people;  Catholics  from 
Scheduled Tribes, mixed-caste or Brahmin communities; Hindus from various castes; and 
unconverted Scheduled Tribes.45  While livelihood concerns flowing from environmental and 
infrastructure stresses were significant, identities and relationships around land and resources also 
formed important refrains for mobilization. These struggles also largely emerged in the more 
populated hence electorally significant plateau and coastal regions, enabling often successful 
negotiations with the state. They uncovered not just official disregard of the destruction of the 
environment and traditional livelihood bases in favor of capital but also a corrupt system that 
enabled state and private actors to violate laws. Land and resource grabs for capitalism-facilitating 
accumulation thus form a historical trajectory of development and resistance in Goa post 1961, and 




Global Genealogies: Growth, Zones, Corridors 
 
In a 2009 report, the World Bank notes: “Growing cities, ever more mobile people, and increasingly 
specialized products are integral to development” (World Bank 2009: ix). Economic growth, it adds: 
...will  be  unbalanced.  To  try  to  spread  out  economic  activity  is  to  discourage  it.  But 
development can still be inclusive, in that even people who start their lives far away from 





44 Peasants from ST and SC communities often tend the lands of upper-caste Catholics and Hindus and/or have small 
holdings. Depending on their class status in some villages, they may purchase Comunidade shares to cultivate rice, tend 
coconut and arecanut (beetlenut) groves, grow fruits and vegetables, produce coconut oil and farm prawns and other 
shellfish. 
45  This should not be read as “exonerating” hierarchies in the context of social movements, or as diminishing the 








The way to get both the benefits of uneven growth and inclusive development is through 
 
‘economic integration’ (emphasis in original; ibid.: xxi). 
 
The Bank itself has been consistently losing relevance in large parts of the “developing” 
world (except the  poorest  countries) as  countries like  India  and  China  have  attained  “middle 
income” status (see Kanbur 2010) and as a result of the spiral of protests against its policies.46 But its 
economic orthodoxy profoundly influences the economic policy agendas through diverse policy 
consultation circuits (see Bebbington et al. 2004; Mosse 2008). In India thus, as if on cue, the 
Planning Commission of India has been announcing that 300 million Indians will be moving to 
cities in the next two decades as the country’s economy grows (GoI 2013b; ET 2013a; see also 
chapter five). Investments in growth infrastructures and urbanization will presumably “integrate” 
this movement of people. 
Given the Bank’s contribution to the debates on displacement (notably through the 
constitution of the World Commission on Dams; see WCD 2000), its report astonishingly makes no 
mention of “development induced displacement” entailed in urbanization and the increased mobility 
of people. The word displacement is mentioned once, in a footnote explaining “migration caused by 
sociopolitical reasons” (see World Bank 2009; 166). This is also typical of policy assertions in India 
that make no mention of dispossession as a corollary to growth and urbanization. 
If the assertions of the massive movement of 300 million people from rural to urban areas 
over the next two decades bear out in India, the implications for dispossession and uprooting of 
rural populations, agrarian livelihoods and cultures, and large-scale land-use change with consequent 
stresses on the environment and food security are serious. This is particularly significant as 70 
percent of the country’s over 1.2 billion population lives in rural areas and 60 percent depends on 
 
 
46 The Asian and subsequent crises in the South from the late 1990s (see Khor 2001; SAPRIN 2002; Sampat 2003), also 
culminated in the spirited gatherings of the World Social Forums that criticized Bank and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) policies. The gridlock that the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations have created for the 







agriculture and allied activities. The omission of these concerns from policy discussions on growth, 
especially in the Indian context where development induced displacement has been intensely 
contested at least since the 1970s (see also the discussion in the following chapter) and more so 
since the mid-2000s, is bewildering. 
I trace below the global genealogies of the two growth infrastructure models relevant to this 




Special Economic Zones 
 
Export-led economic growth has been an important part of the economic strategy prescribed to and 
subscribed by Southern47  countries on the path to “progress” and “development,” especially since 
the 1970s. The first Export Processing Zone (EPZ) was the Shannon airport in Ireland established 
in 1959.   Offshore assembly in Southern countries had started in the 1950s in Hong Kong and 
Puerto Rico, followed in the 1960s by Taiwan, Singapore, Philippines, Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic. Following the example of Shannon airport, many of these governments set up special 
industrial parks, called Export Processing Zones (EPZs) to attract foreign investment. The first 
Asian zone was the Kandla EPZ established by the Indian government in 1965 in Gujarat. Within 
the boundaries of these zones, firms were allowed to process goods for export without paying duties 
on imported components. Hong Kong, following its tradition as a commercial hub, designated the 
entire island as an EPZ. 
Originally conceived as zones of experiments with the “free market” in otherwise protected 
economies, export zones have been implemented with increasing intensity and varying results across 
the world. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, eleven developing countries had an EPZ; towards the end 
of the 1970s there were fifty-seven zones in twenty-nine countries; in the mid-1980s there were 
 
47 I use the distinction of Southern and Northern countries here keeping in mind the complexities of the North in the 







seventy-nine zones in thirty-five countries, with substantial assembly activity occurring outside 
designated zones as well (Currie 1984 in Wilson 1992). By the early 1990s, Asia accounted for over 
half of the world’s zone employment; Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America about 30 percent 
(with Mexico over half that amount); South America (Brazil, Colombia and Chile) about 8 percent; 




In India, there were a relatively modest 11 EPZs operating before the current model of 
SEZs replaced and considerably expanded the scope of the zone model. Policy preoccupation with 
export-led global integration intensified in the post-liberalization period, and the first SEZ policy 
was drafted in 2000. In 2005 the SEZ policy was finally given a more “stable” form through the 
SEZ Act, 2005. 
The pattern of capital wresting concessions from the state discussed in the previous section 
 
was exemplified to such a degree in the SEZ Act, that the targeted incentive structure of traditional 
zone models was abandoned in favor of blanket concessions and a rather free-for-all grab for land 
and resources, with active support from state representatives (see discussion on the SEZ law and its 
evolution in chapters three and four). Domestic capital (including transnational capital of Indian 
origin) flocked to SEZs, though foreign investment was relatively scarce. By August 2007, in less 
than two years of enactment, the there were already 366 approved SEZs (with additional 176 in- 
principle approvals) in India. By 2011 this number had grown to 584 (with an additional 45 in- 
principle approvals). 
The model has met its nemesis in two arenas however (see chapter four). One, an unlikely 
 
candidate, is the Finance Ministry which imposed a Minimum Alternate Tax on SEZs in 2011 and 
threatens to base their incentive structure on investments rather than the current concessions on 







groups. Combined, these two forces have made SEZs increasingly unviable for capital; and the 







In  1957  Jean  Gottman  heralded  the  growth  of  the  megalopolis  from  his  observations  of 
metropolitan growth corridors along the US northeastern seaboard: 
Urban land utilization is indeed devouring land fast, in many ways. The old habit of 
considering it as a minor occupant of space will soon have to be revised. Our modern 
civilization has found the means to grow more and more agricultural products, to raise more 
and more livestock, on less space; but industrial, commercial, and residential uses are 
constantly increasing their space requirements. Our generation is probably witnessing the 
beginning of a great revolution in the geography of land use. Megalopolis heralds a new era 
in the distribution of habitat and economic activities (1957: 200). 
Gottman also pointed to the historical existence and growth of such corridors in Europe. In 
 
1989 then, a group of French geographers under Roger Brunet identified Europe’s “backbone” 
(what the press termed the “blue banana;” Hospers 2003), including urban centers like Rotterdam, 
Amsterdam, Duisburg, Cologne, Frankfurt, Mannheim, Basle, Zurich, Milan and Genoa, also 
including London and Brussels. More recently, “golden” and “yellow” bananas have also been 
identified in Europe. These metropolitan growth corridors have developed from historical regional 






48 In 2005 for instance, the EU facilitated a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the European Commission 
and the main European rail organizations in the blue banana region, for a European rail traffic management system 
(ERTMS). In 2006 this was backed with the identification of six freight corridors between The Netherlands, Belgium, 







In India however, several large corridors are planned between major cities in anticipation of 
productive investment. These are being facilitated with state support for land acquisition and other 
infrastructural services. They anticipate “productive” investment through the creation of these 
infrastructures, including “world-class” cities (see Goldman 2011) without planning for additional 
productive linkages (see Hirschman 1981 for a discussion on the critical role of linkages for 
investments to result in distributive effects). While the policy rhetoric around these infrastructures in 
India echoes Gottman in Rostowian “take off” terms, these corridors are running into considerable 
trouble over their institution. 
For instance, the Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor (BMIC) is one of the earliest 
such planned corridors in India, initiated in 1995 by the Karnataka state government over 21,000 
acres in 170 villages. The BMIC, stalled for several years now, envisages a four-lane expressway, link 
roads, five new cities and power, water, telecommunications and sewage and waste water 
management services between the IT hub Bangalore, and Mysore city, 143 km south west of 
Bangalore. In 1999, its development contract was awarded on a 30-year lease basis to Nandi 
Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise (NICE), a subsidiary of Indian-origin transnational Bharat Forge 
Utilities Limited of the Kalyani Group. By 2001 the project was caught in allegations of corruption 
in approvals and award, real estate scams, and litigation by over 400 land-owners challenging the 
acquisition of their lands and compensation awarded. Till date, only about 7000 acres of land (out of 
a total of about 21,000 acres) has been acquired by the state government and transferred to the 
developer, and 66 km (out of a total of 163 km) of the planned expressway constructed (see 
Saldanha  2001;  Nandy  2010;  Deccan  Herald  2014;  also  http://www.bmicapa.org/;  see  also 
discussion on the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor in chapter four). 
While the financial crisis of 2008-11 and controversies over SEZs may have kept 







investment into infrastructure corridors or “smart cities.” Investments in industrial corridors have 
seen greater global investments, notably from Japan, which is emerging as one of the biggest growth 
infrastructure investors in India in recent years (conversely, India has emerged as one of the biggest 
Japanese overseas development aid destinations since 2003-04; see Varma 2009).49 
In  its  election  manifesto,  the  BJP  promised  billions  of  dollars  worth  infrastructural 
 
investments and the creation of “100 hi-tech cities” in the country, six of these planned in the 
DMIC (see Mahalingam 2014). IBM has already been enlisted in the creation of “smart cities” along 
the DMIC and has recently created an “Integrated Communication Technology (ICT) Master Plan” 
for the Dighi Port Industrial Area in Maharashtra (in the DMIC). A recent press release of the 
company promises to use its “smarter cities software” in Dighi “to integrate and interconnect 
information from various departments and agencies throughout the city to improve safety, prevent 
and anticipate problems, and improve the quality of life for citizens” (IBM 2013).US-based CISCO 
Technology Systems has recently shown interest in helping India develop new “smart-cities.” The 
Australian High Commission has also reportedly approached the Urban Development and Housing 
Ministry recently to promote Australian “expertise in urban design, construction of new smart cities, 
green and quality buildings, networked buildings, waste management and urban regeneration” in 
“India’s urban development initiatives” (PTI 2014a). 
In “emerging” economies, land and resource transfers are often facilitated by rent-seeking 
state actors, who assume the role of land “speculators” or “brokers” (cf. Goldman 2011; Levien 
2012). In the different though resonant context of China, Walker (2006) has described this 
phenomenon as the plunder of public goods by “gangster capitalism.” The active involvement of the 
central and state governments in the creation of growth infrastructures like SEZs and Industrial 
 
 
49 In his India Japan Global Partnership Summit plenary address in 2011, ex-CEO of the DMIC, Amitabh Kant (he is 
now the Secretary, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion in the Commerce Ministry) stressed partnership 
between Japan and India to counterbalance “the growing influence of the Chinese penetrations of markets across Africa 







Corridors comes, as Goldman (2011) points out, at the cost of large-scale disinvestment from other 
local economies on which a majority of India’s population depends (see also Harris-White 2003).50 I 
turn next to an analysis of the doctrine of “eminent domain” and its role in facilitating land and 




























































































Conflicts over land and resources in India have erupted in left-, center-right- and Hindu right-ruled 
states alike since the mid-2000s. That these conflicts occur in the fullness of two decades of 
neoliberal reforms51 is a clue into their evolution across the political spectrum, as ideological divides 
narrow in the face of “economic growth” imperatives. Protests continue to rage, against forcible 
land acquisition in Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Gujarat and 
Assam states, or against inadequate compensation in Haryana or Uttar Pradesh states. In 2009 
however, after nearly 35 years of rule, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) suffered a massive 
electoral rout in West Bengal, following escalation of conflicts and controversy over land and 
resource acquisition for SEZs (in Nandigram) and industry (in Singur). This is likely to have been a 
bitter pill for political elites across parties. The power of the state and central governments to 
acquire land forcibly and their “repertoires of repression” (Edelman and León 2013) are curtailed by 
electoral realpolitik under the existing conditions of India’s liberal democracy. 
In this chapter I enter the conflict over land and resources in India through an examination 
of the legal doctrine of “eminent domain” (the sovereign power of the state to forcibly acquire land 
for “public purpose”52), and its historical evolution from its pre-Constitutional colonial origins. The 
legal instruments through which the doctrine has found expression, redistributive land reforms on 
the one hand and dispossessing “development” projects on the other, capture the dilemma of its 
dual nature. The questions around sovereignty and decentralization of power that it summons pose 
important challenges for rights to land and resources. Is it desirable to do away with the doctrine of 
eminent domain? What are the existing substantive restraints against the state’s “absolute power” for 







51  By neoliberal reforms I refer to the specific policies aimed at instituting structural adjustment, liberalization and 
privatization in the economy that intensified in the country from 1991. 







power of eminent domain? Using material from legal and archival research, I interrogate these 
concerns critical to land and resource rights. 
The first part of the chapter focuses on the doctrine of “eminent domain.” I begin with the 
history of legal provisions for land acquisition in India, the colonial water laws, the recently repealed 
Land Acquisition Act (LAA) 1894, the largely unsuccessful Land Reforms legislation, and the Coal 
Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (CBAADA) 1957. I then address two aspects of 
“eminent domain” of particular relevance to this study—the ongoing conflation of “public purpose” 
with “private interest” in the service of “economic growth;” and the dilemma over its dual nature. 
Part two of the chapter begins with an examination of the valences of sovereignty embedded 
in the doctrine as “state sovereignty” is historically “overproduced” (cf. Ramanathan 2010) over 
“vulnerable citizens.”53 I then review the jurisprudence around “eminent domain” through some 
critical judgments of the higher courts in India. Next I examine existing substantive “restraints” on 
the power of eminent domain in the constitutional provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules; the 
73rd   Constitutional  Amendment  Act  1992;  the  74th   Constitutional  Amendment  Act  1993;  the 
Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act 1996; and the Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act (FRA) 2006. Finally I conclude the 














53 While special security legislation is unquestionably a critical feature of the sovereign power of the state over citizens 
needing critical redress, it suffices to merely flag it here in the interest of the focus of this chapter on eminent domain. 
54 By legality I reference the “rule of law” theorist Dyzenhaus (2006) who in the tradition of Frankfurt school theorists 
Neumann and Kirchheimer, argues for the central place of “morality” or “ethics” in law. Here, my direct reference by 







The Doctrine in Practice 
 
 
The term “eminent domain” is said to have originated in Europe in 1625 in the works of Hugo 
Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf (Dias 2004). Grotius argued that the property of “subjects” lay under 
the “eminent domain of the state” that may use, alienate and even destroy the property in the case of 
extreme necessity and for public utility, while making good its loss to those who lose it (The State of 
Bihar vs Kameshwar Singh 1952). The doctrine of eminent domain has its origins in India in pre- 
Constitutional colonial British common law. While not expressly referenced in the Indian 
Constitution, it is applied through laws related to land acquisition by “the state.” The claim for 
compensation for the loss of property to compulsory acquisition comes from “natural law”—the 
supposed “natural right” of a person to enjoy personal property derived in the theory of “possessive 
individualism”—and hence the “right to compensation” for its loss. 
In a 1952 judgment upholding the power of eminent domain for acquisition of land from big 
landlords for redistribution, the Supreme Court of India noted: “the concept of acquisition and that 
of compensation are two different notions having their origin in different sources. One is found on 
the sovereign power of the State to take, the other is based on the natural right of the person who is 
deprived of property to be compensated for his [sic] loss” (ibid: 25). In as much as natural law has 
little role in the Indian constitution and British common law from which the doctrine is drawn 
precedes the Indian Constitution, the doctrine of eminent domain has extra-constitutional and pre- 
democratic moorings in India. 
A similar argument can also be made for “private property” entitlements, flowing as they do 
from natural law and colonial common law precedents. The institution of private property follows a 
historical trajectory significantly negotiated during British colonial rule, going at least as far back as 







regimes.55  This British colonial legacy is thrown in relief by comparing the context of Goa, where 
private property entitlements were not as pronounced, and the power of eminent domain was not 
applied on any noteworthy scale. Instead, land and resources were largely collectively held under the 
traditional gaonkari system in each village that was formalized under Comunidade Code56 by the 
Portuguese. While this may be because of the pre-capitalist nature of the Portuguese colonial state, 
post independence in India (and subsequently in Goa), the British colonial legacy of eminent domain 
and private property entitlements were retained. 
Land reforms for redistribution of land to landless peasants and tenants were also premised 
on private property entitlements. The doctrine of eminent domain in fact gained constitutional 
primacy over the “right to property” as a result  of land  reforms (see discussion below). The 
“success”  of  eminent  domain  in  appropriating  land  and  resources  however,  has  historically 
depended on whom it is directed towards—the more economically, socially and politically marginal 
the people whose lands are appropriated (such as the indigenous adivasis and small peasants whose 






Under the Indian federal system, land is a “state subject” (as opposed to “union” or “federal 
subject”). Thus, each state has its own land-related laws. Acquisition for the central (federal) 
government is through a national land acquisition law. Until 2013 this was the colonial 1894 Land 
Acquisition  Act  that  was  retained  post  independence, when  it  was  replaced  by  the  new  land 






55 See Guha 1981; Dirks 1986; D’Souza 2004; Gidwani 2008. 
56 See discussion in the previous chapter. Although private property entitlements existed in Goa, they registered a rise 
after Goa’s “merger” with India. Similarly, the British colonial heritage of “eminent domain” supersedes the Comunidade 







The earliest use of eminent domain by the British in India to acquire land was in the 
irrigation and canal laws like the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873; the (Bengal) Canals 
Act 1864; the Bengal Irrigation Act 1876; and the Bombay Irrigation Act 1879. These laws invoked 
eminent  domain  for  the  acquisition  of  land  for  laying  canals  from  water  resources,  with 
compensation entitlements. They did not assert state “property rights” over water itself, but asserted 
the right of the state to access water resources (see Iyer 2009). In the post independence period, 
most of them have been replaced with newer state-specific legislation, although the older laws form 
the bases for current legal provisions. The LAA 1894 was arguably the oldest national law affecting 
land acquisition to survive right until 2013.57  State-specific laws are beyond the scope of this study 




a. Land Reforms and the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) 1894: 
 
Immediately after independence, the power of eminent domain was only of a statutory character 
(without constitutional reference), operationalized through Land Reforms and the LAA 1894.58 Land 
Reform laws were enacted in each state from the 1950s to break the concentration of land with 
zamindars (big landlords), and to redistribute land to “landless” (read title-less) tillers and tenants. 
The reforms fixed “ceilings” on large land holdings and re-distributed the surplus land after 
“nationalizing” it. 
The Supreme Court of India however, in its early phase (1950-70) struck down land reform 
 







57  The Bombay Irrigation Act of 1879 was also in force in Gujarat state until 2013 (Gujarat and Maharashtra were 
formed out of the Bombay state in 1960). 
58 Since land is a state subject, land reform laws varied from state to state. But land acquisition is a “concurrent” subject, 
so that the central law on acquisition also applies as a minimal benchmark for all the states. In practice this means that 







right” under Article 19(1) (f) of the Indian Constitution.59 This “judicial activism” triggered a severe 
reaction by the Parliament, as many Congress members with Nehru had socialist leanings. Starting 
from the First (Constitutional Amendment) Act of 1951, all state land reform laws related to the 
“takeover  of  property  by  the  state”  were  moved  to  the  “protected”  IXth    schedule  of  the 
Constitution. The IXth Schedule insulated land reforms from judicial challenge and invalidation. The 
Parliament next inserted Articles 31A-C through the First Amendment and the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment, and saved certain laws related to “acquisition of property” from challenge under 
Articles 14—“equality before law;” and 19—“fundamental rights.” This elevated eminent domain 
from  a  statutory  application  to  a  “constitutional  doctrine.”  Blanket  protection  from  judicial 
challenge under the IXth  Schedule however was later considered untenable under the “basic 
structure” of the Indian Constitution (after the definitive Keshavanand Bharti vs. the State of Kerala 
judgment in 1973). 
The “right to property” was then finally removed from the list of “fundamental rights” 
through the 44th  Constitutional Amendment Act in 1978 by the Janata Dal government, and this 
further strengthened the power of eminent domain. This Act also inserted Article 300A, leaving the 
“right to property” as a “constitutional right” (it had already been removed from “fundamental 
rights”) so that a person could not to be deprived of it “save by authority of law.”  The “right to 
compensation” underwent various amendments however, so that the legislature was now under no 
constitutional obligation to pay compensation to most of those “deprived of property.” Those 
entitled to compensation were only the “tillers of cultivated land” (including their buildings and 
structures), and minority educational institutions. All other classes of land or homestead owners and 
others dependent on land or landed communities, such as landless peasants, wage laborers, service 











Land reforms encountered pitched resistance from the landed elite however, and gradually 
lost salience in policy. As noted earlier (see chapter one), in the years leading up to Nehru’s death, 
big farmers consolidated their power in the states, while other propertied bourgeoisie consolidated 
their reach at the center. Except in some pockets like West Bengal and Maharashtra where local 
organizing by the left parties and to some extent Gandhians resulted in redistribution, land reforms 
met minimal success. 
Indira Gandhi too failed to secure redistribution, and with the advent of her son, Rajiv 
Gandhi, “liberalization”-oriented policy gained ground. Post liberalization, in the bid for “urban 
renewal” and “world-class cities,” land ceiling laws in many urban areas have been entirely repealed, 
and in many states greatly relaxed in rural areas to facilitate large-scale private holdings of land. 
The 1894 land acquisition law however, met greater success, and was retained in the post- 
 
independence period with some amendments. It incorporated land acquisition for a variety of 
“public  purposes,”  such  as,  new  and  existing  villages;  town  or  rural  planning; other  planned 
development under government schemes or policy; a corporation owned or controlled by  the 
state; housing for the poor, landless or those affected by natural calamities, government projects or 
development schemes; educational, housing, health or slum clearance schemes; and acquisition for 
public offices. Amendments in 1963 also included acquisition by the state for companies seeking 
land for employee housing, and for any other public purpose sanctioned by appropriate authorities (GoI 
1985).60 
The law had three procedural provisions for “hearing objections” of those dispossessed, 
after the “first notice” of acquisition (“notification” under section 4), after “declaration of 





60 This provision can be considered the fulcrum for recently proposed measures for acquisition that seek to incorporate 











The  constitutional  status  of  eminent  domain,  the  unqualified removal  of  the  right  to 
property as a fundamental right, and the inadequate compensation framework, without attention to 
existing social, political and economic inequalities, rendered dalits, adivasis,61 poor peasants62 and the 
urban poor most vulnerable to land acquisition. Fervor for land reforms died but the post- 
independence   “developmental”   projects—notably   large   dam,   irrigation,   industry,   industrial 
townships and other projects took shape. By 2002, state-led land acquisition in India displaced over 
60 million people (Fernandes 2008). Many of the dispossessed were indigenous people with clear 
collective land and resource entitlements under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution 
(see below), and landless peasants. Most received little, let alone “just” compensation (Iyer 2007; 
Fernandes  2008).  Ironically,  a  more  progressive  public  purpose  of  equitable  redistribution 




b. Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (CBAA) 1957: 
 
Special acquisition legislation was enacted for coal given its historically iconic status as a symbol of 
nationalism and the working class (Lahiri-Dutt et al 2012).63 The Coal Act of 1957 (CBAA; see GoI 
1957) was modeled on the LAA 1894 and empowers the central government to undertake 
prospecting and acquisition of any potentially coal-bearing area. In a matter of seven days after 
serving notice to the occupier of the land, any standing crop, fence or forest can be cleared for 





61 Dalit is the political identity taken by discriminated communities outside the Hindu caste-fold, the previously so-called 
untouchables. Adivasi literally means original inhabitants, or indigenous people. 
62 By peasants I refer to both land-owning farmers and landless agrarian workers. 
63   Other minerals are covered under the Mining Areas (Development and Regulation) Act. Acquisition for their 







entire area for acquisition could be notified within three years. Any objections to acquisition and 
amount of compensation are to be made within 30 days of the acquisition notice and the final 
decision on any such claims and objections, like in the LAA 1894, is to be made by the “competent 
authority” appointed for the acquisition. The valuation of compensation under the law expressly 
states  that  any  profits  emerging  from  what  is  below  the  surface  of  the  land  or  any  future 
appreciation of prices must not be considered.64 Most mining areas including coal bearing ones are 
forest lands inhabited by adivasis and other forest dwellers, with little “infrastructure” and 
“development,” and the valuation of these lands is historically extremely low. As a result, people in 
these areas have been subjected to flagrant cultural, ecological, economic, political and social 




As noted in the previous chapter, discontent with “development” has grown since the mid-1970s 
and the enforced displacement of people for “development” projects is particularly contested (Guha 
1990; Fisher 1995; Parasuraman 1999; Baviskar 2005; Dharmadhikary 2005; Nilsen 2010). Anti- 
displacement movements66 have raised critical questions regarding social and environmental “costs” 
of projects; “prior informed consent” of the “project-affected;” the legal entitlements and livelihood 
security for all dispossessed by a project, including the landless residents of a project area; the 
democratic  process  and  accountability  of  state  actors;  and  the  “capitalist”  bias  embedded  in 






64  The newly proposed Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Bill 2011 proposes to consolidate the all 
mining under one law, with registration for coal minerals administered by the central government. It provides for sharing 
26 percent of the profits from coal and lignite and royalty for other major minerals with the dispossessed. 
65 Even the more recent PESA (discussed below) and the Samata judgment of 1997 upholding the rights of scheduled 
tribes in scheduled areas that expressly prohibits mining leases to non-tribals in these areas have not been able to prevent 
this process of dispossession (see Krishnakumar 2004; Das 2005; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2012). 
66 One of the most influential anti-displacement movements that coalesced in the 1980s is the Narmada Bachao Andolan 
(Save Narmada Campaign) in the Narmada river valley. The Campaign’s key founding activist, Medha Patkar, was also 







to grapple with vital questions regarding the “development” it undertakes—for whom and at whose 
cost. 
Still, years of agitations did not translate into a clear legal mechanism addressing enforced 
displacement, resettlement and rehabilitation until the 2013 land acquisition law. Even explicit 
provisions made for projects have been violated. Ramanathan (2009) argues that there has been a 
historical disparity between the legal recognition of land acquisition and the lack of any effective 
legal framework for rehabilitation and resettlement. The exercise of eminent domain has been historically 
unsuccessful in securing redistributive and economic justice, and has compounded inequalities and conflicts over land by 
“over-producing state sovereignty over vulnerable citizens.” I turn below to the conflation of “public purpose” 




“Public Purpose” and “Private Interest” 
 
The phrase ‘public purpose’ has to be construed according to the spirit of the times in which 
the particular legislation is enacted and so construed, acquisition of estates for the purpose 
of preventing the concentration of huge blocks of land in the hands of a few individuals and 
to do away with intermediaries is for a public purpose (The State of Bihar vs Kameshwar 
Singh 1952: 3). 
The reference in this 1952 judgment of the Supreme Court upholding the land reform 
legislation in Bihar to “the spirit of the times” is ominous in the current context. Eminent domain 
was historically used to facilitate capitalist infrastructures, but under the sponsorship and ownership 
of the state. Post liberalization, the traditional distinction between “public” and “private” purpose in 
state acquisition, the former for state-sponsored “development” projects and the latter for directly 
capitalist-owned projects, is blurring (see Nilsen 2010). The initial state-led land acquisition for SEZs 







towards the exercise of eminent domain explicitly for “private interest.” In a revealing interview, 
then Commerce and Industry Minister Kamal Nath in whose tenure the SEZ Act 2005 was enacted 
noted (in the context of the SEZs preferring locations near urban areas): 
If an investor comes and says I want to build my zone here, and I tell him to go build it 
somewhere else, he will leave. I can’t do that. …We have to be market-friendly. Where the 
investor wants the zone is his [sic] business decision. Otherwise they won’t come. We must 
have a model that works. As I said, they do contribute to infrastructure—inside the zone 
(Gopalakrishnan and Shrivastava 2008). 
The 2013 land acquisition law expands the scope of eminent domain more explicitly by 
 
emphasizing land acquisition for “industry, infrastructure and urbanization.” The foreword to a 2011 
draft of the law revealed a slippage. It noted: 
Infrastructure across the country must expand rapidly. Industrialisation, especially based on 
manufacturing has also to accelerate. Urbanisation is inevitable. Land is an essential 
requirement for all these processes. Government also needs to acquire land for a variety of 
public purposes (emphasis added; GoI 2011c). 
Emphasizing  land  acquisition  for  “infrastructure,  industrialization  and  urbanization,”  it 
stated the government also needs to acquire land for “public purposes;” while the Bill itself sought to 
expand “public purpose” to private investments in infrastructure, industry and urbanization. 
Subsequent versions of the bill elaborated this expanded scope of “public purpose,” and the 
eventually enacted new land acquisition law finesses this wide scope with “partial consent” clauses 
(see next chapter for detailed provisions of the 2013 law). 
The expanding scope of eminent domain conflates the essentially divergent motives of 
private entities that undertake projects for private profit, and of “public purpose,” minimally 







inclusion of a wide array of private investments in SEZs, industrial corridors, Public Private 
Partnerships and “smart cities” as “infrastructure and urbanization” facilitates large-scale 
appropriation of land and resources from “vulnerable citizens” (see also chapters four and five). I 






Postcolonial critiques of the role of colonialism in modern law point to the salience of exceptional 
power67  in shaping it. Indeed, exceptional power was resorted to by the state as much during the 
partition of India and Pakistan, as the Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi, and it continues to be 
applied in the frontier states of Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East or through special security 
related legislation such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2002 and the Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act 1957. Exceptional power exercised through the state is a “reflex” used by 
political parties of all ideological persuasions. 
Skirting the critiques of the use of exceptional power however, is the contradiction that 
exceptional power in the form of eminent domain was also used to institute redistributive justice 
through land reforms, albeit weakly. If liberal democracy is understood as class compromise rife 
with contradictions (cf. Sandbrook et al. 2007), the dual nature of eminent domain is one such 
manifestation of contradictions. Its dilemma is perhaps best understood as a tension among the 
forces of power operating through the Indian state. While it is tempting to secure the power of 
eminent domain for egalitarian redistribution, this potential has at best been marginally realized, and 
hangs in the long shadow of its historical abuse of “vulnerable citizens.” 
Critics have argued for the need to do away with the doctrine of eminent domain entirely 
 











questions of sovereignty and redistributive justice? Can the power of the state for redistributive 
justice be guided with clear substantive limits and without the use of eminent domain? Rule of law 
theorists point to the juridical or self-restraining (as when the state restrains itself from forcibly 
acquiring land in the face of opposition) and cognitive or deliberative (as the law gets reinterpreted 
and altered in implementation and in practice) dimensions of democracy that help circumvent the 
absolute power of the state (Dyzenhaus 1999; Scheuerman 1994, 2002). I turn to these questions in 









It cannot be disputed that in every Government there is inherent authority to appropriate 
the property of the citizens for the necessities of the State and constitutional provisions do 
not confer this power though they generally surround it with safeguards (The State of Bihar 
vs. Kameshwar Singh 1952: 42). 
The power of eminent domain “inheres” in the sovereign power of the state. Sovereignty 
itself emerges in the context of international relations as the right of the sovereign state to determine 
its own affairs without interference from another state. Recent discussions of “multiple” and 
“overlapping” sovereignties point to the inherent contradictions in the concept of “sovereignty” as 
states  grapple  with  pressures  from  international  bodies,  multilateral  and  bilateral  treaties, 
transnational corporations and to some certain extent, local bodies of self-governance (cf. Randeria 
2007). The “global war on terror” constitutes multiple cases in point that clearly defy principles of 
 




68  “Absolute” power in the title of this section is not “totalitarian” power but “exceptional” power operationalized 







sovereign in a democracy. At the same time the Indian constitution recognizes specific enabling 
provisions for the entitlements of communities like the minorities, scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes, over and above individual rights in the interest of social, economic and political justice. 
Sovereign powers of the state are also invoked by right-wing fundamentalists towards conservative 
and often violent agendas. In India, “state sovereignty” forms a domain rife with contest and 
challenge as social movements and multiple political parties frequently challenge the powers of “the 
state” and (re)shape the rule of law in radical assertions over “state sovereignty.” 
In this scenario of complex and contesting forces of power operating through the state, the 
“sovereign” power of the state has several “valences.” In the first instance it arises as the sovereign 
power of the colonial state over its “subjects,” that finds salience in the current applications of 
eminent domain. In the second instance, post-independence, it is the sovereign state’s right to self- 
determination in the international arena, as a guard against “aggression.” State sovereignty in the 
international arena can also be valued as relative “autonomy” for “states” to determine policy in 
unequal fora such as the World Trade Organization (negotiations over India’s new food security law 
have arguably benefited from implicit “state sovereignty” claims). In the third instance in Indian 
jurisprudence, especially since Keshavanand Bharti, it exists as a somewhat tenuous balance between 
“popular sovereignty” and the “basic structure” doctrine (see Krishnaswamy 2010). In the fourth 
instance, it arises in the context of “rights” secured by social movements, such as the Right to 
Information, the Rural Employment Guarantee or the Forest Rights Act. Sovereignty is thus a 
vexatious concept that shifts its source in complex ways but especially assumes greatest force against 
more vulnerable “citizens.” 
When forcible acquisition by the state is challenged, the state’s assumption of “sovereignty” 
is challenged as well, and this is a significant problem for democratic principles governing rule of 







given that the “right to property” is not a “fundamental right.” However, is it worthwhile to retain 
this inherently contradictory concept that allows the state to presume “public interest” and use 
“absolute” force depending on the vagaries of the forces and ideologies that influence it? Thus we 
find an expanded scope of eminent domain in recent growth infrastructure policies working towards 
capitalist growth and private interest. Powerful interests and their allies within “the state” find ways 
of  trumping  “consent”  processes  (see  discussion  in  the  next  chapter)  by  invoking  “eminent 
domain.” If the acquisition for development projects must make prior consent mandatory as part of 
the process of “development,” the “overproduced sovereignty” of eminent domain must be pared 
with clear principles, if not done away with. And if equitable redistribution of land and resources 
may not include consent, the power to forcibly acquire land for redistribution must be specified 
through clear constitutional and legal principles and mechanisms, different from the “inherently 
sovereign” power of eminent domain. What existing provisions might egalitarian regimes for land- 
and resource-use draw upon in India? Questions of appropriate principles for redistributive and 
economic justice are considered more fully in the conclusion of this study. I turn below to an 





Eminent Domain vs. the “Third Tier of Democracy” 
 
The federal political structure of India envisages the union or center, the states and village bodies or 
Panchayats as the “three tiers of democracy.” While a specific principle of subsidiarity (or hierarchy) 
between these tiers has not been legally promulgated, there are several legal provisions that enable 
powers for the third tier of Panchayats and institutionalize “local self-determination,” but these are 







a. The Fifth and Sixth Schedules: 
 
The recognition of community as a social unit requiring enabling provisions for protection and for 
social, economic and political justice was envisaged for states with scheduled areas (predominantly 
indigenous) and for states with scheduled tribes (but no scheduled areas) through the Vth and VIth 
schedules of the Constitution (see GoI 2012d). The Vth  schedule refers to scheduled areas in all 
states other than Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, which are covered under the VIth 
schedule. 
Under the Vth  Schedule, in each state with scheduled areas or tribes, a Tribes Advisory 
Council advises on welfare and advancement matters. The Governor of the state can direct that 
particular central (federal) or state laws may not be applicable or applicable with qualifications in 
these  areas  and  may  make  regulations for  peace  and  good  government in  the  area  with  the 
President’s assent and upon consultation with the Council for: a) prohibiting or restricting the 
transfer of land by or among the members of the scheduled tribes; b) regulating allotment of land to 
members of the scheduled tribes; and c) regulating money-lending. 
The  tribal  areas  in  the  VIth    schedule  are  administered  as  Autonomous  Districts  or 
 
Autonomous Regions (determined by the Governor) with District and Regional Councils for the 
exercise of certain legislative and judicial functions. Laws with respect to inheritance, land revenue 
and other matters relating to village or town administration, social customs, marriage and divorce 
can be made by the Councils, with the Governor’s assent. Central and State Acts may not apply to 
these areas or apply with qualifications provided it is directed by the President with respect to the 
union and the Governor with respect to the state. The Councils possess civil and criminal judicial 
powers specified by the Governor. Interestingly, royalties accruing from mining licenses or leases for 
prospecting or extracting minerals in a VIth   schedule district are to be shared with the District 







final arbiter in a dispute. The councils also have the power to make laws regarding the management 
of forests and the allotment or use of land (except reserved forests) with the significant caveat 
“…that nothing in such laws shall prevent the compulsory acquisition of any land, whether occupied 
or  unoccupied, for  public  purposes  in  accordance  with  the  law  for  the  time  being  in  force 
authorizing such acquisition…” (Constitution of India 2012). The Vth and VIth  schedules potentially 
offer substantive limits to the power of eminent domain with significant local decision-making 




b. The 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts: 
 
Two of the more progressive laws in the country for decentralized governance, the Panchayati Raj 
 
73rd  Amendment Act of 1992 and Urban Municipalities 74th  Amendment Act of 1993 entitle the 
right of the residents of Panchayats (elected village bodies) or urban municipal wards to determine 
their own development and function as local self-governing units. These provisions have significant 
scope and include features like the constitution of the gram and ward sabhas for the preparation and 
implementation of economic development and social justice plans; the constitution of elected bodies 
at village, municipal ward and other levels with direct elections and reservations for Scheduled 
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women; local body finance through grants-in-aid and state and central 






c. PESA 1996 and FRA 2006: 
 
Following quick on the heels of the 73rd  and 74th  Amendments and going further, the Panchayat 
Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act 1996 stipulates that the legislature of a State shall not 







traditional management of community resources and the right of the gram sabha (village assembly) to 
safeguard  and  preserve  traditions  and  customs,  cultural  identity,  community  resources  and 
customary modes of dispute resolution (GoI 1996). It provides for the mandatory approval of plans, 
programs and projects for social and economic development by the gram sabha before they are taken 
up for implementation and mandatory consultation (albeit not consent) with them before the 
acquisition of land for development projects or for R&R. Recommendation of the local bodies prior 
to grant of prospecting licenses, mining concessions or leases for minor minerals is mandatory. 
PESA endows the local bodies with powers to prevent alienation of land in a scheduled area and to 
take appropriate action to restore any unlawfully alienated land (ibid.). 
The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) 
Act (FRA) 2006, in addition to securing the right to forest land and produce for forest dwellers 
along similar lines, further vests the gram sabha with the powers of determining the nature of 
individual and community forest rights and pass resolutions to such effect. It also stipulates that any 
resettlement of forest dwellers on account of conservation activity will not be undertaken unless free 
prior consent of the dwellers has been taken, and provides for penalty provisions against officers 




The power of eminent domain contradicts the spirit of the body of legislation effecting significant 
local governance and decentralization of power. This is not to argue that all is well with the 
implementation of the Vth and VIth schedules, the 73rd and 74th Amendments or the PESA and FRA. 
Indeed, there is a mountain of evidence that discloses the weaknesses and failures in the 
implementation of these laws that allow vested interests within and outside local rural and urban 
communities to prevail over decision-making. The implementation of the 74th Amendment in urban 







claims sovereignty over PESA areas and the rights of indigenous communities are flagrantly violated. 
Implementation of FRA is rife with failures in recognizing the rights of forest dwellers. However, 
arbitration by the state and law is important to ensure social justice. It also needs constant 
reinforcement with political organization on the ground, a vibrant culture of activism unfettered by 
interest groups, conscientious media engagement, the judicial system and other avenues for justice 
like commissions for human rights, religious minorities, scheduled castes and tribes and women. 
In principle and in limited practice the Vth and VIth schedules, the 73rd and 74th Amendment 
 
Acts and the PESA and FRA accord a fundamental “third tier” to governance that has the potential 
to bring the affairs of the state and governance more directly under the control of “citizens.” A 
principle of subsidiarity among the tiers of governance has not been promulgated in the constitution 
though, and time and again, local body resolutions are thwarted in confrontation with the state’s 
power of eminent domain. The Pohang Steel Company (POSCO) SEZ area in Orissa where 
Panchayat resolutions against the project are being consistently disregarded is a case in point. The 
referendum for Mumbai SEZ (MSEZ) in Raigad in Maharashtra conducted in 2008 by the district 
authorities was an unprecedented effort in ascertaining consent, albeit post sustained opposition to 
the project. Yet even here the results were never disclosed to the public, rendering the legitimacy of 
the process itself suspect. The “third tier of democracy” needs to be explicitly enabled to effectively 




Judicial Activism: Missing the Wood for the Trees 
 
Some higher courts have recently been taking a stronger position in upholding the rights of local 
bodies and in dismissing land acquisition. In Surendra Singh vs. the State of U.P. (2011), the high 







…the concept of public purpose in land acquisition has to be viewed from an angle which is 
consistent with the concept of a welfare State. …The Courts must examine these questions 
very  carefully  when  little  Indians  lose  their  small  property  in  the  name  of  mindless 
acquisition at the instance of the State. If public purpose can be satisfied by not rendering 
common [people] homeless and by exploring other avenues of acquisition, the Courts, 
before sanctioning an acquisition, must in exercise of its [sic] power of judicial review, focus 
its [sic] attention on the concept of social and economic justice. While examining these 
questions of public importance, the Courts, especially the Higher Courts, cannot afford to 
act as mere umpires (3-4). 
In Jagpal Singh vs. the State of Punjab and Others (2011), the Supreme Court noted that 
common lands of villages have been: 
…grabbed by unscrupulous persons using muscle power, money power or political clout, 
and in many States now there is not an inch of such land left for the common use of the 
people of the village, though it may exist on paper. ...This was done with active connivance 
of the State authorities and local powerful vested interests and goondas [thugs]. 
The case was regarding the acquisition of a village pond in Rohar Jagir village of Punjab 
where despite the Gram Panchayat’s notice to illegal occupiers, they continued with construction on 
the pond. When the villagers appealed to district authorities, the Collector held that to evict the 
occupiers would not be in “public interest” and directed the Panchayat to seek compensation, thus 
colluding in the regularization of an illegal occupation. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the 
acquisition in this instance further directed: 
…all the State Governments in the country that they should prepare schemes for eviction of 
illegal/ unauthorized occupants of Gram Sabha/ Panchayat/ Poramboke [grazing lands]/ 







common use of villagers of the village. …The said scheme should provide for the speedy 
eviction of the illegal occupant, after giving him [sic] a show cause notice and a brief hearing. 
Long duration of such illegal occupation or huge expenditure in making constructions 
thereon or political connections must not be treated as a justification for condoning this 
illegal act or for regularizing the illegal possession. Regularization should only be permitted 
in exceptional cases e.g. where lease has been granted under some Government notification 
to landless labourers or members of scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes… (ibid: 4). 
In these instances, the higher courts have questioned the procedural irregularities and the 
application of “public purpose,” but the principle of eminent domain per se remains unchallenged. 
Judicial activism is found wanting in this regard. Singh (2006) argues that the erosion of the right to 
property is an outcome of a bargain of power in favor of the legislature and executive over the 
judiciary that violates the doctrine of the separation of powers ensuring judicial review, and has 
created a unitary center of power with the state. As such, compensation based on legislated formulae 
of small private transactions at market value of land regularly undervalue the loss of entire ways of 
life for affected communities and the state’s liability towards these, overproducing the “public 
purpose” of a project. As public purpose is solely determined by the executive, it is vulnerable to 
rent seeking capture (ibid.). Thus we find, in Sooraram Pratap Reddy vs. District Collector, Ranga 
Reddy District (2008) the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court regarding the 
acquisition proceedings for an information technology park through a Public Private Partnership as 
permissible stating: “Development of infrastructure is legal and legitimate “public purpose” for 
exercising power of eminent domain. Simply because a company has been chosen for fulfillment of 
such public purpose does not mean that the larger public interest has been sacrificed, ignored or 







the proceedings.” Here, the conflation of public purpose and private interest, backed by the power 
of eminent domain was upheld by the court. 
While  some  judgments  cite  mounting  instances  of  inequality  and  dispossession,  they 
reinforce the state’s sovereignty and its power of eminent domain. In Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. vs. 
Mathias Oram (2010) on the matter of compensation that was not paid to villagers in over 20 years 
of the acquisition of land by Mahanadi Coal fields, the Court ensured a scheme by which the 
compensation could be speedily awarded to people and added: “Most of the mineral wealth of India 
is not under uninhabited wasteland. It lies mostly under dense forests and areas inhabited by people 
who can claim to be the oldest dwellers of this ancient country. Any large scale mining, therefore, 
needs not only huge investments and application of highly developed technology but also en masse 
relocation of the people… But then we have the laws to handle such situations… The law [of land 
acquisition] is based on the twin sound principles of the eminent domain of the sovereign and the largest good of the 
largest number” (emphases added). 
The divergent views expressed in these judgments converge in safeguarding the power of 
eminent domain. The lack of a clear framework for rights to land- and resource-use (or even 
property narrowly defined) and effective safeguards against dispossession add to jurisprudential 
unevenness over the rights of people and communities faced with forcible acquisition. These rights 
cannot be restricted to compensation or the appropriate determination of public purpose and must 
include prior informed consent. Unless such a framework is elucidated, clearly the power of eminent 




Eminent Domain, Continued 
 
The question of “sovereignty” remains unsettled in law. Recent conceptions of “multiple” and 
 







obscure the inherently fraught nature of “sovereignty” under conditions of liberal democracy and 
neoliberal reforms. Rather than “fix” or delimit sovereignty along various “overlapping” domains, it 
is worthwhile to consider that law, like “the state,” works at the behest of social forces, ideology or 
interest groups (cf. Abrams 1982). Eminent domain is a pre-democratic relic of colonial power that 
“overproduces” sovereignty over “vulnerable citizens,” or “subjects.” Existing substantive restraints 
to the doctrine in India are weak and clearly do not restrain arbitrariness in the interpretation of 
“public purpose.” In the absence of clear egalitarian principles, jurisprudence is inconsistent in 
protecting minimal collective or individual land- and resource-use rights, let alone adjudicating 
redistributive economic justice. 
The limits of legality (or rule of law) are broached at the point of resistance. As peasants’ and 
citizens’ groups mobilize against dispossession, their resistance can be overcome through special 
force (repression), or through deliberative (cognitive) and self-restraining (juridical) “revisions” to 
rule of law. Threat of electoral reprisal, as we discover in the subsequent chapters, can at times also 
effect “reversals” in rule of law. In some contexts, overt resistance to dispossession may not arise 
and may not be successful (see for instance Borras and Franco 2013). Safeguards against 
dispossession along clear legal principles are thus necessary. I turn next to two laws, the SEZ Act 















































The text of the law or “bare law” appears as a fixed legal artifact. Analyses of its provisions in their 
broader social context reveal the forces shaping it, and their constantly evolving character. “Rule of 
law” then appears as an unsettled terrain, thick with negotiations of power. In this chapter I trace 
the evolution of the SEZ Act 2005 and the 2013 land acquisition law. Resistance to land acquisition 
for SEZs influenced both laws and political “conciliations” (re)shaped their provisions and at times 
“reversed” them. I critique the “revisions” to these laws from the perspective of their “stake-losers,” 
and conclude the chapter with a synoptic account of the “successful” resistance to the Mumbai SEZ 




The SEZ Act 2005 
 
 
The SEZ Act 2005 was introduced in the lower house of the Parliament of India on June 13, 2005, 
and passed by both houses of the Parliament within two days with little discussion and zero dissent. 
Introduced as policy by the Hindu-nationalist BJP Party-led Alliance in 2000, the SEZ law was 
enacted by the center-right Congress Party-led Alliance which was at the time supported by the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist)69. The new law found unequivocal support across the political 
spectrum. Like Free Trade or Export Processing Zones (FTZs and EPZs) in the Americas, South- 
East Asia or China, SEZs in India aimed at creating export-led enclave economies with competitive 
tax and duty concessions. Ostensibly modeled on the Chinese model that comprises seven large 
state-owned SEZs, the 2005 SEZ law went much further, ambitiously superseding and expanding 
the scope of the existing 11 EPZs in the country. By April 2011, in a span of six years, the (federal) 




69 The Left parties withdrew their support to the ruling United Progressive Alliance government in the summer of 2008 
over the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal but the UPA alliance succeeded in maintaining an overall majority. The 
UPA was reelected to power in the 2009 general elections. 
70 The approvals process of SEZs is in three stages. Initially, an In-principle Approval is given to a proposed SEZ by the 









2011d). This number surprisingly rose from 366 (142 notified) in August 2007 (GoI 2007a; see 
Figure 2 below)—the “global financial meltdown” did evidently little to dampen the enthusiasm for 




Figure 2: Growth of Notified SEZs and Trends in Investment Related 



































Note: 1 Crore is 10 million. 
Source: GoI 2011e 
 
In stark contrast, in less than two years of enactment, tenacious resistance against SEZs 
erupted across  the  country  from  peasants’  and  citizens’  groups,  forcing  the  central  and  state 
governments  to  respond  variously  with  violent  repression,  tactical  reversal,  negotiation  and 
 
 
secured and the process of implementation is demonstrably underway, Formal Approval is given. Notification comes 
after the Formal Approval when all or minimum required land is secured for a project along with necessary approvals 
and the developer is ready to start developing the SEZ. Once the SEZ is sufficiently developed and investing units are 







deference. In Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, West 
Bengal and Haryana states, land and resource acquisition for SEZs emerged as a central focus of 
contention between the state, corporate developers and peasant and citizens groups—the protests 
erupting ferociously in left-ruled, center-right and Hindu right-ruled states alike. 
In the ensuing furor, in March 2007, 14 people died in police firing, while protesting land 
acquisition of 25,000 acres for Indonesian Salim SEZ in Nandigram in West Bengal. As the violence 
escalated in November 2007, with an unclear number of additional people dead (accounts vary from 
7 to 100), the state government eventually moved the SEZ out of the area. Similarly, under immense 
pressure  from  widespread  protests  by  peasants’  and  citizens’  groups,  the  Goa  government 
announced as a “new year gift” on December 31st, 2007, the cancellation of all 15 SEZs in the state, 
three of which had already begun construction, and proceeded to revoke the state’s SEZ policy. By 
November 2009, one of the most ambitious SEZs on the outskirts of Mumbai city in Raigad district 
of Maharashtra state, the Mumbai SEZ, failed to secure even a quarter of the 11,300 hectares of land 
approved for it in the face of staunch peasant resistance, and officially ceased operations (although it 
still shows up in the list of formally approved SEZs). The resistance to SEZs as it unfolded across 
the country from 2007-2010, sent the message loud and clear to the policy establishment—SEZs 
were bad policy, people would not give up their lands; SEZs had to go. 
As they became political “hot potatoes,” the year 2011 saw a near freeze on the enthusiasm 
for new SEZs; there were hardly any new proposals and requests for withdrawal of approved SEZs 
registered a rise (see Indian Express 2012; ET 2013b,c; Financial Express 2013). Today the number 
of approved SEZs has not just stagnated but reduced from 584 in 2011 to 576 (GoI 2013c; 2014a) 
and every Board of Approval meeting for SEZs receives requests for more withdrawals from 
developers. SEZs are now widely portrayed as failures and victims of “unstable policy environment” 







Tax  levied by  the  Finance  Ministry  (see  next chapter). Significantly, the Commerce Ministry’s 
decision to disallow forcible acquisition of land for SEZs in 2007, and the decision by several state 
governments to discontinue any land acquisition for SEZs has been a big blow for developers. 
Not all SEZs are large projects. It can be roughly inferred from the latest sectoral breakdown 
provided by the Commerce Department that of the total 576 formally approved SEZs (with 392 
notified)71 as of May 2014, at least 353 are definitely small IT-related SEZs of around 10-40 hectares 
each; 16 are definitely large multi-product SEZs ranging upward from 1000 hectares each; and the 
remaining 207 are likely sectoral SEZs of 100-500 hectares each (see GoI 2014a; GoI 2014b). The 
land acquisition controversies have been around the medium and large SEZs. Additional figures 
recently released for the land utilization of notified SEZs show that of the total land area of 
47,803.77 hectares comprising the 392 notified SEZs, 21,310.03 hectares of the processing area72 of 
 
SEZs are laying vacant (GoI 2014c). “Processing area” is 50 percent of the entire land area of a 
zone. Subtracting the vacant area from half of the total zones area shows that only 2591.85 hectares 
are currently producing export-related economic activity in zones across the country. 
The legal framework for SEZs has evolved with considerable changes since its inception. 
 
The “formal” SEZ law-making process involved consultations among several Ministries, but its 
“line” Ministry is the Commerce and Industries Ministry and the Commerce Secretary (the highest 
ranking bureaucrat) presides over the Board of Approval (BoA) for SEZs. The BoA is an inter- 
Ministerial body comprising senior and mid-level bureaucrats from the Ministries of Finance 
(Revenue and Excise Departments) and Commerce and Industry, the SEZ Commissioners (see 






71 The drop from 584 in April 2011 to 576 currently is presumably on account of withdrawals and denotifications. While 
the actual list is too long to attach here, the list shows canceled SEZs crossed out in red. 
72 As explained below, 50 percent of SEZ land is considered its economic processing area and the other 50 percent its 







and Industries Ministry oversees the SEZs operational framework of rules, approvals, withdrawals 








The SEZ Act remains comprehensive in its definition of economic activities, including agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing and services within its purview. It defines manufacturing to mean an 
astonishing array of activities from production and assembly to processes ranging from refrigeration, 
cutting, polishing,  blending, repair,  aquaculture, animal  husbandry,  horticulture and  more;  and 
defines services to include all services covered under the General Agreement on Trade in Services of 
the WTO and any others prescribed by the Central Government (GoI 2005). There are no limits to 




b. Land Requirements: 
 
The SEZ law envisioned “floors,” but had no “ceilings.” Initially, there was a “minimum 
requirement” of 1000 hectares for multi-product SEZs, with no ceiling on additional land acquired, 
500 hectares for sector specific SEZs and 100 hectares for service sector SEZs. Amid increasing 
pressure from peasant and citizens groups against land acquisition, notably in the 11,300 hectare 
Mumbai SEZ area (see discussion below), a ceiling of 5000 hectares was introduced in October 
2007, but was later removed. In 2013, after deliberations with developers in light of “land acquisition 
problems,” the Commerce (and Industries) Ministry reduced minimum land requirements to 500 
hectares for multi-purpose SEZs; 50 hectares for sector-specific SEZS; 10 hectares for agro-based 







Land for SEZs was initially acquired by the state governments under the Land Acquisition 
Act 1894 (then in force). As protests escalated, the BoA passed a resolution in April 2007 and sent a 
letter to all state governments stating that no forcible acquisition should be undertaken for SEZs by 
any state government. It added that if any land was found to be acquired forcibly for any SEZ after 
April 5, 2007, the BoA would not approve the SEZ (GoI 2007b). This letter was later backed up by 
a circular to all states in October 2009 (GoI 2009b). 
A major part of the growth envisaged in the SEZs is through real estate and “infrastructure” 
development. Only 50 percent of land in a SEZ is required for “economic processing activities,” and 
the rest can be used for additional “infrastructure” like townships, entertainment services including 
malls and golf courses, or hospitals and educational institutions. The 50 percent figure has an 
interesting trajectory since according to the SEZ Rules notified on February 10, 2006 the minimum 
processing area was initially 25 percent; amended to 35 percent with a relaxation clause to 25 percent 
on August 10, 2006; and further amended to the current 50 percent on October 12, 2007 along with 
the introduction of the 5000 hectare ceiling for multi-product zones. These figures changed as 
protests against land acquisition raged against large SEZs across the country (the large Mumbai SEZ 
was particularly controversial). The land is transferred to the developer in a long-term lease of 35 
years (extendable) and thus the ownership remains with the state. The developer can transfer assets 






SEZs are deemed foreign territory for all economic purposes including trade. Incentives to both, 
units and developers include a wide range of tax concessions and duty exemptions to attract 
investment in these zones. These include duty free imports into the SEZs; Income Tax exemptions 







exemption for the next five and 50 percent on profits “ploughed back” into investment over the 
subsequent five; and exemptions from Central Sales tax and Service Tax. The Finance Ministry has 
been opposed to the 15-year tax concessions and introduced the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) 
effective 2012. The Direct Tax Code (DTC) proposes to shift the profit-based incentive regime into 
an investment-based regime by 2014. However, a recent news item indicates that the Commerce 
Ministry is likely to pursue the removal of MAT and DTC provisions for SEZs under the NDA 
government (Seth 2014). 
While environmental laws are applicable within zones, these can be modified by the state 
governments and SEZs themselves are exempt from environmental clearances. Labor laws are also 
applicable within zones but there is flexibility for state governments to modify them and the Zone 
Authority (see below) is empowered to arbitrate in case of labor action, to call off strikes and 
disband any labor unions. 
Once  they  are  “net  foreign  exchange  positive”  (exporting  at  profit),  SEZ  units  can 
technically sell surplus products and services in the domestic area. There are considerable customs 
duties for sale into the domestic area however, rendering such sales unviable. In industry conclaves I 
attended during 2011-12 several developers argued for duty relief in sales to the domestic market 
given the “global crisis” and “slow” demand in the international market. Domestic sales, they 
argued, would help them attract more investment in the SEZs. But this would also amount to units 
availing tax benefits inside the zones and rendering production in the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) 
unviable, and the proposal was not accepted in the 2013 SEZ rules. Developers also requested 
allowing domestic area customers access to the entertainment, health and education services in the 
“non-processing area” of SEZs. The Commerce Department seemed more sympathetic to this 









Administratively, each zone is to have an Authority comprising the Development Commissioner, 
three central government officers and two industry representatives. The local governance bodies at 
the village level and, through a recent intervention, town municipalities, have no influence on the 
administrative structure of the Zones. By law, only identity-bearing persons are to be allowed entry 
into the zones and each zone is to have its own private security apparatus, making SEZs public- 
private “city-states” (Gopalakrishnan and Shrivastava 2008). 
Section 31(9) of the Act gives considerable immunity to the Authority and states: “no act or 
proceeding of an Authority shall be invalidated because of any vacancy or defect in the constitution 
of the Authority.” It adds that this immunity will apply to “any irregularity in the procedures it [the 
Authority] adopts that don’t affect the merits of a case.” Section 48 of the Act adds that no law suit, 
prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central government or any chairperson, 
member, officer or other employee of the Board of Approval or the Authority or Development 
Commissioner for anything done or intended to be done “in good faith under this Act” (emphases 




The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 
The framework of the 2013 land acquisition law (RTFCTLARRA) has evolved over a decade. The 
 
first post independence central policy on rehabilitation and resettlement was drafted in 2004, and 
was subsequently replaced in 2007 (see GoI 2007c). At the height of controversy around SEZs (with 
the violence in West Bengal as a backdrop), the UPA government introduced the “twin bills,” also in 
2007—the Amendment Bill 2007 and the R&R Bill 2007 in the Parliament. The bills expanded the 







useful to the general public, for which land has been purchased by a person under lawful contract to the 
extent of seventy percent but the remaining thirty percent of the total area of land required for the 
project as yet to be required” (emphases added, GoI 2007d). The “twin bills” were eventually 
dropped, but the expanded scope of “public purpose” was retained and elaborated in all the drafts 
of the new land acquisition law. 
As controversy over inadequate compensation erupted in the northern states of U.P. and 
Haryana in 2011, the Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill 2011 was introduced. 
Going further than the Amendment Bill, it sought to replace the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and 
bring rehabilitation and resettlement for the first time within the ambit of the land acquisition law. 
Subsequent versions of the bill and the eventually enacted law in 2013 retained rehabilitation and 
resettlement provisions, although they have changed dramatically in the process (see GoI 2012b; 
GoI 2013d).73  The 2013 land acquisition law (RTCTLARRA) is historic in the mere fact that it 









The law emphasizes the new policy trinity of “infrastructure, industrialization and urbanization” in 
its preamble, stating that it is: 
A Bill to ensure, in consultation with institutions of local self-government and Gram Sabhas 
established  under  the  Constitution,  a  humane,  participative,  informed  and  transparent 





73 For accounts of the land acquisition law deliberations see Goswami 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Ramadorai 2012; Vohra and 







urbanisation with the least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families… 
 
(emphases added; GoI 2013d). 
 
It includes acquisition by “appropriate government” (state or central departments) for own 
use, hold and control (including Public Sector Undertakings); for strategic defense purposes; 
infrastructure projects as notified by the center (federal government); agriculture related projects; 
industrial  corridors,  mining  and  National  Investment  and  Manufacturing  Zones;  water  and 
sanitation, educational, sports, health-care, tourism, transportation and space program related 






The 2013 law envisages Social Impact Assessments with participation of affected communities and a 
public hearing74  to determine the efficacy of the “public purpose” of a project. The SIA 
recommendations, however, are non-binding and the ultimate determination of legitimate public 
purpose lies with the same “appropriate government” that approves the project in the first place. 
Objections to acquisition or social impact reports can be heard by the district collector who will then 
make recommendations to the “appropriate government” for final decision on “public purpose.” 
Objections to compensation awards can be made to a duly established “authority.” 
Violating the spirit of the corpus of laws protecting scheduled areas and tribes (see previous 
chapter) however, the 2013 law allows for the acquisition of scheduled lands, but with “prior 




74 Environmental Impact Assessments under the Environmental (Protection) Act 1986 mandate Public Hearings as part 
of the environmental clearance required for certain category of projects. However, the proceedings of these hearings 
have no legal force and are merely to be taken into account while granting clearance to a project. 
75 “Prior informed consent” was significantly debated in India with the anti-displacement struggle in the Narmada river 
valley and the World Commission on Dams process refined the concept (see WCD 2000). The 2007 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples established the principle of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) 
internationally. In this case this international norm, intended to protect, is providing the language of “prior consent” to 







land-owners is required for private projects; and of 70 percent for Public Private Partnership 
projects (the difference seems arbitrary). No clear procedure for consent is clarified in the law 
however, and while gram sabhas and urban local bodies are to be “consulted,” resolutions taken by 
these bodies find no clear role. The procedure to be followed if there is no consent is also not clear. 
Consent is not required for government acquisitions. By leaving out the corpus of land 
acquisition undertaken by the state from the purview of consent, the law ignores the fact that in 
several areas, Nandigram or Singur in West Bengal, Raigad in Maharashtra, or in villages in Goa, 
Andhra or Odisha, people agitated against the state, and against acquisition itself, and not for better 
rehabilitation and resettlement. The law sidesteps this fundamental issue of “consent” and focuses 






Legal entitlements for rehabilitation and resettlement for land-owners and landless laborers, artisans, 
fisherfolk, tribal and traditional forest-dwellers dependent on land are welcome measures covered by 
the law. Landless people who do not work on land directly but are dependent on land-based and 
other rural communities, such as barbers, ironsmiths and other rural service providers are left out of 
the compensation framework. 
The 2011 draft increased compensation with four times the prevailing market rate of land in 
rural areas and twice in urban areas (although whittling down of these factor multiples was in the 
offing, see Ghildiyal 2012), with annuity and additional compensation benefits. The 2013 Law 







business lobbies to serve their own interests (see Americas Quarterly May 8, 2014 special feature issue on consulta previa or 







compensation should be at market value of the land or twice that in rural areas, depending on 
distance from an urban area. Compensation in urban areas is fixed at “market value.” 
Market value is to be determined by calculating the average market value of land transactions 
in the area for the previous three years, from half the highest sale transactions. Sale deeds however, 
never reflect the real sale price of land as transacting parties “depress” official prices to avoid stamp 
duties (see discussion in Chapter four). Besides, the significant escalation of land and property prices 
in project areas once a “development” project is announced is unaccounted for, as awards are to be 
determined on the transactions of prior years. 
The initial draft of the Bill was to have retrospective effect for five years. With public 
criticism and resistance from industry and the business press, the subsequent versions dropped the 
retrospective clause. The 2011 draft also imposed rehabilitation and resettlement coverage on land 
purchased by private parties for any project over 100 acres in rural areas and 50 acres in urban areas. This was a 
significant sore point in the business press in the debates over the land acquisition law. The 2013 
law, at already lower rates of compensation, extends this rehabilitation and resettlement coverage for 
private  purchase  only  above  an  area  “specified  by  the  appropriate  government,”  or  if  the 
“appropriate government” was approached by the private party for land acquisition, to the entire 
area. This is claimed to safeguard federalism, but competitive bidding by states to attract investment 
can potentially raise such limits arbitrarily (see also Levien 2012). Without ceilings on the extent of 
land that can be acquired, unlimited acquisition can intensify inequalities of ownership, access and 
wealth. 
Historically oppressed Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) communities (see 
note 33 in chapter two) and other agriculturists displaced in irrigation projects are to be given land 
for land, but whether commensurate quality can or will be guaranteed is questionable. Similarly, 20 












d. Agricultural Land: 
 
The initial draft of the law allowed no acquisition of multi-crop irrigated land, but the second 
version altered this with the qualifier that it could be minimally acquired and never above five 
percent of the state’s total cultivable area. The 2012 version stated that such land would be acquired 
only under “exceptional circumstances,” as a “last resort” and would not exceed limits notified by 
the “appropriate government” (state or central depending on jurisdiction), nor exceed the total net 
sown area of the district or state. It stipulated that an equivalent area of culturable wasteland would 
be developed or an amount  equivalent to the value of such land shall be deposited with the “appropriate 
government,” for investment in agriculture to enhance food security. The 2013 law retained these provisions to 
“safeguard food security,” but exempted all linear projects such as highways, railways and irrigation 
canals. 
Given population densities and the paucity of fertile land, the second option of depositing 
an amount with the “appropriate government,” rather than developing additional culturable 
wasteland seems more likely. This raises possibility for irreparable loss of agricultural land, even as 
land and resources get alienated from local producers for “public purpose.” With the propensity to 
encourage agribusiness, “food security” can be conflated with “food production.” The limits for 
acquiring agricultural land are to be determined by the “appropriate government,” which is also 
responsible for “sanctioning” the project in the first place. The disregard for any ceilings potentially 
facilitates highly unequal concentration of land and resources. With the scale of appropriation 







livelihood security of the people who stand to lose their access to land and resources. I turn below 
 








Iyer (2007) argues that in the case of people threatened with dispossession due to “development” 
projects, it is a cruel irony to call them “stake-holders.” Considering that many SEZs required 
hundreds of hectares of land, the dispossession of land, resources, livelihoods and communities 
were not even a matter for initial policy consideration. Recall that in 2008, then Commerce and 
Industries Minister Kamal Nath claimed that SEZs have nothing to do with displacement. 
Repeated demonstrations, blockades, marches, petitions and gram sabha (village assembly) 
 
resolutions in the SEZ areas, often spanning several years in which hundreds and thousands of 
people spent money, energy and time, are marked features of the resistance to SEZs (and other 
growth infrastructure and urbanization projects) across the country. Alliances between citizens 
groups, peasants, fisherfolk, indigenous people, and other concerned persons have emerged over the 
course of these struggles. The resistance to land acquisition in several large and medium SEZ areas 
has  had  significant  extra-legal  influence  on  the  law-making  processes  of  the  SEZ  and  land 
acquisition laws. 
For instance, land acquisition for SEZs was initially undertaken by the state by the exercise 
of eminent domain (under then in force LAA 1894), and transferred to “developers” in long-term 
extendable leases of 35 years. By April 2007, with the escalation of SEZ conflicts, the Commerce 
Department sent out the circular to all states stating that no forcible acquisition for SEZs should be 
taken and backed it up with an order in 2009. 
As the Mumbai SEZ controversy festered over 11,300 hectares of proposed acquisition, the 
 







clarified which 5000 hectares were subsequently sought by the Mumbai SEZ; the question became 
irrelevant as the SEZ ceased operations by 2009. The 5000 hectare ceiling was later withdrawn. 
Around the same time as the ceiling issues related to the Mumbai SEZ, questions around the “non- 
processing area” emerged. The initial figure of 25 percent for processing and the rest for “social 
infrastructure” including malls and swimming pools indicated real estate interests factored into 
SEZs. The non-processing area was subsequently raised as allegations of real estate scams grew, 
especially in SEZ areas on the outskirts of urban areas. 
Another major policy arena that the resistance to SEZs influenced was the repeal of the 
Land Acquisition Act 1894 and its eventual replacement with the 2013 law. The new law brought 
compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement within the purview of a land acquisition law for the 
first time. It also secured “consent-based” acquisition for private and Public Private Partnerships 
and other private “infrastructure” projects. It introduced higher compensation at two times the 
market rate in areas far from the urban periphery. It also introduced Social Impact Assessments. 
While the limitations of the 2013 land acquisition law are many, these significant features were a 
direct result of the “politicization” of land acquisition, to a great extent around SEZs. 
These limited “concessions” to agitations also came at a high price. Through the course of 
agitations,  the  stonewalling  and/  or  repression  of  “stake-losers”  were  and  continue  to  be  a 
consistent feature, in stark contrast with the “stake-holder consultations” held by state actors with 
developers (see discussion in the next chapter). I describe below the resistance to the Mumbai SEZ 
briefly, as a study in contrast with the privileged “stake-holder” discussions, and the general lack of 
accountability of “the state” towards “stake-losers.” The agitation also underlines the limits of 
“revisions” as peasants’ and citizens’ groups opposing SEZs and other growth infrastructures refuse 







Resistance in the Rice Bowl76 
 
Traditionally called bhatyacha kotha (rice bowl), large parts of Raigad district in Maharashtra lie along 
the coast of the Arabian Sea, making them fertile areas for rice production, fish and salt pans, mostly 
for subsistence or local markets. A large majority of the land owners are small peasants with two or 
three acres of land and also have at least one person in the family with a job either in government 
departments  or  small-scale  enterprises;  although  farm-land  forms  a  crucial  part  of  the  local 
livelihood strategy. The land owners also employ landless indigenous communities from the area 
who work on the fields for daily wages during the rainy season. A majority of the small farmers of 
the region are from the kohli or aghri castes, traditional fisherfolk and cultivators, who received land 
for cultivation ironically under the land reforms undertaken by the state in the 1960s. 
Located strategically close to Mumbai city with its ever expanding real estate market, with 
four ports (existing and planned) in the surrounding area and a proposed bridge across the sea 
connecting downtown Mumbai, the “multi-product” Mumbai SEZ was to come up on 11,300 
hectares of land in the Raigad district of Maharashtra. Panvel, Pen and Uran tehsils (administrative 
blocks) of the district where the 45 villages to be displaced by the MSEZ are located, are along the 
outskirts of Mumbai city, making them prime targets for real estate and industrial development.  The 
project was promoted by Reliance Industries, one of the most prominent Indian corporate houses, 
which was also proposing to build a bridge over the sea connecting the SEZ area to downtown 
South Mumbai (South Mumbai real estate prices compare with the highest real estate markets 
globally). Local residents alleged that the Mumbai SEZ was in effect a “real estate zone” to serve the 
urban elites of Mumbai. 
As I conducted fieldwork in the area in the summer of 2008, resistance had been brewing for 
 
three years since the intention to create an SEZ in the area had become publicly known in 2005 (the 
 
 
76 This narrative is constructed from field-notes and interviews conducted in the MSEZ area in June-July 2008. See also 







state had introduced its SEZ policy under the 2000 Export-Import policy before the central law 
came  into  effect).  Villages  in  different  tehsils  organized  independently  and  adopted  different 
strategies for mobilization and resistance. 
Ganesh Thakur, a small entrepreneur from a peasant family in Vadav village in Pen was 
reportedly contacted by an “agent” of the Mumbai SEZ to help secure land for the company. At the 
time, he had no information regarding the proposed SEZ. As he began facilitating the sales, section 
four notices (disclosing preliminary interest in the land to be acquired) under the LAA 1894 were 
released by the tehsil in August 2006. The notices indicated the scale of the intended acquisition of 
11,300 hectares covering 45 villages for the MSEZ. This revelation raised alarm in the area, and 
 
Ganesh Thakur soon emerged as one of the foremost opponents of the project. 
 
Rajan Jemse, a middle-class professional also of peasant background from Vashi village in 
Pen, made extensive use of the provisions of the Right to Information Act 2005 to unearth project- 
related documents from a number of state departments and offices. Documents revealed that the 
Hetavne (small) dam irrigation scheme, which peasants had been waiting for nearly twenty years, was 
to be diverted to the Mumbai SEZ. By law, irrigated land could not be acquired for any public 
purpose. Official records showed that the land in question was “unirrigated,” and even “barren,” 
despite standing crops of rice at the time of fieldwork.77  People from the area asserted that their 
lands were fertile and that their villages were to be covered under the Hetavne scheme, and hence 
their land ought to be considered irrigated. Residents from the villages in the Hetavne catchment 
area organized themselves into the Baavis Gaon Sangharsh Samiti (22-Village Struggle Committee). 
Jemse and other residents argued that “the state” was facilitating a transfer of commons and “public 
investment” to the “private sector” and that all investments with agricultural support schemes in the 
area over the years stood to be similarly appropriated for the use of a private entity. The information 
 
 
77 See Borras and Franco (2013) for a discussion of the justifying narratives of “marginal” and “available” lands deployed 







regarding the diversion of the Hetavne dam proved critical in catalyzing resistance in the 22 villages 
of Pen. 
For Kasu Mhatre of Vadav, losing her three acres of land meant the loss of a crucial source 
of livelihood support. While her husband was employed in a “government job” as a clerk, the rice 
from the fields was critical for feeding her family, with two young children. The loss of homestead 
land was an additional fear as prices in the area would become prohibitive if the project came up. 
MSEZ claimed that the habitation sites in the villages would be left untouched. This was perceived 
as a facetious argument by residents, as the habitation sites fell within the boundaries of the 
proposed SEZ. The low-lying SEZ area was to be “developed” by land filling to secure construction 
from flooding through nearby creeks. Residents claimed this would create havoc with access to 
habitation sites as well as increase threatened flooding as a result of land fills. Mhatre emerged as a 
critical organizer in the struggle, and was arrested and jailed for seven days in the course of protests. 
This was not an easy battle. Series of protests, road blockades, petitions, marches and tense 
negotiations with the state in local tehsil headquarters and Mumbai followed. The 22-Village 
Committee was joined in this effort by a local political leader from the Workers and Peasants Party, 
N.D. Patil, and other local and regional political leaders and social activists. They networked with 
other  groups  opposing  SEZs,  and  made  contacts  in  the  local  and  national  media.  The  area’s 
proximity to Mumbai and the involvement of Reliance Industries, helped with media attention. 
Mumbai SEZ reportedly used a variety of tactics. Indirect pressure through “agents” who tried to 
persuade the residents to give up the struggle and accept a relatively more generous compensation 
package that promised jobs to local families and public relations campaigns by the developer failed 
to win local sympathy. The 22-Village Committee waged an effective campaign for three years and 








The remaining twenty-three villages in Uran (22) and Panvel (1) tehsils did not come under 
the Hetavne irrigation scheme. Sanjay Thakur of Khopta village in Uran tehsil had discovered the 
MSEZ plans in a newspaper announcement of section 4 of the LAA 1894 in December 2005. When 
the formal notices were released in the tehsil in early 2006, people from the area organized and 
submitted formal objections to the land acquisition officer in Uran. In August of 2006, 5000 people 
from these villages demonstrated in front of the Uran tehsil office. Forming the Shetkari Sangharsh 
Samiti (Peasant Struggle Committee), they contacted lawyers and senior legal experts to file a Public 
Interest Litigation (PIL) in the High Court of Maharashtra. 
Dr. Subhash Gharat, a medical doctor and resident of Chirner village in Uran active in the 
local resistance to MSEZ, summed up the predicament of the residents. He said that the need of the 
hour in the area was “development,” but this forced acquisition of land and resources and their 
transfer to the private sector belied claims of any local development for residents and fundamentally 
threatened  their  livelihoods  and  homes.  The  residents of  the  area  repeatedly  raised  concerns 
regarding their survival as they were ill-equipped with skills to survive outside of cultivation, and 
pointed to the limited utility of cash compensation. 
The fate of the litigation remained undecided with Mumbai SEZ lawyers requesting that the 
case be clubbed with all other SEZ-related cases in the country and be transferred to the Supreme 
Court of India for a single hearing on the SEZ Act. The existence of the April 2007 BoA letter 
asking states not to acquire land forcibly for SEZs was not known among the residents even in the 
summer of 2008. Even as the popular struggle continued with relentless agitations and 
demonstrations, Mumbai SEZ attempted to buy land in the area. Residents complained of “middle- 
men” hired by the developer to alternatively heckle or persuade them into selling. Mumbai SEZ 







person from each family. Local residents claimed that the only jobs they would be provided were 
blue collar service jobs like security or cleaning and that this did not amount to “development.” 
In April 2008 the Raigad district administration conducted an unprecedented Referendum 
on the Mumbai SEZ in the area. While the results of the Referendum were never officially released, 
local organizations claimed that 96 percent of the residents had voted against the project. This 
would be hard to verify, but the fact that MSEZ failed to acquire more than 20 percent of the land it 
sought in the area, bears testimony to the extent of resistance. The state-led land acquisition process 
was abandoned around this time. The ceiling of 5,000 hectares for large SEZs was introduced in 
2009, but in the summer of 2009, during follow-up interviews, there was no clarity among local 
officials and residents if this meant the Mumbai SEZ would be split into two contiguous SEZs or 
sized by a little over half, and which part would be retained, despite the earlier assurance by the state 
government that the Hetavne irrigation area would not be included in the SEZ. By the end of 2009, 
the “in-principle approval” period of three years for the Mumbai SEZ began to lapse and it ceased 
acquisition operations. 
As the developers applied for an extension of the period, the central (federal) Board of 
Approval of SEZs rejected its appeal and advised the developer to submit a fresh proposal if the 
Mumbai SEZ wished to continue attempts at developing a SEZ in the area. In the latest approval 
lists of the Board of Approval however, the Mumbai SEZ still shows in the list of “in-principle 
approvals” (see GoI 2013c). 
Resistance strategies straddled a multiplicity of approaches, from direct confrontation to 
legal recourse as people in the area negotiated their lives amid extreme uncertainty and insecurity. 
Accessing and sharing information regarding the project was critical to catalyzing resistance and 
forging alliances for both, the 22-Village Committee and the Peasant Struggle Committee. 







relatively generous land acquisition compensations in this case, what stands out clearly is the 
unwillingness of peasants and other local residents to give up small holdings of land and homestead. 
The Mumbai SEZ will likely not be able to acquire land in the area without considerable repression, 
but given the proximity of the area to Mumbai with its coastal access, its powerful promoter and 
continued listing in the “approvals list,” the threat of dispossession for local residents has not 
entirely disappeared. I examine next the workings of power in the “behind-the scenes” SEZ law- 






























The Domain of the State 
 
 







Corridors of Power 
 
The Revenge of Finance 
 
“Liberty will not descend upon a people. A people must raise themselves to liberty that must be earned before it can be 
enjoyed.” It was a muted Delhi winter afternoon in November 2011 as I made my way up the wide 
red sandstone steps to the North Block. As I walked towards North Block’s entrance, I was greeted 
by these words inscribed along its arched stone entrance. With the Rashtrapati Bhavan (President’s 
House) in the center, the North and South Blocks flank either side of the expansive driveway leading 
up to the Bhavan.78 Together, the two Blocks host several important Ministries such as Finance, 
Home, and the Prime Minister’s Office. I was there to meet the Joint Secretary Finance, second in 
the Finance Ministry’s bureaucratic hierarchy. He had chanced to answer my call intended for his 
personal secretary, and I “luckily” landed an interview with him without circuitous protocol. As I 
entered the corridors of the Ministry, I wondered if, somewhat ironically, the inscription was an 
unwitting invitation to all “people” across time. I later learned that these were Queen Victoria’s 
words, likely inscribed upon direction of the main designer of the palatial premises and much of 
colonial New Delhi, Edwin Lutyen, after whom many parts of what is now central Delhi are called 
“Lutyen’s Delhi.”79 
In his budget speech in March 2011, the Finance Minister had announced a Minimum 
Alternate Tax (MAT) of 18.5% on booked profits, bringing within the tax net all industries that 








78 This was formerly the British Viceroy’s palace. 
79 Herbert Baker, attributed with designing many significant buildings in Cape Town around the time, assisted him on 
this assignment, especially for the North and South Blocks. The Bhavan itself was built in the early 20th Century by 
clearing the Rasina and Malcha villages of a few hundred families, under the Land Acquisition Act 1894.This incredibly 
powerful elite area of Delhi subsequently came to be called Raisina Hill, in obvious allusion to the ruling caste 







distressed industrialists and developers of Special Economic Zones (SEZs).80  I was eager to 
understand why the central (federal) government was seemingly “axing its own foot” with the MAT 
and other proposed measures like the Direct Taxes Code (DTC), that was to replace the Income 
Tax Act 1961 and among other things, link tax incentives to the scale of investments made by 
industries, rather than give them tax concessions on profits. 
What I got from the Joint Secretary Finance, Ashutosh Dixit, was a lesson in “revenue 
foregone” (or lost) by the central government as a result of existing tax concessions. He explained 
that the diversion of export-oriented industries from the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) to SEZs81 was 
the reason behind the zero growth of exports from the domestic area in recent years, and the 100 
percent growth of exports from SEZs. I also learned that the SEZ “model itself was flawed.” 
Instead of promoting manufacturing, he asserted, the “model was catering too much to the services 
sector, [and] services never needed a boost since they were anyway doing well.” He argued that it 
was sufficient to reduce taxes for units in SEZs, but the country could not afford to give up revenue 
from SEZs altogether (interview November 24, 2011). 
This interview clinched my interest in the deeply divided motives and arguments of the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) over SEZs, which 
several sources were alluding to in the course of my research. As I dug deeper, interviews with 
bureaucrats and developers, as well as bureaucratic paper trails between the two Ministries revealed 
that the differences were entrenched, pointing to intense rivalry, mistrust and policy divergence. 
The Finance Ministry then released a “harmonized” definition of infrastructure in March 
 





80 Under the SEZ Act 2005, until then, SEZ developers and units enjoyed blanket tax concessions for the first five years 
of operations, 50 percent concessions on booked profits for the next five years and an additional 50 percent concession 
on profits “ploughed back” into investment in the SEZ for the subsequent five. The 18.5 percent MAT reduced tax 
benefits in SEZs (see previous chapter). 







smoother implementation of “infrastructure” projects. A “master list” deemed as “infrastructure” all 
public and private undertakings for transport, communication, energy, water and sanitation and social 
and commercial infrastructure; commercial infrastructure included private investments in health, 
education, SEZs, industrial parks and tourism facilities (GoI 2012c; see Table 1 below). SEZs were 
not liable for forcible acquisition under a departmental order from 2007 (GoI 2007b; 2009a), but 
their inclusion in the list seemed to open a possibility for doing this. 
Table 1: List of sub-sectors for Infrastructure Lending 




1. Roads and bridges 
2. Ports1 
3. Inland Waterways 
4. Airport 
5. Railway Track, tunnels, viaducts, bridges2 





1. Electricity Generation 
2. Electricity Transmission 
3. Electricity Distribution 
4. Oil pipelines 
5. Oil/Gas/Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) storage facility3 




Water & Sanitation 
1. Solid Waste Management 
2. Water supply pipelines 
3. Water treatment plants 
4. Sewage collection, treatment and disposal system 
5. Irrigation (dams, channels, embankments etc) 
6. Storm Water Drainage System 
7. Slurry Pipelines 
 
Communication 
1. Telecommunication (Fixed network)5 
2. Telecommunication towers 
3. Telecommunication & Telecom Services 
 
 
Social and Commercial 
Infrastructure 
1. 
Education Institutions (capital stock) 
2. 
Hospitals (capital stock)6 
3. 
Three-star or higher category classified hotels located outside cities with population of more than 1 
million 
4. 
Common infrastructure for industrial parks, SEZ, tourism facilities and agriculture markets 
5. 
Fertilizer (Capital investment) 
6. 








Hotels with project cost8 of more than Rs.200 crores each in any place in India and of any star rating; 
11. 
Convention Centres with project cost8 of more than Rs.300 crore each. 
1. Includes Capital Dredging 
2. Includes supporting terminal infrastructure such as loading/unloading terminals, stations and buildings 
3. Includes strategic storage of crude oil 
4. Includes city gas distribution network 
5. Includes optic fibre/cable networks which provide broadband / internet 
6. Includes Medical Colleges, Para Medical Training Institutes and Diagnostics Centres 
7. Includes cold room facility for farm level pre-cooling, for preservation or storage of agriculture and allied produce, marine products and meat. 
8. Applicable with prospective effect from the date of this circular and available for eligible projects for a period of three years; Eligible costs exclude cost of land and 










On the one hand, Finance82 had deliberately stymied the SEZ model by introducing the 
Minimum Alternate Tax and the Direct Taxes Code, and on the other it sought to facilitate the 
smoother implementation of “infra” projects. I learned over the course of research that the 
differences between the Commerce and Finance Ministries modeled divergent policy imperatives for 
the (central) Government of India; Finance oriented towards an “inclusive” model of “economic 
growth” with revenue collection for state expenditures, while Commerce took a more “hardline” 
approach of “minimal government,” allowing capital a freer run with subsidies and concessions. But 
what constituted “infrastructure,” and its significance for “economic growth,” was undisputed 




The institution of the SEZ model in India met two key sources of resistance that transformed its 
implementation trajectory. One was the intense peasants and citizens’ resistance to land acquisition, 
especially for large and medium SEZs; and the other, somewhat unlikely, was the Ministry of 
Finance, which objected to their scale, scope and tax and duty concessions from the word go. While 
resistance highlighted dispossession, corruption and real estate scams in the institution of SEZs, 
Finance consistently warned of their potential for “land-grabs,” speculative investment in real estate, 
transfer of existing industries to SEZs and the “revenue foregone” by “concessions.” These two 
arenas of resistance effectively dampened the SEZ model and changed the rules of the SEZ law (or 
game), and influenced the formulation of the new land acquisition law. 
This chapter analyzes the “behind-the-scenes” law-making process of SEZs. The “formal” 
 






82 In the interests of readability I refer to the Finance Ministry as simply Finance and to the Commerce and Industries 







that have been at loggerheads over them. “Soft law”83 settings (by which I refer to industry- 
bureaucrat conclaves and recommendations by industry in the form of submissions or reports), were 
also powerful influences on the policy framework. Extra-legal influences, like the protests in SEZ 
areas, influenced political “course-correction” and I discussed them in the previous chapter, but 
beyond the pale of evidence and shadowing “formal” and “soft law” circuits, rumors and gossip 
point to bureaucratic “turf wars,” Ministerial rivalries and high-level corruption as major extra-legal 
forces shaping the law. These “circuits of power” have determined the trajectory of SEZ 
infrastructures in India. Their analyses offer insights into the motivations and forces driving other 
“growth infrastructures,” like the ambitious Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). 
The materiality of infrastructure allows for the possibility of exchange and circulation of 
goods, ideas, waste, power, people and finance, among other things; and also signifies aesthetic and 
affective desire and possibility (cf. Larkin 2013). Infrastructure also signifies paradigms of 
development. In the post liberalization period in India there has been a marked shift from the post- 
independence model of state-led investments in infrastructure, to private investments or Public 
Private Partnership models (see also Nilsen 2010; Goldman 2011). The institution of what I call the 
“infrastructures of growth,” facilitates the circuits of capital with a deeply embedded (if hackneyed) 
model of “trickle-down” development. 
At the scale envisioned in the policy framework, investments in “growth infrastructures” 
fundamentally reconfigure relationships with land and resources84—moving people away from 
agrarian  mores  and  other possibilities of  “development” or  “infrastructures,” and  engendering 
deeper dependence on capital’s investment circuits. Unwittingly for public and private and investors, 
 
83 Zerillo (2010) refers to “soft law” as non-binding but coercive processes of closed-door consultations and 
recommendations that result in non-binding directives, declarations, resolutions, which inevitably come to be enacted as 
law. This interpretation is disputable, as coercion renders these processes more appropriately in the realm of “mixed” or 
“private governance.” Here I refer to “soft law” as arguably non-coercive closed-door consultations and 
recommendations from private bodies that influence law-making (see discussion later in the chapter). 








the institution of growth infrastructures by private entities is also allowing (often) successful 
opposition movements of peasants’ and citizens’ groups challenging takeovers of land and resources 
for  private  interest.  An  ongoing  dialectic  of  “institution-opposition”  is  creating  contingent 
“revisions” in legal frameworks, but the impact of “revisions” on resistance is minimal as people 
resist dispossession. Any analysis of these significant transformations then, behooves examination of 
policy-making processes: the who, what, why and when of law-making that despite ostensibly 
democratic frameworks, are invariably obscured in bureaucratic practices or rendered invisible in 
“corridors of power.” 
The materials for this chapter were obtained from interviews with senior and mid-level 
bureaucrats in the Ministries of Commerce and Industry and Finance; SEZ Commissioners and 
administrators; SEZ developers and unit owners; legal experts; journalists; and academics in and 
around Delhi, Mumbai and Goa. I also attended four industry-bureaucrat conclaves on SEZs 
organized by industry and state bodies. I tracked archival records of communications, agendas and 
minutes of meetings, reports and documents available on Ministerial websites as well as industry, 
media and academic archives on SEZs. Contentious communications between the Finance and 
Commerce Ministries were especially hard to come by, and I describe below how I came upon them, 




Archival Tra(va)ils and Infrastructures of Information 
 
Then Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh convened a meeting in April 2005 with several 
Ministers of his Cabinet, to intervene in the matter of Ministerial differences over SEZs, particularly 
between the Finance and Commerce Ministries.  A number of issues were resolved in the meeting 
and Finance had to back off on its objections to the SEZ framework proposed by Commerce on 







was taken to constitute an Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) with special cabinet powers to 
resolve  further  differences  (F.No.149/61/2003/TPL),  and  the  documents  related  to  EGoM 
meetings shed important light on how the SEZ policy framework evolved. The EGoM comprised 
Ministers of Commerce and Industry; Finance; Agriculture; Consumer Affairs, Food and Public 
Distribution; Home Affairs; Law and Justice; Labour and Employment; Defence; and 
Communications and Information Technology. 
The intervention of the Prime Minister underlines the significant political status the SEZ 
policy enjoyed at the time. A corollary to this status however, is that documents related to issues 
under deliberation by the EGoM are considered “confidential” and inaccessible to “ordinary 
citizens,” even under the wide entitlements of the Right to Information legislation.85 Once an issue is 
resolved  and  no  longer  under  the  EGoM’s  deliberation  however,  related  documents  can 
theoretically, by law, be accessed upon request. 
After trying in vain for several months to access EGoM meeting-related documents through 
simple requests and applications with officials in the Commerce Department, I finally consulted the 
Director SEZs (third in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the Commerce department) and filed a Right 
to Information application requesting access to EGoM documents in September 2011. The reply to 
my application came in October 2011 and revealed that nine EGoMs had been convened over SEZs 
until then (and to date), from 2006-08. I had also asked for photocopies of minutes, agendas and 
file-notings86 related to all EGoM meetings in my application. In his reply, the Director SEZs (the 






85  As explained in the introduction, the Right to Information (RTI) Act 2005, gives wide entitlements to citizens for 
accessing public documents and information. An application is typically made to the designated information officer in a 
department, to which the officer must reply in writing within 30 days with the requested information or reasons for its 
denial. 
86 These are hand written notes of various bureaucrats and Ministers on their file correspondence that reveal “who said 







documents I had requested under provisions exempting access to information affecting “national 
security.” 
I was keen to not ruffle feathers and jeopardize access to other relevant information (like 
tips and invites for business conclaves on SEZs). It was only in February 2012 that I broached the 
issue again in an interview, this time with Joint Secretary Commerce (second in the Ministerial 
bureaucratic hierarchy). I mentioned my previous application and suggested that relevant rules 
indicated that I could be given copies of documents related to EGoMs that were no longer under 
deliberation. I explained that these documents were significant for my research, as I was studying the 
SEZ law-making process. Since the last EGoM had been convened in October 2008, I suggested 
that the grounds for denial may not be valid. He congenially recommended I approach the Cabinet 
Secretariat as it had begun servicing EGoMs from 2010. 
When I contacted the Cabinet Secretariat, they asked me to file an application with the 
Commerce Ministry as it had been the “line” Ministry servicing SEZ EGoMs during the period I 
sought documents for (2006-08), and the Cabinet Secretariat had only begun servicing EGoMs from 
2010. I contacted the Joint Secretary and the Director SEZs again, updating them regarding the 
 
Cabinet Secretariat’s response and once again requesting the information I sought. The Director 
SEZs promised to process my request and get back to me. When I got no reply from him for nearly 
a month, I went to meet him again. He suggested that I file a fresh RTI application with the same 
request. I immediately did so, asking for some other relevant information as well. The additional 
information I sought was clarified in April (albeit after the 30-day stipulated period and another 
reminder from me), but the EGoM documents were left unaddressed in his reply.  I then appealed 
to the Appellate Authority (typically the next higher official), in this case, the same Joint Secretary 







The greater the difficulties I encountered in gaining access to EGoM documents, the more I 
was convinced that these documents would reveal important information. In the meanwhile, a 
journalist I knew put me in touch with a colleague from an important business daily who had 
previously filed an information application on SEZ-related documents with the Commerce 
Department. The said journalist gave me all his documents in soft copy format. A scan through the 
1500 page set of documents revealed that they contained at least some EGoM-related documents. 
Perhaps they had accidentally come in with the rest of the SEZ-related documents the journalist had 
requested, or a journalist was not someone to be messed with. Another journalist I knew additionally 
agreed to give me hard copies of all the SEZ-related documents he had previously procured from 
the Finance Ministry through a reliable “contact.” I sensed that I may have had enough material for 
my research, but pursued my information application to ensure that I had all the relevant documents 
in one place, and also out of a sense of intrigue regarding the denial of information. 
In response to my appeal, the Appellate Authority again denied the information I sought, 
citing the same national security exemption in his May 2012 reply. By then, my fieldwork in Delhi 
had already drawn to a close and I had relocated to Goa. I decided to file a second appeal with the 
Chief Information Commission87 in Delhi. Alas, the Information Commission’s backlog is huge and 
by the time my appeal came up for hearing in 2013, I was in New York writing my dissertation and 
unable to attend. A delay in getting the date of hearing notification meant that I could not request 
that a representative attend the hearing. Nevertheless, the Director SEZs had to appear for the 
hearing, and in his explanation claimed that EGoM issues were still under consideration and hence 
confidential  (after  nearly  five  years  of  the  last  convened  EGoM,  and  having  provided  such 




87 The RTI Act has a two-tier appeal mechanism, the first comprising a higher official within the concerned department 
and the second with an independently established Information Commission at the state and federal level depending on 







could be shared with me and his response was recorded in the Information Commissioner’s order. 
The Information Commissioner gave him 30 days to determine the relevant documents I could be 
given access to (Preeti Sampat vs the Department of Commerce 2013). The last communication on 
the matter was another request from the Director SEZ requesting the Information Commissioner 
for extension of the time period to ascertain which documents could be given to me. 
The bureaucratic paper trail I cite below proved critical to analyzing the SEZ law-making 
process. This critical information was thus accessed from the documents that two journalists had 
procured and passed on to me. While I could not gain access to the EGoM documents on the merit 
of my requests and Right to Information applications, the long and winding road that was then left 
abandoned because of my relocation to New York City was instructive. It underlined the extent to 
which bureaucratic privilege can derail entitlements and rights (and I was privileged in many ways, 
including that I knew the bureaucratic procedures relating to information applications and could 
eventually secure access to the documents through other sources). It indicated that what the refusal 
of disclosure was protecting may indeed point to significant issues in the law-making process. It also 
reinforced the exclusion of “ordinary citizens” from policy-making arenas. I was never meant to be 




Policy Imbroglio (Hotel Le Meridien, July 2011) 
 
An industry-bureaucrat conclave on SEZs was organized by the influential Associated Chambers of 
Commerce (ASSOCHAM) in the post-MAT (Minimum Alternate Tax) period of “uncertainty” in 
July 2011. The meeting, held in the plush five-star Le Meridien Hotel, anticipated the growing 
“policy imbroglio” with SEZ investor “withdrawals” and “surrenders.” I reproduce below excerpts 
from the presentations of two key actors, then Commerce Secretary (highest ranking bureaucrat of 







Associates, Hitender Mehta. Their arguments capture the hedging by the Commerce Department 
over MAT and land acquisition, on the one hand, and the growing disquiet among investors over 
SEZ “policy reversals,” on the other. 
The day-long panels at the ASSOCHAM convention were held in a large convention hall of 
the hotel and featured a range of talks, from the Commerce Secretary, the (next in line) Joint 
Secretary Commerce, Commissioners from  various  SEZs,  representatives of  Free Zones from 
Turkey and Oman, SEZ developers, industrialists and legal and taxation experts. Unrest in the SEZ 




a. The Bureaucrat: 
 
Then Commerce Secretary Rahul Khullar was moved up the agenda as the first speaker, as he had 
“to leave soon after for another meeting” (industry’s palpable unrest was possibly factored into his 
schedule). His speech revealed the Commerce Ministry’s disposition around the MAT and land 
acquisition at the time, and indicated the agenda items Commerce was open to discuss, and those 
that it would not. He highlighted two related issues, the concentration of SEZs in a few states 
around metropolitan centers and the need to reach the “hinterlands.” 
In an obviously “educated abroad” accent, he started with a reprimand: 
 
…Most of your SEZs are concentrated in about six states. Those six states also account for 
 
92 percent of total exports from the SEZs. Which means it’s not merely the number of 
SEZs but the concentration is complete, almost total in terms of exports emanating from 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Andhra, Kerala and Karnataka. Even within those states, 
by and large, you would be spot on if you just looked at the major cities and looked around 
them. That’s the second problem [that] within the states where they’re coming up, the 







Adding that the main motivation behind SEZs was a “hassle-free environment” with 
“infrastructure provision” to facilitate production, he said, tax concessions were secondary, the first 
priority was a “good environment for producers.” “Labor, land and infrastructure” he said, are 
“pan-India difficulties, with power and water shortages, inadequate roads, connectivity and ports.” 
SEZs were to take care of “infrastructural bottlenecks that are worse now than at the time SEZs 
were envisaged in 2004.” For a businessperson outside zones, he said “wage rates are going up and I 
may lose my edge, and I may need to get out of the business.” Land he added “is a major issue in the 
country. It is just no longer possible, given the agitations that have taken place over the last 4-5 
years, and the very complicated politics that is involved in all of this, to get hold of large parcels of 
land, and say this is an SEZ.” 
Snapping his fingers then: 
 
You know, there may have been a time when you snap your fingers and you could get a 1000 
hectares. It’s not gonna happen now. And if its not gonna happen now, what are we gonna 
do? Are we just gonna sit around and do nothing about it, or do we need to start having a 
second look? At both the SEZ Act and the rules? 
This concentration of SEZs all along metropolitan hubs, has got to end. Simply 
because the price of land has reached astronomical levels [in these areas]. Now, if you’re real- 
estate developers, it doesn’t matter. You buy land at astronomical levels, you sell it on at 
astronomical levels. But you’re not real estate developers, you’re manufacturers. Land, is only an 
instrument in your [business]. That regional concentration has to end. You have to get out of 
the Bangalores and the Hyderabads and the Kolkotas, you have to go into the hinterland. 
Because you’re going to get land cheaper there. And you’re going to get labor cheaper there, 
you’re not going to get labor cheaper in Bangalore. If you don’t [move] it won’t happen. I 







would  be  in  a  land  [sic]  in  the  boonies.  I  understand  the  concern  of  the  DTC  [tax 
concessions being linked to investments] and what have you. But, even if you fix the MAT 
and all those issues, you will have these three big problems to cope with. And the quicker 
you guys, collectively, think about what needs to be done on those matters and tell us, the 
better it would be to deal with the problems that may arise in the next five years (emphases 
in original, speech July 27, 2011). 
After his speech, a developer raised a question about the cooling of investor interest in SEZs 
post MAT. Khullar assured the participants that the taxation concerns of industry would be given 
“fair hearing with the Parliamentary Affairs Committee” constituted for the issue. He urged again 
that industry focus on the three issues of “land, labor and infrastructure” for the long term (and 
forget about MAT). After this, he left the meeting. 
His attempts to deflect developer and industry concerns over MAT and the proposed Direct 
 
Taxes Code (DTC) however, failed. It became clear over the day’s proceedings that the convention 
had been convened primarily for SEZ developers and units to gauge how “serious” the central 
government  was  about  revoking  their  promised  tax  benefits  with  the  MAT  and  DTC.  The 
Secretary’s suggestion of focusing on “investment in the hinterlands” was not enticing, and ignored 




b. The Lawyer: 
 
Towards the end of the day, Advocate Hitender Mehta, a legal expert on SEZs, spoke on the two 
“burning issues,” MAT and land acquisition. I juxtapose below the concerns he raised as a counter 
to Secretary Khullar. His presentation highlighted the agitation within industry circles with the 
“policy instability” unleashed by the MAT, the DTC and increasing activism by the higher judiciary 







Advocate Mehta began by exhorting developers to petition the Supreme Court against the 
MAT. He noted that in a recent interview he had heard Commerce Secretary Khullar argue over the 
reduction of the MAT from 20 percent88  to 10 percent. This he said, meant that the Commerce 
Ministry was “resigned” to the MAT and only willing to “bargain” over it. He pointed out that the 
SEZ Act had its own tax regime and its “rules of business” clearly mandated that any change in 
fiscal incentives to SEZs was to be initiated by the Commerce Ministry. He added that “Personally I 
am seeing this as a backdoor amendment which Finance Ministry has chosen to do.” Only three 
petitions had been filed in the courts thus far he said, and he felt that others needed to step up: 
“unless they [other developers] take action, they initiate some sort of resistance process, Ministry of 
Finance may not actually then come down to [renegotiating] the terms.” 
On land acquisition, stressing that no compulsory acquisition is allowed for SEZs, he added, 
“but now issue comes up, previous acquisitions done by the state governments are being questioned. 
And there are some court rulings, one by Supreme Court in Noida case, [of] 156 acres. They ruled 
down the acquisition by the state government! They said now this is to be restored!” Similarly raising 
alarm over a High Court order of the demolition of the DLF SEZ in Gurgaon89 he added: 
Another thing is coming. In Gurgaon, my friend from DLF is sitting, 22-year old acquisition 
 
by the state was reopened. And Punjab and Haryana High Court, they passed an order to 
demolish a functional SEZ! I don’t know whether they’ve [judges] visited this SEZ or not, 
the kind of infrastructure that has come up, whether they’ve seen this or not, but it is scary, 
to see what kind of jurisprudence is evolving! Luckily, this decision has been stayed by the 
Supreme Court, but still, the final outcome is awaited. 
 
88 Developers consistently referred to the 18.5 percent levy of MAT as 20 percent. 
89  The Punjab and Haryana High Court ordered the demolition of the DLF SEZ in Silokhera village in Haryana in 
February 2011 because of an illegal transaction between the company and the state government. Petitioners from the 
village had challenged the acquisition of over 200 acres of land from their village by the state government and its sale to 
private companies. The SEZ land had first been sold to another developer for a hospital who in turn sold it to DLF. 








He continued, “And in Noida we are now hearing that cases of 1976 onward, they are 
contemplating to reopen. So where is the stability of law?” Highlighting the Jagpal Singh vs State of 
Punjab judgment of January 2011 (also discussed in chapter two) he explained: 
The Supreme Court, what they’re thinking I’m just trying to bring out to your notice. 
They’re actually questioning state government acquisitions. This [case] was in particular 
reference to the gram sabha [village assembly] acquisitions. And they come down very heavily 
and they cited this in their judgment. That in U.P., [the] consolidation of land holdings Act is 
widely misused and with the connivance of consolidation authorities. And surprisingly U.P. 
government has not chosen to object to this, so let us say that they have accepted it. And 
Supreme Court goes on, saying that ‘similar [acquisitions] may have been practiced in other 
states. The time has come to review all these orders by which the common village land has 
been grabbed by such fraudulent practices.’ 
Pausing for a dramatic moment he then exclaimed: 
 
It, it actually leaves me in a shivery condition! And before parting with this case what they’ve 
said, it’s even more scary! They give direction to all the state governments in the country, 
that they should prepare scheme of eviction of illegal unauthorized occupants of gram sabha, 
gram panchayat, peromboke [village commons], shamalat [grazing lands] land and these must be 
restored to the gram sabha! This is quoted from the Supreme Court Judgment! And then they 
say the political connections, or, huge expenses incurred in construction, these are no 
excuses.” He concluded, “Now I leave it to you to just, think about this, review this and 
what kind of jurisprudence is evolving. And it would be a message for investors also, if they 
want to invest in the SEZs, particularly developers, they need to take care of this situation 







Needless to add, legal developments and fresh litigation are great foraging grounds for 
lawyers  and  tax  experts  and  his  alarm  may  well  be  motivated  by  enlightened  self-interest. 
Regardless, while Secretary Khullar tried to deflect attention from the MAT, Advocate Mehta 
advocated a frontal confrontation. Both highlighted the tax and land issues to very different ends. 
These presentations captured the widening gap at the time between Commerce’s ability to deliver 
industry’s expectations and the sundering of the “consensus” between capital and the state over 
SEZs. After the July convention, several “stake-holder” discussions were held by the Commerce 
Department in an effort to soothe industry unrest, and while changes in operational rules were 
subsequently  made,  the  major  issues  of  MAT  and  land  acquisition  remained  unresolved  and 
festering. 
The backlash was potent. As industry had to “bite back,” there was growing and frequent 
industry decrial of “unstable policy” or “policy paralysis” engendered by then ruling Congress-led 
UPA. Though not confined to SEZ issues, this decrial especially intensified in the last two years 
leading up to the 2014 election year.90 The endorsement of the controversial then-Chief Minister of 
Gujarat, Narendra Modi as an ideal Prime Ministerial candidate by major Indian business houses; 
their support for his spectacular high-tech “Presidential-style” election campaign; and the BJP’s 
resounding victory under his leadership with his elevation to Prime Minister in the 2014 elections, 
have also to be seen in this context of capital’s dissatisfaction with the previous regime.91 The 
“surrender” of the Reliance Haryana SEZ Ltd. (RHSL) in the commercial and residential suburb of 




90 Other factors fueling industry ire have included the number of crony capitalist deals busted by the Central Bureau of 
Intelligence and subsequently the Supreme Court in recent years. 
91 Modi has been known to facilitate big business through land and tax concessions in Gujarat state where he was elected 
for three consecutive terms as Chief Minister in the face of an extremely weak opposition. See also Varadarajan 2014 for 
a trenchant analysis of how the judicial fallout of “crony capitalism” scandals during the UPA regime have added fuel to 
industry’s (f)ire in supporting Narendra Modi as an ideal administrator. Support by big capital has added to the spade - 
work of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the ideological caucus of the BJP, in the BJP’s electoral campaign, and urban 










The RHSL “Surrender” 
 
Promoted  by  one  of  the  biggest  Indian  corporate  houses,  Reliance  Industries  Limited,92  the 
proposed Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited was announced in 2006 by the Haryana government and 
was to cover over 20,000 acres in Gurgaon and Jhajjar districts. A total of 1,383.68 acres had been 
“acquired” by the project, which it sought to surrender in 2012. In 2003 (before the SEZ law was 
enacted), about 1,700 acres of fertile agricultural land was proposed to be acquired by the state 
government in five villages of Gurgaon by the Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure 
Development Corporation (HSIIDC) under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 then in force.93 In 2004, 
amid protests from farmers, the state government scaled down its target by 100 acres and issued a 
final  notification  for  about  1,600  acres.  Some  landowners  petitioned  the  state’s  high  court 
challenging the “public purpose” for which the land was being acquired. With unrest growing, the 
government constituted a “high-powered committee” to reevaluate its decision for acquiring the 
land (Ohri 2014). 
In May 2005 (again, before the SEZ law was enacted), Reliance Industries proposed an SEZ 
in the adjacent Jhajjar district of Haryana over about 450 acres which was notified soon after. In 
May 2006, the high-powered committee released its decision to drop an additional 50 acres from 
1600 acres. A week later the company proposed to the government that the Gurgaon land (1550 
acres) be included in the SEZ project in Jhajjar. The Haryana industrial corporation soon passed a 
resolution, in which it expressed its “incapacity” to come up with an SEZ on its own, stating that 





92 Reliance Industries also promoted the failed Mumbai SEZ on the outskirts of Mumbai city discussed in the previous 
chapter. 







In 2007, some landowners from the area filed petitions in the Punjab and Haryana High 
 
Court94  against the government’s decision to hand over their land to the company for an SEZ. By 
 
2009, the high court ordered a stay on the creation of third-party rights (SEZ developer) on the 
disputed land. The state government subsequently challenged this order in the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court adjourned the matter until recently when it remitted the matter back to the high 
court for fresh adjudication. 
By January 2012, Reliance offered to return the Haryana industrial corporation 1,383.68 
acres of land given to it by the state government and abandon the SEZ project in Gurgaon, and 
petitioned the Board of Approval for SEZs for a “withdrawal,” without stating any reasons. An 
official Haryana government release said the SEZ Project at Gurgaon had “been rendered 
economically unviable due to the mid-term corrections in the SEZ Policy viz. imposition of the 
Minimum Alternate Tax, withdrawal of the Tax holiday, slowdown in the global economy, 
prohibitively high prices of land and other problems associated with aggregation of land through 
private negotiations” (PTI 2014b). 
RHSL had  requested  “refund” of the amount paid  by them to the Haryana  industrial 
 
corporation and reimbursement of expenditure incurred on the site, apart from interest on the said 
amount aggregating to Rs.1,172 crore (approximately $195.3 million)95. In February 2014, the 
Haryana Cabinet approved the return of the land to the Haryana industrial corporation, in lieu of 
payment of an amount of Rs 343.51 crore ($57.3 million) to RHSL as against Rs 399.85 crore ($66.6 
million) paid by RHSL at the time of transfer of land, stating: “The claims on account of 
Administrative charges forming price of the subject, refund of the Stamp Duty, reimbursement of 
development expenditure and interest amount have not been accepted. The refund amount has been 
worked out strictly as per the terms of the Joint Venture Agreement date 19th June 2006 signed…” 
 
 
94 The two states share a High Court and the capital city of Chandigarh. 







(PTI 2014b). The decision to denotify Reliance Haryana SEZ Ltd, was taken by the SEZ Board of 
 
Approval in June 2014. 
 
In May 2014, the High Court questioned the Haryana government “for taking no action 
against Reliance Industries while taking back nearly 1,400 acres of land allotted for developing one 
of the country’s biggest special economic zones under the public private partnership or PPP model” 
(Ohri 2014). The division bench sought an explanation from the state government for not levying 
any penalty despite the company’s failure to develop the SEZ even after eight years (for more details 
on the case see Ohri 2014; PTI 2013, 2014b). 
When I met a senior representative of the Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited in Delhi in 
September 2011 in the company’s Gurgaon headquarters (before the SEZ withdrawal) located in the 
premises of the Ambience Mall, he explained to me that RHSL was “waiting and watching.” His 
frustration was palpable. Enumerating the problems with land acquisition and “policy instability,” he 
described the UPA regime as “governance with crutches” that “walks slowly” and is constantly 
“falling.” He declared that India needs a “single party” with a “political focus on growth” and the 
“huge Indian market” with “300-400 million middle-class consumers.” Elaborating on schemes like 
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program,96  he said, “Why is the government doing it? 
Teach the guy to fish; allow industry to teach [him].. [let] industry come in.” He went on to add that 
there  was  “too  much  democracy”  in  the  country,  and  described  the  need  for  a  “strong 
administrator” to set it right. I sensed what was coming, and he soon added, we need a “strong 
leader, we need someone like Narendra Modi” (interview September 20, 2011). As I disciplined my 
smile in place to allow the moment to pass, I experienced firsthand, for the first time, the meaning 
of the expression, “feeling the hackles rise at the nape of my neck.” (It was one thing to know 
intellectually how the interests of capital allied with authoritarianism, but another to hear firsthand, 
 
 
96 A hard-won, albeit limited victory of social movements in 2005 ensuring 100 days of employment a year for each rural 







and in silence, the endorsement of an authoritarian right-wing Hindu-nationalist accused of abetting 




Making the SEZ Law 
 
 
The Indian economy was relatively insulated from the “global” financial crisis in 2008-11 by a 
combination of  monetary policy,  expanding  domestic market and  capital, and  a  mixed-bag of 
stimulus and welfare entitlements (see Subbarao 2009; UNDP 2011). As a result, Indian capital 
invested enthusiastically in the initial SEZ promise of land, resources, “infrastructure” (water and 
power were to be supplied 24x7 to the SEZs) and potentially, the labor of dispossessed peasantry. 
As is evident from the jump in the numbers of SEZs from 2008 to 2011 (366 to 584), while the SEZ 
model was to facilitate India’s global economic integration, this was not necessarily at the “behest” 
of “global” capital seeking to come in, although global investors were certainly on the “invitation 
list,” for instance the Indonesian Salem SEZ in West Bengal or the South Korean POSCO SEZ in 
Odisha. The interest of global capital influenced the development of the SEZ framework, with the 
involvement of consultancy firms like McKensie in SEZ policy formulation. The SEZ model as it 
bore out however, was more in keeping with the aspirations of domestic capital with its growing 
global  reach  and  interest  in  real  estate  (this  also  becomes  evident  from  the  low  number  of 
operational SEZs, only 143 SEZs were operational in 2011 out of 381 notified and 584 total 
approved). 
I  discuss  below  the  SEZ  law-making  process  that  has  involved  frequent  inputs  from 










Zerillo (2010) argues that to understand how legality works in social settings we need a more open 
definition of what law is. He refers to “soft law,” as “non-binding coercions,” those specific 
procedures and mechanisms aimed at obtaining compliance despite their non-justiciable character. 
He argues that it is a practical necessity to look at particular sites and locations where soft law 
originates and takes shape. In the increasing proliferation of law-making procedures and sites and in 
the privatization of legal regimes, which then draw upon the power of the state for enforcement, 
soft law becomes “hard law.” However, coercive settings are more aptly described as “mixed” or 
“private  governance”  settings;  my  use  of  “soft  law”  here  refers  to  non-coercive settings that 
influence law-making. The milieu of liberalization and export-led growth facilitated the SEZ policy 
framework through its genesis and evolution. The Commerce Ministry’s “hard line” approach to 
promoting the interests of SEZ capital meant that the law itself evolved in frequent and ongoing 
consultations with industry “stake-holders.” The Commerce Department actively championed 
industry concerns and needs. These consultations, reports and recommendations, became the “soft 
law” settings that fed the making of the SEZ “bare law.” 
In 2000, under the leadership of then Commerce Minister late Murasoli Maran of the BJP- 
led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a new SEZ policy was declared. Deeply impressed by a 
visit to China’s Shenzhen SEZ in early 2000, Maran soon incorporated SEZs in the Export-Import 
policy announced later that same year, calling for “a significant break with the past” through the 
introduction of a “simple and transparent policy” without “inspector-raj” and with “100% FDI” 
(The Hindu 2000). 
In 2001, a report of the global management consultancy firm McKinsey & Company (2001) 
prepared at the initiative of then Prime Minister of the BJP-led NDA, Atal Behari Vajpayee, 







sector. Major action required for doing so is the creation of SEZs offering world class infrastructure 
and other facilities.” A 2003 press release issued by the Commerce Minister cited this report and its 
call for SEZs (GoI 2003a), as did the 2003 proposal of the Commerce Ministry to enact a new SEZ 
law (GoI 2003b). The proposal also referenced interactions held with Indian financial institutions, 
leading to the establishment of a committee under the leadership of the Industrial Development 
Bank of India. The committee recommended provisions for a legislative framework for SEZs that 
would promote greater confidence among financial institutions. 
In 2004 then, a joint McKinsey—Chamber of Indian Industry (CII) report (2004) 
recommended that the government needed to remove barriers to export-led growth, two key 
recommendations asking for simpler administrative procedures and flexibility in employment of 
contract labor to encourage SEZs. Indeed, a “single-window clearance mechanism” for approvals, 
and flexibility for state governments to relax labor and environment laws found their way into the 
legal framework of SEZs. Reports and submissions by global and domestic corporate consultants 
and interest groups found voice in the SEZ policy and legal framework as it evolved. 
Ongoing engagement with “stake-holders” is reflected more recently in conclaves addressing 
industry concerns over SEZs organized by government and industry bodies. These conclaves like 
the ASSOCHAM one discussed earlier are organized by important industry lobby groups and 
Commerce Department affiliated bodies. One conclave I attended was organized by the Chambers 
of Indian Industry (CII); two by state-led bodies, the Export Promotion Council for EOUs and 
SEZs (EPCES), and the Santacruz Electronics Export Processing Zone (SEEPZ) in Mumbai. Along 
with key developers, most of these conclaves had senior bureaucrats from the Commerce and 
Finance Ministry (particularly the Revenue Department) in attendance. At least two of them, the one 







hotels and three accompanied with lavish meals.97 Three were day-long meetings and one was a half- 
day consultation. 
The first “stake-holder consultation” in post MAT scenario was organized by the Export 
Processing Council in September 2011 at The Hans Hotel in central Delhi. Here again, officials 
flagged the issues of the concentration of SEZs near urban areas (see Figure 3 below released at the 
time by the Commerce Department in a “discussion paper”), while developers complained about 
MAT. Revenue department officials in  attendance felt obliged to explain  that there was clear 
rationale for taxation and that Revenue was not against SEZs per se. Officials requested suggestions 
for improvements in the investment environment for SEZs, and developers asked for reductions in 
duties for sale in domestic areas given the slow global demand, and relaxation of norms for servicing 
domestic customers in SEZs. Other issues discussed at The Hans, such as the relaxation of 
“minimum land” and “contiguity of land” requirements, the “broad-banding” of sector-specific 
SEZs to allow additional sectors into an operational SEZs had also come up in the ASSOCHAM 
convention. By November 2011, based on recommendations from the first consultation and other 
submissions by developers and industry bodies, the Commerce Department had came up with a 
draft discussion paper to further facilitate discussions, identify “problem areas” and resolve them 

















97 I note the settings of these consultations here as they contrast sharply with the settings of the areas where SEZs come 
up, the “underdeveloped” countryside. These “stake-holder” consultations also contrast with the intense agitations and 
strain that people opposed to SEZs (and similar projects) undergo to before they can get the representatives of the state 







Figure 3: Distribution of SEZs 
 
 




The discussion paper identified several issues raised by developers previously, like: a) the 
minimum area requirements for SEZs; b) contiguity of land parcels; c) “broad-banding” of sector 
specific SEZs to attract investors; d) allowing domestic customers to be serviced in non-processing 
areas; e) the increasing unattractiveness of SEZ fiscal incentives; and, f) leveraging domestic sale 
entitlements for manufacturers to attract more investment (GoI 2011e). 
It identified four “adverse perceptions” of SEZs “on account of a few black sheep” that 
 
were “causing damage to ‘Brand SEZ:’” i) that SEZs are about “garnering control of land;” ii) they 







between various government departments undermining the Single Window Mechanism of SEZs; 
and iv) that the fiscal policy environment for SEZs was “unstable.” It acknowledged that as a result 
of these “perceptions,” there was significant reduction in the number of SEZ proposals; withdrawals 
of approved proposals and requests for denotification with a reduced interest in setting up new units 
in SEZs (ibid.). 
The Commerce Department then used the discussion paper to facilitate “stake-holder 
discussions” in 2011-12 in Mumbai (SEEPZ), Bangalore, Kolkata and Kandla. The discussion paper 
was also posted on the official SEZ website inviting comments from “stake-holders.” 
At the SEEPZ meeting in December 2011, a developer proposed the reduction of minimum 
 
land requirements to 250 hectares for multi-product SEZs and 40 hectares each for sector-specific 
and IT SEZs. Representatives of the real estate body CREDAI (Confederation of Real Estate 
Developers Associations of India) and several other developers raised the issue of “relaxation of 
norms” for schools, hospitals and residential areas or non-processing areas in SEZs so that people 
not working in SEZs are also allowed access to these areas. Easier “exit options” for developers 
wanting to quit, or develop and transfer SEZs were also raised. With marked efficiency, the 
discussion paper on the official SEZ website reflected these fresh proposals within two weeks of the 
Mumbai meeting, ready for the subsequent stake-holder consultations. 
Many of these recommendations found their way into the changes proposed to the SEZ 
rules by  the  Commerce Department. Commerce was clearly  attempting to  revive the  flagging 
fortunes of the model, although it could not address the core issues of MAT and land acquisition. In 
August 2013, the Commerce and Industries Ministry finally released new rules, presumably after 
Ministerial  deliberations.  The  new  rules  were  not  as  comprehensive  as  the  discussion  paper 
proposals of Commerce. The reduced minimum area requirement was 500 hectares for multi- 







opposed 250, 40 and 40 hectares respectively suggested in the discussion paper). “Broad-banding” 
of sectoral SEZs was allowed among industries related to each other and “exit norms” for investors 
wishing to withdraw were made more flexible. Domestic sale concessions, access to domestic area 
customers and contiguity norms were not allowed. It appears that the writ of the Finance Ministry 
held on attempts at the “dilution of the original SEZ concept” by the Commerce Ministry. 
I met Commerce Secretary Khullar one afternoon in February 2012, in his smart office at 
Udyog Bhavan (Commerce House) near the Central Secretariat in Delhi. A popular upbeat bollywood 
number was playing on the large led screen hooked up to the wall by one side: “dhoom macha le, dhoom 
macha le, dhoom” (let’s create an uproar, let’s create an uproar, uproar).  As I was shown in, he looked 
up from the files on his table, nodded in terse acknowledgment, lowered the volume and resumed 
signing the papers in front of him. After a few minutes, he set his files aside and matter of factly 
proceeded to explain the prevailing SEZ scenario. He explained that there were two to three main 
issues. The “politicization” of land acquisition “was not envisaged” at the time of the law’s drafting. 
There was “consternation” with MAT among industry circles as benefits had indeed been taken 
back. He added that there were “things that can be fixed and we’re doing it.” Issues that could be 
fixed included procedural simplification, fixing rules of business and allowing the servicing of 
domestic customers in the SEZ “non-processing area,” although not for “multi-story apartments 
and hotels” but “super specialty hospitals and schools” on a “case to case basis” (interview February 
29, 2012). 
 
“Soft law” practices in the form of industry recommendations consistently informed the 
legal evolution of the SEZ framework and eventually found their way into “hard law.” The leverage 
of the soft law settings suffered greatly from 2011 however. As I show below, the Finance Ministry’s 
compliance was coercively obtained through the highest political intervention of the state, the Prime 







critical to the evolution of the SEZ legal framework until 2011.  The tables were turned by Finance 
in 2011 with the introduction of the MAT and the proposed DTC. I discuss the standoff over SEZs 




Shadowing (Soft) Law 
 
How did the Commerce Ministry establish its writ over the SEZ Law in the initial years? The 
bureaucratic paper trail gives ample evidence of the turf war that played out between the Ministries 
of Commerce and Finance over SEZs. But there is more to the SEZ law-making process than meets 
the eye, even more than the “secret” EGoM and other bureaucratic files reveal. Max Gluckman 
(1965) in his work on “law as process,” showed how gossip and scandal revealed the role of shame, 
social pressure and suasion in legal processes. Here I extend this wider interpretation of legal 
processes. Analyses of the paper trail and bureaucratic and developer grapevines reveal the role of 
bureaucratic and Ministerial rivalries and possibly high-profile corruption in determining the legal 
trajectory of SEZs. 
A member of the SEZ Board (of Approval)98 I interviewed revealed that each Board meeting 
 
approved over 25-30 proposals in a sitting of 2-3 hours. The decisions seemed already taken and 
there was little deliberation discussing the merits of the projects being considered for approval. This 
rendered the approval process a mere formal exercise. 
The Finance Ministry has such complaints on record. In a letter to then Director SEZ on 
August 7, 2006, a day before the Board meeting was to be held, the Revenue Department raised 
issue that its representatives had not received copies of the proposals made by applicants that were 




98 When citing sensitive information I have not disclosed the date of interview or other details that may compromise the 
informant. This informant was not from the Ministry of Finance however, though Finance representatives on the Board 







not furnished. Revenue asked for the deferral of these agenda items until all relevant documents had 
been made available, with sufficient time for scrutiny. It cited and enclosed an intriguing December 
2005 missive by the Finance Minister to the Revenue Secretary. The missive asked the Secretary to 
ensure that the Revenue representative in the SEZ Board (and other approvals committees of the 
Commerce and Industries Ministry), “be a high-level representative who can speak his [sic] mind and 
assert his views” and is “fully prepared with the agenda items.” The letter added, “If the agenda 
papers have reached him [sic] late, and he has not had time to examine each item, he should insist 
on postponement of the meeting or at least some items of the agenda on which he has not had 
adequate notice or time to prepare” (F. No. 178/141/2006-IT.1; RTI document available with 
author). 
The August 7 letter from Revenue also raised issue with the total number of SEZ approvals 
until then. An initial limit of 150 SEZs had been fixed in a previous EGoM meeting, after which a 
review of already approved SEZs was to be undertaken. Finance pointed out that the agenda items 
indicated that the approvals were expected to go well over the limit. The letter recommended 
waiting for already approved SEZs to become operational before approving any fresh proposals. 
The concerns raised in the letter were subsequently noted by the senior bureaucracy. 
Additional Secretary Revenue followed up with a letter to Special Secretary Commerce the day after 
the Board meeting. The letter raised concerns that “about 100 cases (6th  item of the agenda) were 
considered by the BOA during the 3rd  meeting in a matter of about an hour a [sic] quarter and 
formal as well as “in-principle” approvals were given. Important factors like the financial health of 
the Developers and their capacity to carry out capital-intensive projects were not discussed. In some 
cases Developers with lesser area of land were given approvals ignoring those who had bigger 
areas.” He further raised the issue of the BoA going over the 150 mandated SEZs. (D.O. No. 







Secretary Commerce refuted all of the Revenue Secretary’s charges adding that the “internal” limit 
of 150 approvals was reserved for final and not in-principle approvals. 
An Empowered Group of Ministers meeting (EGoM) was convened within the same month 
to discuss Commerce’s claim of distinction between in-principle and final approvals for SEZs and 
the “internal guideline” of 150 approvals. A case was made by Commerce that the limit had been an 
internal one, and referred to final approvals, with no bearing on in-principle approvals. The Finance 
Minister (FM) again raised concerns of “revenue loss” from the additional SEZs being allowed to 
escape the tax net, urging that the limit of 150 SEZs be adhered to. The Commerce Minister 
(C&IM) countered the Finance Minister with figures of potential revenue generated from additional 
SEZs. Most EGoM members rejected the distinction between in-principle and formal approvals but 
all save the Finance Minister were in favor of removing the “internal” limit of 150 SEZs. The FM 
had to give in. A national daily carried a news item the following day citing sources that claimed that 
the FM “waged a lone battle” against more SEZs (see Badarinath 2006). 
At the same EGoM, the FM had also raised issue requesting suitable guidelines for SEZ 
approvals with clearly recorded reasons for approval, rejection or deferral.  The approvals procedure 
could not be discussed in the EGoM, but was taken up by him through subsequent letters to the 
Chair of the EGoM (the Defence Minister) and the Commerce and Industries Minister. A series of 
communications over guidelines for approval followed between the Ministries, primarily between 
Commerce and Finance. The guidelines for approval were eventually drafted and approved two 
months later, in October 2006 (this series of events constructed from F.No. F.1/3/2006-EPZ; RTI 
document available with author). The pitched battle between the FM and the Commerce Minister 
over SEZs interrogates claims of a coherent ideology or interest within “the state;” in the SEZ 







a. Ministerial Rivalries and Corruption: 
 
A senior developer I interviewed claimed that the tug of war over SEZs between the Finance and 
Commerce Ministers was a result of the Finance and Commerce Ministers’ personal stand-off with 
each other. He claimed that the “rush” for SEZ approvals came with many developers lining up to 
meet then Commerce Minister with bribe money to get their projects approved. This “income” 
from SEZ approvals went to ruling party coffers, keeping the party favorably disposed towards the 
model, and the Minister. This, he argued, did not go down well with then Finance Minister, who felt 
threatened by the success of the Commerce Minister (interview December 6, 2011). While the 
veracity of these allegations of corruption and Ministerial rivalry is difficult (if not impossible) to 
ascertain with evidence, there was clearly a struggle between the Commerce and Finance 
bureaucracies and Ministers over SEZs, as indeed, the paper trails and interviews with bureaucrats, 




b. Bureaucratic Turf Wars: 
 
Ex-bureaucrat G. K. Pillai was Special Secretary Commerce during the initial years of the SEZ law’s 
enactment (and subsequently served as Commerce Secretary) and widely acknowledged as a sincere 
promoter of the SEZ model.99  When I met Pillai, he spoke passionately of the model and shared 
brochures and other material with me. He openly accused Finance of being against the SEZ model 
and creating problems for it with a “vicious campaign about SEZs being a big scam.” Finance 
“insisted” on three representatives in the BoA, he said, and that all decisions in the Board be made 
by consensus and not majority. Commerce, he added, “compromised” on these demands (interview 
February 20, 2012). Another ex-bureaucrat of the Commerce Ministry subsequently working in the 
corporate sector accused Revenue bureaucrats of waging a “turf war” as Commerce was getting all 
 
 
99 Mr. D. K. Mittal, who was then Secretary Commerce and is now Secretary Finance, was considered the visionary force 







the “credit” for SEZs (interview September 20, 2011). A senior academic extremely sympathetic to 
the SEZ model similarly accused the Finance Ministry of derailing the SEZ model, but put its 
perceived need for revenue in perspective, adding that such a large part of the Indian economy is 
“informal” that any loss of revenue threatens the Finance Ministry. Given the “drag” on resources 
by welfare schemes such as the employment guarantee law, Finance, the academic explained, feels 
the need to secure revenue (interview March 1, 2012). 
Joint Secretary Finance and the Customs representative from the Revenue Department in 
the SEZ Board on the other hand, insisted that the loss of revenue with tax concessions for SEZs, 
their potential for real estate speculation and the diversion of existing industry into SEZs to avail 
concessions were the prime reasons for raising issue with SEZs (interviews November 24, 2011; 
February 14, 2012). Indeed, the paper trail reveals that Finance raised these concerns consistently, 
from the time the present SEZ model was conceived, in 2000. 
All legal provisions related to taxation and fiscal incentives in India come under the purview 
of the Finance Ministry. Journalist Suresh points out that Commerce acquired full powers to frame 
the fiscal and economic policy of SEZs without any responsibility to collect revenue, through an 
amendment to the Allocation of Business Rules 1961 in November 2002. This was a “unilateral” 
decision by Commerce, without consulting the DoR. Revenue discovered this amendment only in 
September 2003 when a proposal for the SEZ law was sent to it. A previously sent draft Cabinet 
note on the SEZ Bill in February 2003 also did not mention this amendment. Revenue soon raised 
issue  with  this  encroachment  over  its  turf  (unpublished  notes  shared  September  8,  2011). 
Documents reveal that the disagreements that developed between the two Ministries were so 
 
profound that it was only just before the law was to be introduced in the parliament of India in June 
 
2005 that a meeting of a group of Ministers was convened at the initiative of then Prime Minister, in 
 







SEZs (F.No. 149/61/2003-TPL; RTI document available with author). This was the same meeting 
in which the decision on constituting EGoMs was taken. These reservations over tax incentives 
likely laid the foundation for what would later develop into a full fledged war over SEZs between 
Finance and Commerce, with the 2011 introduction of the MAT and DTC only a latest twist in it. 
To backtrack a little, amid records of Ministerial communications, I chanced upon a January 
 
21, 2005 letter to the Prime Minister’s Office (before the SEZ law was enacted later that year) by 
Rajendra Singh, Chairman, Sea King Infrastructure Limited, forwarded on his behalf by the 
Commerce Ministry. The letter indicated the substantial leverage of big capital in the formulation of 
the SEZ law beyond the more visible soft law settings discussed previously. It also indicated 
Commerce’s  alliance  with  big  capital.  The  letter  described  the  predicament  of  the  Mumbai 
Integrated SEZ (as the Mumbai SEZ was initially called). It claimed that Sea King Infrastructure had 
been working on designing and planning its SEZ from 2000, since the policy was initiated and had 
already spent over Rs. 3000 million ($75 million at then approximate rate of Rs. 40 = $1) towards it. 
It added, “We have been following up with the Commerce Ministry for the last three years for this 
vibrant policy to be converted into reality through the SEZ Act. However the investors and users 
from all over the world are now feeling very shaky due to the unexpected delay in enacting the SEZ 
Act. This may not send healthy signals among the investing community within and outside the 
country. ...Developers, users and investors of SEZ [sic] from all over the world are now getting 
restive as they have been eagerly waiting to make large investments. We therefore have taken the 
liberty to request you for your kind intervention so that sound legal framework can be provided 
through an SEZ Act at the earliest possible” (PMO U.O. No. 130/31/c/4/2005; RTI document 
available with author). 
A subsequent letter by the Prime Minister’s Office dated February 3, 2005 to the Commerce 
 







“very urgently,” so that they can be considered by the Cabinet meeting scheduled for 9th  and 16th 
February 2005. While it cannot be clearly established that the Sea King letter had influenced this 
letter, it is significant that these letters were included in the same file by the Ministry of Finance 
(these were files I accessed from the second journalist). The subsequent meeting convened in April 
by the Prime Minister with several Ministers approved the draft Bill, overriding many of Finance’s 
concerns. The Bill was finally introduced in the Indian Parliament in June 2005, and enacted in a 
matter of two days, with little discussion and no dissent. 
However, Finance raised cudgels immediately after the enactment of the law, airing concerns 
now in the EGoMs. Repeatedly through the drafting of the rules for the SEZ law, Finance raised 
concerns that given the incentives all existing productive export units would relocate to SEZs doing 
little for fresh investment. No explicit provision was made in the law for preventing this shift until 
Finance prevailed upon the Ministerial deliberations. Finance additionally raised concerns regarding 
distortions in land, labor and capital resulting from uneven development of SEZs with a bias 
towards urban locations and industrialized states. The Ministry unsuccessfully pushed for the cap of 
150 SEZs. It raised concerns of land and resource diversions for real estate speculation in SEZs. 
And it made repeated threats to Commerce that in the interest of a stable fiscal regime, the latter 
should desist from meddling in fiscal affairs (F.No. 149/61/2003-TPL; RTI document available with 




c. Ministerial and Bureaucratic Personalities: 
 
How did Commerce initially secure and subsequently lose its leverage over SEZs towards 2011? 
The academic mentioned earlier alluded to another facet of law-making, that of bureaucratic 
“ownership.” Once the initial team of people driving a model or project is gone, through routine 







initial years there was a lot of passion behind the SEZ model, but once the initial team moved out, 
the subsequent Minister and bureaucrats were either not strong enough to confront Finance, or did 
not particularly care about the model, allowing it to falter (interview March 1, 2012). I recalled the 
Bollywood song playing on television when I had met then Commerce Secretary a few weeks earlier, 
and wondered. 
Ministerial personalities may have also played a role here. At the time of UPA 1 (2004-09), 
when the SEZ law was being finally drafted, the standoff between Ministers of Commerce and 
Finance were equal political heavyweights of the Congress party, P. Chidambaram was Finance 
Minister from 2004-08 and Kamal Nath was Commerce and Industries Minister from 2004-09. In 
2009, there was a change of guard with UPA 2 and while the Finance Minister’s portfolio went to 
 
another Congress political heavyweight, Pranab Mukherjee (currently the President of India), the 
Commerce and Industries Ministry went to relatively junior, Anand Sharma. In 2011, it was Pranab 
Mukherjee who introduced the MAT in his budget speech. From 2007 onwards, as outlined earlier, 
the SEZ environment also became increasingly vitiated with several controversies over land 
acquisition raging across the country. Finance had also been pushing for a limit to the number of 
SEZs from the beginning, and by 2011 there were already 584 approved with 377 notified SEZs in 
the country. This combination of factors may have pushed back the leverage Commerce had over 
the SEZ model and allowed Finance to reestablish its turf by 2011. 
There is, of course, no proof to substantiate the allegations of corruption and Ministerial and 
bureaucratic rivalries but the paper trail clearly reveals that the Commerce and Finance Ministries 
have been at loggerheads over SEZs from their inception. I flag these allegations here as that arena 
of law-making process that lies beyond both “hard” and “soft” law but “shadows” them, present in 
“word of mouth,” gossip and rumor, but beyond adequate evidentiary grasp. Analyses of paper trails 







vicissitudes of bureaucratic and Ministerial interest indeed determine the fate of critical laws and 
policies, there is an even greater case for more robust and transparent systems of accountability and 




Legacies of a Mixed Economy: Revenue, Welfare and “Inclusive Growth” 
 
The Ministry of Finance has fought a battle over SEZs from the inception of the policy in 2000, the 
enactment of the law in 2005 and down to current deliberations. The issues it has raised do not only 
pertain to fiscal incentives that Finance considers its turf, but also to concerns over “land-grabs,” 
“real estate speculation,” the diversion of industry from the domestic area to SEZs and the 
predominantly service-oriented investment in SEZs when its stated goal was manufacturing. There is 
thus an  argument to  be  made for  Ministerial and  Departmental bureaucratic dispositions and 
cultures here. 
India adopted a “mixed economy” model upon independence that sought to combine a 
centrally planned economy with capitalist growth (see chapter one). Finance has traditionally been an 
extremely powerful Ministry with revenue collection, budget and disbursement functions. Poverty 
has historically been an overarching policy concern (Ray and Katezenstein 2005) and as result 
welfare measures have been important policy strategies in dealing with poverty. The emphasis on 
public spending and ongoing welfare measures like the public distribution system (for subsidized 
food grains); rural and municipal development works; public health centers; public primary and 
secondary  schools;  disability  and  old  age  pensions;  more  recently  the  employment  guarantee 
program; and numerous such old and new state-led welfare initiatives may have historically 
engendered the Finance Ministry’s dispensation towards revenue collection. It may also explain its 








How then did Commerce go so far out on a limb in the context of SEZs? In the post- 
liberalization period, the Commerce and Industries Ministry is cast in a role of supporting and 
facilitating capital  expansion  and  accumulation. As  Commerce attempts to  aid  capital  and  its 
demands on “the Indian state” for concessions, Finance is still rooted in a model of revenue 
collection for the exchequer with an orientation towards “inclusive growth.” The two Ministries are 
thus cast in contradiction with each other at this conjuncture, despite an overarching commitment to 
capitalist growth. The “policy instability” that industry decries in the reversal of SEZ concessions, in 
this sense does not emerge from Finance, but from Commerce’s “break from the past” tax and 




A Note on “Consultations” 
 
Recall the years and processes of struggle in the Mumbai SEZ area discussed in the previous 
chapter. The infrastructure of consultations with “stake-holders” is in stark contrast with the 
stonewalling and often violent repression of the “stake-losers.” Unabashedly skewed in favor of 
capital, there is no system of hearing or redress for the “stake-losers,” or even a mechanism to 
record complaints or objections by the “stake-losers” under the SEZ law-making framework. For 
formal approval of a SEZ from the Board of Approval, all that is required is partial acquisition of 
land by the developer and an undertaking to acquire more land, with the endorsement of the state 
government in question. The state government deals with issues over land acquisition, including 
opposition, since land is a state subject. Despite a three-year maximum stipulated period of approval 
however, SEZs proposals are regularly renewed on request, keeping people opposing them in 
constant stress and abeyance. For instance, in the case of the controversial South Korean-owned 
POSCO SEZ in Odisha, the developer has not managed to fully acquire land for seven years, but 







resisting acquisition have been fighting for as many years against the project. The persistence of the 
 





Infrastructures of Growth 
 
 
The evolution of the SEZ legal framework has been a multi-layered process now spanning nearly a 
decade and a half, starting in 2000. Formal, “soft law” and other law-making processes in the 
shadows of the corridors of power have shaped SEZs, through their inception as policy, 
implementation as law and evolution in rules.  Opposition in the SEZ sites has also influenced their 
policy framework. 
Through the creation of SEZs, capitalists of largely Indian origin attempted to take control 
 
of large parts of the most valuable opportunities the large domestic economy offers the global 
market:  land,  resources,  and  arguably  some  freeing  reserves  of  cheap  labor,  or  dispossessed 
peasantry (although I argue that there is indifference towards the dispossessed; see also Levien 
2012). SEZ concessions were not just in the form of tax incentives, but also over administrative and 
other legal measures for creating “quasi-corporate city-states.” Disingenuously invoking exceptional 
legislation, in their scale and scope SEZs in reality sought to establish a normative paradigm of 
infrastructural development for economic growth. As the ambitious model unfolded, capital and 
allied  forces  in  Commerce  were  forced  to  beat  retreat.  The  state’s  repressive  apparatus 
unsuccessfully attempted to counter resistance on the ground and bureaucratic and ministerial 
disagreements between Ministries of Commerce and Finance resulted in policy imbroglios. The 
grand  vision  of  proliferating  urban,  gated  global  enclave  economies  with  state  of  the  art 
infrastructure and 24/7 services is today in a considerable state of impasse. 
In the current ruling dispensation of the far-right Hindu nationalist BJP, Commerce may 







Minister Arun Jaitley overshadows the Commerce and Industries Minister Nirmala Sitaraman quite 
starkly. In his election campaign, Prime Minister Modi was often heard announcing that he would 
abolish the income tax when he came to power. As regimes and influences shift, the framework will 
potentially evolve further. For the moment, interest in SEZs remains low, and the baton has passed 
on to other “infrastructures of growth.” 
What emerges from this critical analysis regarding “the state” is that it is not a coherent 
“cunning” entity (Randeria 2003), or “vertical and encompassing spatiality of power” (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002). It is also not more specifically a “speculative” (Goldman 2011) or a “land-broker” 
(Levien 2012) state. “The state” is instead rife with contestation and meanings that diverse actors 






Around the same time as SEZs, the Delhi Mumbai Infrastructure Corridor (DMIC) was initiated in 
 
2006. Overseen by the Industries Department100  of the Commerce and Industries Ministry, the 
DMIC maps a complex policy terrain recently schematized by the new National Manufacturing 
Policy (NMP) in 2011. As discussed earlier, the NMP envisages National Investment Manufacturing 
Zones of 250 square kilometers (about 61,700 acres) each. Under the DMIC, these “mega zones” 
comprise designated Investment Regions and Industrial Areas with SEZs and industrial townships. 
The projects within the investment and industrial areas are to be developed through Public Private 
Partnerships101 along the 1483 km stretch between Delhi and Mumbai cities, spanning six states (see 






100 The Department of Commerce (DoC) and the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) are the two 
main departments of the MoCI. 








Unlike the SEZ model, the DMIC does not promise extra tax concessions to developers 
(except where SEZs are being developed along the DMIC), but land and resource concessions are 
matters of course. Investors are also guaranteed assured rates of return102 for the first few years for 
the sum of investment in the partnerships.103  Given the scale of operations, it is unsurprising that 
where  operations  have  begun,  in  Maharashtra,  Gujarat  and  Haryana  states,  these  Investment 
Regions are running into growing resistance from peasants and citizens groups over land acquisition. 
The  DMIC  is  presumably  premised  on  the  template  of  the  Bangalore  Mysore  Infrastructure 
Corridor discussed in chapter one. It also forms the template for several other infrastructure 
corridors, such as the Amritsar Kolkata Industrial Corridor, the Chennai Bangalore Industrial 
Corridor and the larger one linking all the southern corridors, called the Peninsular Region Industrial 




























102 These rates of return are called Internal Reserve Ratios (IRRs). A senior developer from Unitech I interviewed 
revealed that given that interest rates in advanced capitalist countries like Japan are so low, assured rates of return on 
investment to the tune of 4-12 percent in PPPs are incredibly attractive returns for investors (interview February 28, 
2012). In a study on the privatization of water supply in Delhi, a colleague and I discovered that the IRR was amounting 
to 12 percent for the potential private partner to the Delhi Jal (water) Board (see Koonan and Sampat 2012). 
103  In the Delhi water supply public private partnerships framework for instance, 12 percent assured rate of return in 
guaranteed to private investors for the first five years of investment (see Koonan and Sampat 2011). 









Figure 4: DMIC Project Influence Area and New Industrial Regions 
 
Source: GoI 2007e 
 
In December 2006 the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) of the 
Commerce and Industries Ministry signed a memorandum of understanding between Vice Minister, 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of the Government of Japan for areas of “mutual 
cooperation” and setting up a Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC; see GoI 2007e). During 
Premier Shinzo Abe’s visit to India in August 2007, a final project concept prepared by the well- 







Commerce and Industries Ministry) was presented to both Prime Ministers. According to the DMIC 
website, ”[The] Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor is a mega infra-structure project of USD 90 
billion with the financial & technical aids from Japan, covering an overall length of 1483 KMs 
between the political capital and the business capital of India, i.e. Delhi and Mumbai.”105 The website 
continues, “A band of 150 km (Influence region) has been chosen on both sides of the Freight 
corridor [106]… The vision for DMIC is to create [a] strong economic base in this band with [a] 
globally competitive environment and state-of-the-art infrastructure to activate local commerce, 
enhance foreign investments, real-estate investments and attain sustainable development. …DMIC 
would also include development of requisite feeder rail/road connectivity to hinterland/markets and 
select ports along the western coast.” 
It adds, “Approximately 180 million people, 14 percent of the [Indian] population, will be 
affected by the corridor’s development… This project incorporates Nine Mega Industrial zones of 
about 200-250 sq. km. [20-25,0000 hectares], [one] high speed freight line, three ports, and six air 
ports; a six-lane intersection-free expressway connecting the country’s political and financial capitals 
and a 4000 MW power plant. …Funds for the projects would come from the Indian government, 
Japanese loans, and investment by Japanese firms and through Japan depository receipts issued by 
the Indian companies.”107  Further, it explains, “High impact/ market driven nodes - integrated 





105 See http://www.dmic.co.in/dmic-introduction.php (accessed April 14, 2013). 
106  The Freight Corridor also runs almost parallel to the Delhi—Mumbai leg of the Golden Quadrilateral National 
Highway. The Golden Quadrilateral was the much touted 6-lane highway instituted by the BJP-led National Democratic 
Alliance government in 1999-2004 between the four metropolises, Delhi (north), Mumbai (west), Chennai (south) and 
Kolkata (east). 
107 Ex-CEO of DMIC, Amitabh Kant (now Industries Secretary to the GoI in the Commerce and Industries Ministry), 
in a meeting with top Japanese investors and bureaucrats at the India Japan Global Partnership Summit in 2011 exhorted 
Japanese investors for greater partnership in India and especially in the DMIC, “…to counterbalance in many ways to 
the growing influence of the Chinese penetration of markets across Africa and Asia…” 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIwrwmtQ3n8). 
108 IRs are expected to have a minimum area of over 200 square kilometers (20,000 hectares), and IAs over 100 square 







provide transparent and investment friendly facility regimes… 24 such nodes - 9 IRs and 15 IAs 
spanning across six states have been identified after wide consultations with the stakeholders i.e the 
State Governments and the concerned Central Ministries. It is proposed that 6 IR and 6 IAs would 
be taken up for implementation in the First Phase during 2008-2012 and rest of the development 
would be phased out in the next 4 years.” 
The Mandal-Becharji Special Investment Region (SIR) in  Gujarat was one  of  the  first 
“nodes” to begin implementation; and faced immediate resistance from the 44 villages whose 50,884 
hectares of land were sought for it (Indian Express 2013; ToI 2013). When agitations intensified, 
then-Chief  Minister  of  Gujarat  (and  future  Prime  Minister)  Modi,  likely  fearing  electoral 
repercussions in a sensitive election year, canceled of notification for 36 villages for the Special 
Investment Region (Indian Express 2013). The remaining eight villages are still resisting the 
acquisition of their villages for the Investment Region and opposing the institution of a Maruti 
Suzuki automobile plant in the region on the pasture lands of the traditional cattle-rearing Maldhari 
community (Chauhan 2013; Thakkar 2013; JAAG 2014a,b).109   The Maldharis, along  with other 
landless communities had been given this land in 1954 under land reforms. 
In Dholera Special Investment Region with 22 villages (920 sq km) slated for acquisition 
(also in Gujarat), agitations have been continuing (Indian Express 2014); 100 people were detained 
and 22 arrested in February 2014 when protesting land acquisition (JAAG 2014b; ToI 2014). 
Similarly, land acquisition of around 75,000 acres for Dighi port in Maharashtra state’s Raigad 
district (also the district that evicted the MSEZ) was dropped by the central government in the face 
of farmers’ protests and the Maharashtra government’s inability to acquire land (Shivadekar 2013). 
The ambitious “smart-city” plans of the SIR are worth noting and its promotional video shows a city 
that looks like a sci-fi set with towers, bridges, a “global business hub,” “multi-model transport 
 
 
109 Maruti Suzuki is facing immense agitation and has seen frequent strikes and confrontations from contract workers in 







systems,” airport, sea ports, “entertainment zones,” “smart homes” and more to the accompaniment 
of an eerie techno drumbeat. The video ends with the smiling face of Modi and ends with the 
promise: “The city of Dholera will come up, this is as true a fact that the sun will rise tomorrow...”110 
(see Figure 5 below; also Datta 2014). 































































The Domain of Capital Perilous 
Geographies of Indifference (Where 
Once We Sowed Paddy 







300 million Indians currently live in towns and cities.  Within 20-25 years, another 300 
million people will get added to Indian towns and cities.  This urban expansion will happen 
at a speed quite unlike anything that India has seen before.  It took nearly forty years for 
India’s urban population to rise by 230 million.  It could take only half the time to add the 




Prologue: On January 4, 2014, “Ruby Residency,” a five-story building under construction in Canacona town of 
Goa, collapsed with over 50 workers working on different floors. In rescue operations over the next two days 22 
injured workers were pulled out alive, but the toll of the dead kept rising. As operations continued, adjacent buildings 
began developing cracks because of the impact and debris clearance. On the third day, operations suddenly stopped—an 
adjacent building had started collapsing. Some of the remaining trapped workers were local Goans111, and the 
suspension of rescue sparked immediate protests. Operations resumed, and two villas on the block had to be demolished 
to access the area. When operations finally ended 10 days later, the count stopped at 32 dead workers and 22 injured 
but alive. Three directors of the realty firm from Mumbai, Bharat Realtors and Developers, were absconding, as was 
the Municipal Engineer responsible for issuing a clearance certificate to the building. The Deputy Collector of South 
Goa district112 was arrested for signing the Occupancy Certificate for the building (a week before it collapsed) and the 
Deputy Town Planner for not following due procedure before issuing its license. 
The Chief Minister of the state, Manohar Parrikar of the Hindu-right Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) arrived 
on the scene the day the building collapsed and issued “new” construction norms in two days: soil testing for buildings 







111  Given high human development indicators, construction and other low-wage earning workers in Goa are generally 
migrant workers from rural Bihar, Jharkhand and Karnataka. 
112 Canacona is a taluka or administrative block in South Goa district. A Collector is the administrative head of a district. 
113  These sell cement-sand ready mixes that can be used for construction without the otherwise more cumbersome 







contractors. On January 12, BJP’s controversial Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi114 arrived in Goa for a 
rally in the lead up to the 2014 general elections. His party announced that the proceeds from his ticketed election rally 




The Canacona building collapse in Goa adumbrates some of the complex dynamics of the growing 
“real estate economy” (REE) in India. As inequality, corruption, dispossession and electoral 
opportunity-mongering dog “business as usual,” the REE creates a “perilous geography of 
indifference.” Its indifference is perilous not just for workers, peasants, other residents and the 
environment from where it extracts and where it grows, but for accumulation itself. Threats of 
“collapse” and resistance “interrupt” (cf. Gidwani 2008) its unfolding landscape. 
By  the  real  estate  economy  or  REE,  I  refer  to  the  massive  urbanization-real  estate 
assemblage (cf Mcfarlane 2011)116 exerting an organizing pull on several resources and sectors in the 
Indian economy. I stumbled upon the significance of the REE while studying the successful 
resistance to SEZs in Goa. Discussing SEZs meaningfully required an examination of the real estate 
economy’s remarkable growth over the last decade in the country, and the state. With Goa’s 
popularity as a tourist destination, SEZs in the state were deeply implicated in “land-grabs” for real 
estate. This was the case in other SEZ areas as well, especially those on the outskirts of large 





114  Modi was then Chief Minister of Gujarat for 14 years and is widely held responsible by domestic and international 
human rights organizations for allowing the pogrom that killed over 2000 Muslims in Gujarat state in 2002. The US 
administration has consistently denied him a visa as a result of human rights advocacy although there have been some 
recent signs of a thaw. 
115 This type of political gimmickry is not exclusive to the BJP, of course, or to Modi, but its nefariousness is linked with 
the indifference to dispossession in Modi’s promise of “100 smart-cities.” 
116  Mcfarlane (2011) brings the theory of assemblage into dialogue with a conception of dwelling in making a wider 
ontological argument about the city as assemblage; creating processual, relational, mobile and unequal assemblages. He 
argues that if housing is a doing, that it is dwelt or inhabited as much as built, this dwelling is a form of assembly 
through practices of gathering, composition, alignment and reuse. Assemblage then usefully grasps the spatially 
processual, relational and generative nature of the city where generative refers to historical processes and political 







developments, I realized that at stake were not just SEZs or other “infrastructure” and real estate 
projects, but a refashioning of “the Indian” economy and society “from above,” through large-scale 
urbanization integrated with circuits of capital. In terms of scale, it is useful to recall here that 70 
percent of India’s billion plus population is rural and 60 percent dependent on agriculture and allied 
activities. The quote from a Planning Commission of India document above suggesting the 
movement of 300 million people to cities should be seen in this light. This chapter takes me furthest 
from SEZs, but also drives home the significance of some of the larger forces driving SEZs. 
What is the REE and how is it consolidating in India? What are the implications of the 
growth of the REE for changing relations to land and resources, and to development? How is its 
development in Goa particular to the state, and how does it resonate with the broader shifts in the 
Indian economy? How is resistance to the REE shaping an impasse over land rights and relations to 
and around land and resources? 
In this chapter I discuss the growing REE in India, with a particular focus on developments 
in Goa. The first section of the chapter is set up as an “assemblage” and pieces together the REE. I 
discuss policy measures around the REE that are leading to its consolidation; the developers, 
financiers and other interests driving it; and the growing income inequality and endemic corruption 
fueling the REE. I then focus on the REE in Goa; the influence of the state’s tourism industry on 
real estate; and the politics around the Regional Plan (RP) that sought to convert many green and 
eco-sensitive areas (protected areas) in villages to “settlement” areas (where construction was 
permitted) and caused a ferment of resistance. The final section discusses the implications of the 
REE for relationships with land and resources and conceptions of “development.” 
Available official data, private developers’ reports and information from interviews with 
developers, officials, journalists and activists in Delhi, Mumbai and Goa are the sources for the 







research on them is nascent or fragmented.117 Media reportage and available analysis points to 
inadequate regulation with frequent “underhand” deals and corrupt nexus of politicians, bureaucrats 
and developers. Official data regarding the volume of transactions, growth in built units or accurate 
sale prices is disparate and unclear. Short of going through unsorted individual land transaction and 
sale deed records village by village maintained in block offices in hand-written files, even a near 
accurate picture of land-use change and square feet of commercial and residential property built is 
tough to create. Developers too are loath to part with information for fear of competition. 
Confounding analyses further is the fact that sale deeds of transactions often do not reflect the real 
price of land or property; these are often suppressed in official records by transacting parties to 
avoid stamp duties. While I was successful in obtaining some relevant and indicative materials, the 





What is the Real Estate Economy? 
 
 
Framing the REE 
 
My reference to the real estate economy is not to imply that it is organizing the entire Indian economy 
in a Lefebvrian “urban revolution” (2003), but to suggest that it is forming major axes of 
accumulation, and resistance.118  Policy, land and property markets, developers, realtors, financiers, 
labor, resources like iron ore, sand, stone and water, and resisting peasants’ and citizens’ groups; are 
equally drawn into creating its dynamic in India. The policy impetus for urbanization encompasses 




117 See Chakaravorty (2013) for a recent pro-market analysis of land and property markets in India; Levien (2012) for a 
study of agrarian change in the wake of the Mahindra World City near Jaipur city in Rajasthan state; Weinstein (2008) for 
the role of the underworld mafias in Mumbai’s real estate market. 
118 While Finance and Insurance have accompanied the rise of Real Estate in the US since the 1980s, in India, they form 







encompasses commercial growth infrastructures such as SEZs and industrial corridors. The 
diversification of several large business houses into housing, infrastructure and retail construction 
indicates its scale and “fix” for the “absorption of surplus value” through urban investments (cf. 
Harvey 2001; 2012). While the REE remains regulated, global finance is unable to directly invest in 
housing, commercial and retail real estate per se, but is fueling the REE through “urbanization and 
infrastructure” projects like “smart cities” and “industrial corridors” that envisage “integrated 
townships.” Smaller-scale, regional, state and district level developers are abundant in India, and fly- 
by-night operators join their ranks. Its growing share in employment underscores its significance. 
The REE is playing a critical role in refashioning relationships with land and resources. 
The REE draws upon ideologies and aesthetics of “waste” and “value” as well as 
“backwardness” and “modernity” to “develop” land for accumulation. In the policy primacy for 
urbanization, eminent domain is often used to forcibly acquire land for “development.” Growing 
“differential rent” from “conversion” of agricultural land to real estate is also reconfiguring the 
political economy of land in urban peripheries. Thus, with appreciation of land prices as 
“infrastructure and development projects” are announced, some farmers “give up” land without 
resistance for immediate returns, as agriculture is less profitable or valuable.119 Investors and builders 
from the REE may or may not have direct stakes in potential “productive linkages” emerging from 
real estate creation and the few numbers of operational SEZs discussed in the previous chapter are 
instructive, but policy emphases on “industrialization and infrastructure creation” complement the 
REE logics of accumulation. 
The “creative destruction” the REE unleashes is often officially unacknowledged or 
obscured,  and  ranges  from  direct  and  induced  dispossession  of  people,  lands,  resources  and 
livelihoods (see also Harvey 2009; Smith 2002); to the debris and contamination around stone and 
 
 
119  In discussions of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession using “extra-economic” force, such 







sand quarries; the “accidentally” injured and dead bodies of workers; or the “illicit” finance circuits 
that range from illegal mining profits in the case of Goa to “underworld” financing in the case of 
Mumbai (Weinstein 2008). The corruption endemic in the REE (exemplified in the Canacona 
building collapse) often belies collective developmental goals, and discloses a “free-for-all” grab of 
land and resources by political and economic elite. The REE thus produces “perilous geographies of 
indifference,” as its promoters attempt to focus on value creation and ignore, obscure or erase— 
illegalities, accidents, dispossession and ecological destruction. This indifference is perilous to their 
goals, as at times the social forces that are expected to absorb these impoverishing processes join in 
alliances of successful resistance and takeover. The Goan agitations against RP 2011 and SEZs are 
emblematic of such alliances, perilous to the consolidation of the REE, and generative of conditions 






A recent report by Cushman & Wakefield ranks India 20th among the current top 20 real estate 
investment markets globally, with an investment of $3.4 billion in 2012 (ET 2013d). A study by 
Global Construction Perspectives and Oxford Economics further predicts that India will become 
the world’s third largest construction market by 2025, adding 11.5 million homes a year to become a 
$1 trillion a year market (Sen 2013). In 2011-12 the shares of real estate and construction together 
accounted for 19 percent of the Indian economy, growing from 14.7 percent in 2000-01 (GoI 2013f; 
see Table 2 below). More remarkably, in 2009-10, the construction sector formed the second largest 
employer of workers in India, employing 11 percent of the workforce after agriculture, which 
































Real estate, ownership of 




































Source: Adapted from Central Statistics Office in GoI 2013f; Shares are in current prices and growth in constant prices; Figures 
in brackets indicate growth rate. 
 
Several builders I interviewed in the course of my research point out that Real Estate has 
around 250-270 “backward and forward linkages” with other sectors of the economy. While 
enumeration and  discussion of  all  of  these is beyond the  scope of  this study, some obvious 
backward linkages are mining (iron ore, stone and sand quarries), brick-making, cement and steel 
manufacture,  transport  and  contract labor.  Forward  linkages  include  services  like  architectural 
design, engineering, plumbing, electricity provision, water supply, furnishings, fittings, carpentry, 
tiling and interior designing. Developers frequently describe Real Estate as a “major catalyst” in the 
economy; one developer called it the “mother of the development of a particular locality;” and 
several point to its “cascading” or “multiplier effects.” 
India’s real estate as a sector began to consolidate in the mid-2000s. In housing, large-scale 
projects for various income categories (low, middle and high) were previously undertaken by the 
state. Developers I  interviewed frequently pointed out that the  state could not  keep up  with 
“growing demand” towards the turn of the century and private players were allowed entry into the 
housing sector. The REE today includes a plethora of private builders that range from local, small- 
scale builders in small towns or what are called “rururban” areas121  like Goa, to those with regional 
and national projects. Regional and national developers also cater to a variety of commercial and 
retail real estate and infrastructure related construction, the latter often through group or subsidiary 





121 Villages in Goa are typically described as “rururban” because of the urbanized infrastructure and amenities available 







residential and commercial operations. Its Red Herring Prospectus122   describes the diversity of its 
projects and gives a sense of the expanding REE: 
Our operations span all aspects of real estate development, from the identification and acquisition 
of land, the planning, execution and marketing of our projects, through to the maintenance 
and management of our completed developments. In our residential business line, we build 
and sell a wide range of properties including plots, houses, duplexes and apartments of 
varying sizes, with a focus on the higher end of the market. In our commercial business line, we 
build and sell or lease commercial office space, with a focus on properties attractive to large 
multinational tenants. Our retail business line develops, manages and mainly leases shopping malls, 
which in many cases include multiplex cinemas. We are also expanding our business by entering 
into the infrastructure, SEZ and hotel businesses (emphases added;123 DLF Limited 2007: 1). 
The  Indian  REE  is  largely  dependent  on  the  Indian  upper  class  elite  and  is  forging 
 




With  the  growth  of  the  Indian  economy  and  the  resulting  increase  in  corporate  and 
consumer income, as well as foreign investment, we see significant opportunities for growth 
in our three primary businesses. …In order to ensure the high quality of our projects, we 
have  entered  into  joint  ventures  with  WSP  [UK-origin  transnational  William  Sale 
Partnership] to provide us with engineering and design services and Laing O. Rourke [UK- 
origin transnational] to provide construction expertise… (ibid.). 
Unitech is another well-known national realty firm and boasts 100 residential, commercial, 
 
retail and hospitality projects across the country. I met a senior representative of the company in 
 
 
122  Red Herring reports are submitted to Securities and Exchange Board of India prior to a public issue and detail all 
business undertakings and assets of a company. 
123  The emphases indicate the creation of residential, commercial and retail real estate for wealthy elite and hence the 







Gurgaon, a south western suburb of the NCR that falls in Haryana state. Gurgaon was initially a 
predominantly agrarian rural area. It has now emerged as a major commercial and residential hub, 
with several malls, office and residential complexes, well-connected by the recently installed Delhi 
Metro.124   Unitech has developed several high-rise buildings and residential complexes including 
villas, in Gurgaon. En route to Unitech’s office buildings in the Delhi Metro, from a portion of the 
metro that is elevated, Unitech’s distinct red logo can be clearly seen about a mile from the train. 
The representative I met explained to me that the overall economic growth in the country in the 
past two decades complemented strong growth in the real estate sector. He said prominent realty 
firms now go for campus placement to premier management and engineering institutes, which was 
not the case even a decade ago. He added that realty firms are also one of the largest sources of 
advertising revenue for the media, and almost every newspaper now has a property supplement 
(interview February 28, 2012). 
Similarly, Director General of the National Real Estate Development Council (NAREDCO) 
(Retd.) Brigadier Singh, pointed out in another interview that the growth of the real estate market 
has meant that not just construction industry but many big domestic industrial houses like “the 
Tatas and Birlas125  have now jumped into it [Real Estate],” opening a real estate arm with mass 
housing construction to “cash in on the profitability of the sector.” Thus, the Tata Housing 
Development Company, Tata Realty and Infrastructure, Infiniti Retail, Trent and the Indian Hotels 
Company are some examples of Tata Sons’ wholly or partly owned residential, commercial and retail 






124  The Delhi Metro began operations in 2005 and is financed in large part by the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) that now has major infrastructure investments in the form of PPPs across India. These range from urban 
transport, water supply and management, large dam and “smart city” (compact, vertical and technologically superior 
cities) projects. 
125  Tata and Birla groups of companies are two of the oldest and biggest Indian business houses comprising several 







But these are the large-scale developers. A number of small-scale local real estate developers 
are part of the REE as well. Many of them are organized in the state chapters of the CREDAI 
(Confederation of Real Estate Developers’ Associations of India). In Goa alone, according to 
the list provided to me by Commonwealth Realtors in 2012, there were 62 Goan b uilders who 
were members of CREDAI Goa. CREDAI Goa President, Nilesh Salcar revealed that several 
builders  preferred  not  to  become  members  of  the  CREDAI  because  it  entailed  sharing 
information with competitors (interview April 30, 2012). Fly-by-night operators such as Bharat 
Realtors and Developers, responsible for the Canacona building, are particularly notorious in the 
smaller-scale real estate market. Larger and more organized developers, such as members of the 
CREDAI, expressed hope that with greater consolidation, such operators who bring a “bad name” 
to the business would eventually get weeded out (interviews with Unitech representative February 
28, 2012; Advalpalkar builders January 9, 2014). The REE at this conjuncture encompasses multiple 







As discussed in previous chapters, several recent policy and market mechanisms promote 
urbanization. The 2013 land acquisition law sanctions forcible land acquisition for industrialization, 
infrastructure   development   and   urbanization.   The   National   Manufacturing  Policy   envisages 
“integrated industrial townships.” Industrial corridor projects between several cities such as Delhi- 
Mumbai or Kokata-Amritsar envisage “integrated industrial townships” and “smart-cities.” Land is 
being acquired for investment zones in several states along proposed corridors. The Bangalore- 







between the two cities (Goldman 2011). Special Economic Zones Act similarly reserve 50 percent 
 
land for townships and related “social and recreational infrastructures.” 
 
Growing agrarian distress caused by Market Led Agrarian Reforms (cf. Borras and Franco 
 
2010) environmental stresses and consequent indebtedness of farmers (see Vakulabharanam and 
 
Motiram 2011) is adding to the pull away from agriculture. 
 
Apart from recent policy mechanisms, other policy developments related to liberalization are 
influencing the push towards real estate. Noida,126  a growing real estate hub in the south eastern 
National Capital Region (NCR) flanking Delhi is divided into several sectors teeming with multi- 
story buildings (the construction of multi-story buildings is restricted in many parts of the capital 
itself for security reasons but allowed in its suburbs). The Delhi Metro operations are still expanding 
into the suburb, and some sectors are harder to reach through public transport. In some areas, the 
entire landscape is filled with concrete, eight-to-ten-story buildings one after another, with paved 
sidewalks and scarcely a tree for relief. I met Noida-based ASSOTECH builders Director Mahendra 
Goel in his eighth floor suite in one such building in Noida. Mr. Goel pointed out that from 2000, 
the Indian share market expanded from an index of 8-9000 to 14-17000. The growth in speculative 
money gains, greater money supply, housing needs, people seeking to park and diversify investment, 
all together worked in favor of growing real estate investments (interview March 29, 2012). 
Similarly, a representative of a prominent Goan real estate builder, Devashri Builders (a 
subsidiary of prominent Goan mining group Dempo127) pointed out that the reduction of savings 
account rates by banks in the early 2000s made gold and real estate attractive investments for 
middle-class Indians, the latter being particularly attractive given appreciation rates over time. He 




126 Noida is a suburb of Delhi and falls within the National Capital Region, but is n Uttar Pradesh state. 








15 percent year-on-year, making it a lucrative investment for the middle and upper classes and 
fueling the growth of the real estate economy. Investment in shares and stocks require “a thinking 
cap” and bank savings rates don’t keep up with inflation, hence, investment in property offers a sure 
return  (interview  with  Devashri  Builders,  April  25,  2012).  Thus,  the  impetus  for  real  estate 
investment has come from expanding money supply among the middle and upper classes in India. 
Unsurprisingly then, there is a mismatch between existing housing needs and affordability. 
Figures from the National Housing Board indicate that 39,621,322128  households officially needed 
housing based on the 2001 census, which already seems on the conservative side. NAREDCO’s 
Brig. Singh pointed out that urbanization and industrialization has seen growing migration to the 
cities and increase of “non-formal workers.” This has resulted in the development of slums as there 
is no affordable housing for the poor. Housing is available mostly for the well-off middle and upper 
classes. With  the  realization  of  this  “mismatch” and  “lacunae,”  new  integrated townships are 
required to reserve low-income housing to promote “inclusive integrated growth for townships” and 
financial incentives (see section below) are being given for housing “economically weaker sections” 
and “lower income group” people (interview March 27, 2012). Goa’s Milroc Development 
representative pointed out on the other hand, that while higher interest subsidies exist for low 
income groups, “very few builders cater to that group… land and costs are so high that we… cater 
to… only middle class” (interview April 25, 2012). This is a particularly entrenched phenomenon in 
the growing real estate economy that caters to the middle and upper classes with the resources to 
invest for housing, or as remunerative property. I turn below to a discussion of land prices and 


















In his analysis of Indian land markets, Chakravorty (2013) argues that land prices in India have risen 
phenomenally and growing real estate prices reflect the rise in the price of land, given construction 
costs have risen stably along the consumer price index. He points out that current urban land prices 
range from $833 to $33 million per acre129  and the price of urban land has increased five-fold in 
2001-11.130 He further argues that agricultural land prices in some rural areas may have increased by 
 
a factor of five to 10 over the past decade and that agricultural land price is higher in the urban 
periphery than in interior districts. Prices vary, he suggests, along productivity and income from 
land; how active local land markets are; and the scarcity of land supply and fragmentation (ibid.). He 
argues that the rising price of land is caused by expansion of money supply in the post liberalization 
period: expansion of credit markets; income growth for some sections who in turn invest in land 
and property as status markers; rise in “black” money; foreign investment from Non-Resident 
Indians; and the scarcity of land with respect to location and intense fragmentation (ibid.). 
With an international comparison of real estate price to income ratio he argues that while in 
the world’s most expensive land markets (Hong Kong, London, Paris and Tokyo) 62 to 69 years of 
the national average income is needed to buy housing in the highest end of the property market, in 
New York and Singapore this is 47 years, and in Mumbai and Delhi the ratio is a whopping 580 and 
180 years of national per capita income respectively. This underscores the post liberalization 
inequalities in wealth and income distribution in India (pp. 147-8). While his study reveals the extent 
and role of income inequalities in activating land markets and in the current money supply, he does 
not make enough of the insight that rising income inequalities are the drivers of land and real estate 
markets in India. 
 
 
129 The current dollar-rupee rate is at Rs. 60 = $1. 
130 Devashri Builders representative argued that the price of land has gone up 900 percent in the past decade, fueling the 
cost of RE. This he claimed can be addressed by releasing more land so that prices come down or fueling growth so 







To illustrate, in his study of agrarian change around the Mahindra World City (MWC) on the 
outskirts of Jaipur city, Levien (2012) found that the MWC paid $22,679 per acre for 3000 acres for 
land acquired by the state agency. While their development costs amounted to $66,000 per acre, they 
were selling industrial land at $224,000 per acre and residential land at an estimated $554,420 per 
acre; making whopping profits of $135,000 per acre of industrial land and over $465,000 per acre for 
residential land. The fact that there are buyers at these prices indicates large disposable incomes or 
wealth, or access to credit, seeking profitable investment and driving land and property prices 
phenomenally upward. 
A representative of Gera Builders, a Pune-based realty firm with operations in Goa (and now 
expanding into Bangalore) revealed in an interview that in 2010, if the local price of property was 
$300 per square meter  and $30 per square foot, non-Goan property buyers were ready to pay up to 
 
$300 per square foot (interview January 1, 2014). Other Goan developers added that the entry of 
national-level builders in the Goan market in 2004 fueled price rises in local markets so that land 
(and property) became unaffordable for local residents. Income and wealth inequality, in other 
words, is not just a factor fueling land prices but the driver of real estate investments. Growing 
disposable incomes of some sections of the country’s population thus fuel unequal and often illegal 
land and property markets and provide the impetus for the growing real estate economy in India. 
It is worth noting that Goan builders I interviewed repeatedly claimed that their clientele is 
 
60-70 percent Goan, given local population growth and intra-state migration for livelihoods, and 
that in the case of non-Goan builders the figures may be reversed. This assertion is hard to verify 
and may also be presented in view of the controversy generated over real estate-related land 
conversions for “outsiders” in the wake of the Regional Plan agitations against land conversions for 











the discrepancy between what local and metropolitan buyers are willing and able to pay for property 
has been a critical issue in Goa. There are thus two levels of housing needs; one is more organic and 
related to population growth; and the other is related to investment in property with the latter 






Financing for real estate is a mixed bag. The Unitech representative I met explained that the Reserve 
Bank of India typically views real estate with skepticism and fears the creation of “real estate 
bubbles.” Consequently bank financing for the construction of real estate projects is non-existent. 
For large developers, financing from foreign private equity has increased in the last decade, after the 
liberalization of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).132 But there are considerable restrictions for 
foreign  investment in  real  estate projects. Insurance and  pension  funds,  for  instance, are  not 
available for realty, although this is the case, he argued, “globally.” Arguing for deregulation to allow 
pension and insurance funds, he also cautioned against the introduction of “derivative products” to 
avoid volatile speculative investment. He called real estate a “major growth driver” because of its 
“linkages,” and advocated that it be “viewed from this lens” (of a growth driver) and not just as “a 
risk” for banks. Prior to the FDI liberalization, he explained, funding for housing projects was 
largely from state agencies which could no longer “keep up with the demand” (interview February 
28, 2012). Unitech, he explained, also has its own fixed deposit scheme (see Table 3 below) with 
investment options ranging from six months to three years and interest rates from 11.5 to 12.5 
percent at Rs. 25,000 (approximately $420) minimum investment. This is significant within India, as 













FDI and bank finance for individual real estate projects is limited but foreign investment and 
other debt-finance options for “smart-cities” or SEZs are ongoing, as these are designated 
“infrastructure projects” (and not real estate). With the growing demand for real estate and greater 
consolidation of real estate developers, it is likely that more avenues for foreign and bank investment 
will open up.133 
 
Table 3: Unitech Fixed Deposit Scheme 
 
About FD Scheme - Types of Scheme 
Scheme (A) - Non Cumulative* 
Period Minimum Amount (Rs.) Rate of Interst (%p.a.) 
1 Year 25,000/- 11.50% 
2 Years 25,000/- 12.00% 
3 Years 25,000/- 12.50% 
*Interest would be paid on a quaterly basis 
*Additional amounts in multiples of Rs. 1,000/- 
Scheme (B) - Cumulative** 
Period Minimum Amount (Rs.) Rate of Interest (%p.a.) Payable on Maturity Yield (%p.a.) 
(Rs.) 
6 Months 25,000/- 11.50% 26,438/- 11.50% 
1 Year 25,000/- 11.50% 28,031/- 12.13% 
2 Years 25,000/- 12.00% 31,743/- 13.49% 
3 Years 25,000/- 12.50% 36,304/- 15.07% 
**Interest compounded monthly on deposits of one year or more and payable on maturity 






Delhi-based Raheja Builders representative in another interview echoed the Unitech 
representative’s views that with the liberalization of FDI into real estate, it consolidated as a sector, 
becoming more organized, now contributing 6-7 percent to the country’s GDP (interview March 5, 
2012). NAREDCO’s Brig. Singh further explained that there is greater liberalization of “external 
commercial borrowings” for the sector. Drastic changes in financing patterns since 1999-2000, he 
pointed out, have meant lots of incentives to developers and “incentivization of loans for buyers” so 
that now every bank has housing loan schemes that are cheaper than those for industry (interview 
March 27, 2012). 
 
 
133   In  her  study  of  interactions between  foreign  financiers (excluding pension  and  insurance  funds)  and  Indian 
developers struggling to form partnerships to create an “internationally familiar” real estate market in India, Searle (2014) 
finds that conflicts over issues like land valuation, power, prestige and business practice also form critical stumbling 







Developers typically announce a project, raise money from customers and use it to finance 
construction and buy other properties. This often leaves consumers at risk since schedules are rarely 
followed, and costs of construction rise over time (interview with Advalpalkar builders January 9, 
2014). A proposed real estate law seeks to appoint a regulator for projects to protect consumer 
rights. Nevertheless, growing disposable incomes in the post-liberalization period are a key driver of 
real estate growth. According to Raheja Builders representative for instance, a person earning $750 
salary annually in 2001 is now typically earning $2,500134  and the growth in disposable income is 
sought to be invested in property. 
Apart from these “official” sources, a lot of funding for realty projects is from “unofficial” 
domestic channels. Weinstein (2008) points out that the flow of “underworld” mafia funds in the 
Mumbai  real  estate  economy  for  instance  peaked  in  the  1990s  and  maintains  an  entrenched 
presence. “Crony capitalism” with patron linkages between state and corporate representatives 
additionally ensures prominent deals for certain developers. Representatives of the CREDAI argue 
for greater transparency in approvals processes to mitigate crony capitalism, although developers 
confess  that  this  is  not  likely  to  go  away  overnight.  Interestingly, a  senor journalist with a 
prominent English-language national financial daily alleged that the reason for Mumbai SEZ’s 
(MSEZ) failure in Raigad was because of a high-level Maharashtra state politician’s significant stakes 
in the extremely high-end south Mumbai real estate market. The development of the MSEZ135 along 
with the new Shewdi bridge connecting Raigad to south Mumbai over sea would have significantly 
depreciated south Mumbai prices. 
In Goa, on the other hand, financing comes from other sources as well. Mining of lower 
 
grade iron ore saw a boom in the 2000s in the state, with growing demand from China. As a result, 
 
 
134 I have calculated these approximate figures at Rs. 40 = $1 for 2001 and Rs. 50 = $1 for 2012. 
135 MSEZ was promoted by Reliance Industries Limited, a prominent business house and whose owner Mukesh Ambani 








there was rampant illegal mining and miners, transporters and other ancillary concerns became flush 
with money.136 Given the rise in profitability from real estate, this money has found its way into the 
state’s real estate economy. Goan builders confirmed this linkage in several interviews and even 
point to a recent slump in investment as a result of the current ban on mining in the state (as noted 
earlier, Devashri Builders in Goa is a subsidiary of the Goan mining corporate Dempo). 
For “economically weaker sections” again, NAREDCO’s Brig. Singh explained that micro- 
finance institutions are being encouraged to provide housing credit at affordable rates of interest, 
along with government sponsored mortgage guarantee and interest subsidy schemes for limits of 
$10,000.137 In the year 2012, for example, loans up to $30,000 were being given for $50,000 houses 
 
with five percent interest subsidy. Incentives to developers include no service tax for floor area of 60 
meters and below. He argued however, for the need to first create jobs through industrial 
development and necessary infrastructure and “planned scientific development” like the DMIC, 
given cities’ contribution to GDP is far more than rural areas, from 40-60 percent (interview March 
27, 2012). 
The radical transformation of urban and rural landscape in India is currently underway 
through domestic capital and funding sources. Illicit channels, customer advances and housing 
finance form a bulk of the funding for real estate projects, except when they are large-scale city- 
making projects. I turn below to the issue of land conversions, appropriation of water resources and 








136 Extensive laterization with rich iron oxides that give Goan soil its deep red color have turned the state’s mountainous 
region into a controversial mining belt. Rampant illegal and ecologically destructive mining has destroyed many water 
sources and adversely impacted agriculture. Diligent litigation by environmental activists, reports of judicial commissions 
and inquiries however, have resulted in suspending all mining operations in Goa since 2012 until all operations are 
comprehensively investigated. Recent reports suggest that partial mining activities are likely to be resumed by January 
2015. 









Again, “developing” land through real estate is increasingly lucrative for political and economic 
elites, while the cost of housing and land is spiraling beyond local affordability as residents whose 
lands are coveted get priced out of their homes and often livelihoods. Real estate-related land 
acquisition and transfers of agricultural and common land are also giving rise to what has been called 
a “land-broker state” (Levien 2012) or “speculative government” (Goldman 2011). Interests within 
or allied with state representatives purchase land from farmers or the state forcibly acquires them 
using eminent domain at cheap rates. These lands are then sold or leased to developers at higher 
rates, with the middle persons, or the state, making profit. The transformation of rural economies 
into urban real estate has thus become highly remunerative for rent-seeking state actors and 
developers, even  where such  projects  are  not  explicitly promoting  “world-cities” or  involving 
foreign finance capital (cf. Goldman 2011). 
The threat of diversion of resources and public investments to private entities was explicit in 
the Mumbai SEZ area (see chapter three). The increasing conversion of land for settlement 
facilitating real estate growth is exerting pressure on local water sources in Goa as well, as ground 
water gets pumped and used for construction and sometimes, water bodies are included within the 
enclosures of such projects. An ice-cream shop owner and activist from popular tourist village Colva 
in South Goa, Judith Almeida, notes that ponds have been taken over by builders through illegal 
conversion to construct swimming pools for residential projects (interview April 30, 2012). In 2004, 
about 30,000 square meters of a creek were given to a hotelier for a multi-purpose playground, 
facilitated by a prominent local politician. Almeida and others challenged the conversion and 
allotment of the creek in court and eventually the project was scrapped. Judith Rebello from Verna 
recounts that a neighbor who runs a special needs school for children had created a garden for them 







she decided to clean the well with alum and potassium permanganate, which when thrown into a 
well dissolves organic debris and restores the water level. The following day, the water level was not 
restored, but construction workers at a nearby housing construction project were heard yelling that 
the color of the water they were pumping for construction was red, which is when she realized why 
her water table had fallen (interview, June 12, 2012). While the scale and clientele of the project were 
unclear, such local stresses on resources resulting from rampant construction have fueled the ire of a 
cross-section of local residents against land conversions and resulted in the agitation against the RP 
2011 (discussed below). 
 
The acquisition around the proposed Mopa airport in Goa also exemplifies the land 
conversion rush in Goa. While the airport at Mopa is considered investment in infrastructure, 
several political and economic elites have invested in properties around the proposed airport in 
anticipation of land appreciation and future gains. Several farmers from around Mopa village in 
North Goa have been adamantly refusing acquisition and are against the new airport with its 
attendant consequences on land, resources, livelihoods and environment. A number of politicians 
have already purchased land in the area surrounding the proposed airport in anticipation of 
appreciation in land and property prices. While the Government of Goa (GoG) intends to acquire 
land to facilitate a Public Private Partnership with a developer for developing the airport, 
infrastructure projects thus facilitate speculative investments by those with “inside information” 
about the project. Eminent domain is used for the airport, and facilitates market based transfers of 
land and resources. The investors in land now form a lobby promoting the airport and allied 
infrastructural development in the area even as several local residents oppose the project in ongoing 
agitations. Activists point out that the existing airport at Dabolim meets the current needs of about 
three million travelers annually and has room further expansion. Mopa on the other hand, seeks to 







a   further   push   for   infrastructure,  real   estate   and   tourism   related   development  in   both 
states(interviews with environmentalist and  Goenkarancha Xetkari Ekvott activist Abhijeet 
Prabhudesai, January 6, 2014; Fr. Eremit Rebello, December 29, 2013). This raises critical questions 






Construction workers, in Goa and across the country are migrant workers. According to the Goan 
Milroc Development representative, each new project creates “multiple problems” and frictions 
relating to on-site accommodation of workers and related pressures on local (interview April 25, 
2012). Mr. Suctancar of Prudential Group in Goa similarly lamented that labor keeps shifting and 
 
every six months brings a change (interview April 26, 2012). Unitech’s representative argued that a 
stable labor force is required for construction work so that skills training can be imparted to 
workers. The construction industry, he added, needs to be “incentivized” so that it becomes a 
permanent source of employment rather than just “off-season” (from agriculture) work for labor. 
These interventions required government support he claimed, and could not be undertaken by the 
private sector alone (interview February 28, 2012). 
The growth of the REE has serious implications for both ecological sustainability and labor. 
The intensification of illegal stone quarrying in the ecologically sensitive Aravalli mountain range in 
Rajasthan and Haryana states or in the Ghats of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, 
accompanied by historically prevalent appalling working conditions of miners and construction 
workers (Indian Express 2012a; Mishra 2012) are illustrative. Devastation of agriculture in mining 
areas and the impact on water sources is established. Mines and construction workers, often 
employed through a contractor or sub-contractor, lack formal contracts and benefits, and their 







2013). In 2007-08, the proportion of migrant workers (comprising those who migrate for one—six 
months) was 33 percent in urban areas and 19 percent in rural areas (ibid.). Given the widespread 
agrarian distress across the country, seasonal or long-term out-migration (from home villages and 
towns)  has  grown  (Vakulabharanam  2013),  adding  to  the  numbers  of  vulnerable  migrant 
construction worker population who are paid below statutory minimum wages and are at risk of 
frequent   injuries   and   fatalities,   with   little   official   compilation   of   data   concerning   them 
(Soundararajan 2012). These impoverished and “undervalued” laborers who extract resources to 
redevelop land and create real estate, oil the wheels of the REE, moving on to the next project 






The fact that the real estate economy is deeply corrupt is well established (see Weinstein 2008; 
Samuel and Datta 2011a, b; KPMG 2011; Gandhi and Walton 2012; The Hindu 2013; Bera et al. 
2013). The Canacona building collapse and similar other frequent building collapses are an extreme 
manifestation of corruption in clearances and materials used. There are several buildings that may 
not collapse, and corruption in their construction practice and clearances may not become starkly 
evident. One afternoon in July 2012, as I sat in the office of a small-scale builder in Goa’s Ponda 
town, I was rewarded with an honest and detailed acknowledgment of the salience of corruption in 
the sector. The builder openly lamented about the “costs” builders have to incur for a construction 
 
 
138  In my previous work in Rajasthan with the peasant and workers solidarity collective MKSS in rural Rajasthan, my 
peasant neighbors in Devdungri village commonly migrated for work given their small and low-productivity rain-fed 
land holdings. If families could make arrangements, they would leave behind school-going children (often sons) with 
relatives while daughters and older children would accompany parents. Meera, one of my neighbors, recounted living 
and working conditions after returning from two years of work in 2004-06 at a stone quarry in Karnataka state. Having 
left one school-going son behind with one married daughter, she had gone to Karnataka with her husband, older son, 
teenage daughter and another older married daughter and her husband. Inhalation of stone dust had adversely affected 
their lungs and breathing and the older daughter lost her infant child to ill health while at the quarry. The contractors 
were strict and given the conditions, it was difficult to work beyond a few years in the quarries. While Meera’s family was 
able to repay a large part of the debts that had forced them to migrate for so long, she was determined never to go back, 







project that drive property prices up. He explained that “under the table” payments include those 
made for the “conversion” of a piece of land to settlement if it was not already designated as 
settlement; for the local Planning Development Authority (PDA); for “appropriate” determination 
of infrastructure tax; municipality license fees; Public Works Department project cost estimation; 
labor cess; renewal of project approval license after two years; architects and other consultants for 
plumbing and electricity; suppliers and contractors’ costs; service tax; income tax; and fees for 
completion and occupancy certificates. Thus, he explained, “the “real” cost or actual price (of real 
estate) has to reflect all the unofficial costs and be profitable over and above.” 
The list of unofficial costs he recounted is not comprehensive. Samuel and Datta (2011a) 
note 50 different “points of payment” for builders. Their report on corruption in RE quoted 
Niranjan Hiranandani, one of the biggest builders in Mumbai, as saying: “Corruption is the highest 
in real estate and the government is aware of that.” The same report quoted Deepak Parekh, 
chairman of HDFC, the country’s largest housing finance company as saying: “The process that asks 
a builder to take approvals from different agencies gives birth to corruption,” adding, “Every stage 
involves malpractice” (Samuel and Datta 2011a). Typically, 20 to 30 percent of the cost of a property 
reflects the illegal payment cost of a builder (Samuel and Datta 2011b). 
The proposed regulator in the new bill mentioned earlier does not go over issues of 
corruption in land conversions and the appropriation of resources, particularly water. Nor does it 
enable monitoring of bribes paid to various government agencies mandated with overseeing 
clearances. CREDAI has instead been demanding that real estate-related clearances be regularized 
into a “single-window” clearance mechanism to avoid corruption. This would mean further 







The policy impetus for urbanization and real estate with embedded income inequalities, corruption, 
resource appropriation, appalling labor conditions and environmental destruction are the underside 
of the REE’s geography. These conditions also signal peculiar tensions with “rule of law.” Capitalist 
and rent-seeking elites in “the state” and upper classes are equally implicated in the REE. 
Significantly, the REE is being consistently resisted and challenged, bringing its promotion and 
development to impasse in various contexts (although more readily in its enclave manifestations as 
zones and corridors). While the following chapter tackles the manner and implications of resistance 
to SEZs in Goa more comprehensively, I turn below to trace the REE-related developments in Goa 
and the successful resistance against the state’s Regional Plan 2011 that unsuccessfully attempted to 




How was the REE resisted in Goa? 
 
 
The Goan real estate economy, mirroring broader Indian trends, took an upward swing from the 
mid-2000s. Tourism and relatively high human development indicators (PTI 2011) helped put the 
state on the national real estate map. In 2004, the national realty company DLF reportedly bought 
land for development in Panjim (capital city) at nearly 10 times the prevailing market prices in a 
competitive bid, creating an immediate appreciation of land and realty values across the city 
(interview with Prudential Group representative, April 26, 2012). Goa’s longstanding popularity as a 
tourist destination had already attracted several big players in the hotel and entertainment industry to 
the state, appreciating land and property prices in prime tourist locations. As other developers 
cashed in on the promotion of Goa as a tourist destination for residential and commercial purposes, 
a construction boom associated with “second homes” for metropolitan elites ensued. Regular 

















Figure 6: Goa Property Advertisement in National Daily Times of India 
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To get a sense of the extent of built-up area construction in recent years in Goa, I obtained 
annual figures of the infrastructure tax collected by the Town and Country Planning Department 
(TCPD)139 for provision of infrastructure services like roads, electricity, water, etc. and divided it by 
the rate of infrastructure levied. The figures are revealing: 
 
 
Table 4: Infrastructure tax collected from municipalities and administrative blocks: 
 
Year 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 
Total  Tax  (in 
US dollars)140 
497,452.5 503,279 5,560,119 8,194,689 6,659,083 





Part of the wide discrepancy in  2007-09 figures and  the following years is because in 
October 2008 the infrastructure tax was raised from a flat rate of Rs. 30 (approximately 60 cents) per 
square meter to Rs. 50 (approximately $1) per square meter for residential buildings and Rs. 100 
(approximately $2) per square meter for commercial buildings.  Calculating at 30 cents, in 2007-08 
the built area taxed was 1,658,175 meter square; in 2009-10, at a flat rate of the maximum for 
commercial buildings $2, it was 2,780,060 meter square; and in 2011-12 it was 3,329,542 meter 
square, and the latter two are serious underestimates as they don’t take into account residential 
buildings with lower taxes. The increase in built area taxed in four years from 2007-08 to 2011-12 is 
thus over 200 percent at an underestimated rate. 
According to Mr. Nilesh Salcar, President of CREDAI Goa, there is a shortfall of 15-20,000 
housing units in Goa and the 75-77 developers part of CREDAI together add barely 5000 houses a 
year.141  He explained the difficulties of getting a project off the ground, from increasing cost of 




139   The  TCPD is  the  GoG agency responsible for  the  overall Regional Plans  of  the  state. It  oversees all  zone 
notifications and final land conversions. 
140 At 2011 dollar rate Rs. 50 = $1. 








getting no objection certificates for water supply, sewerage, electricity; construction license from 
village panchayat; land conversion approvals from forest department, administrative officials and 
TCPD; and a lot of activism related to pressure on land add costs and delay.  He argued that a low 
density, low-rise model (with less floor space index or floor area ratio) was not going to work for 
Goa as the cost of housing was increasing. Interestingly, he also pointed out that a lot of “big” (read 
national) investors (read builders) were “conned” into buying land without realizing how stringent 
the rules for land conversion for “settlement” (areas where real estate construction is allowed) were. 
These builders were now not getting requisite permissions he claimed, and were “stuck” with land 
parcels (interview April 30, 2012). Nevertheless, the demand for housing in Goa is high and is not 
adequately met. The RP 2011 then was to intervene in this overall “difficult” scenario and facilitate 




The Tourism—Real Estate Dialectic 
 
The first Regional Plan 2001 was prepared and approved by Goa’s Legislative Assembly in 1986 
(Trichur 2013).142  This plan sought to promote tourism as the engine of Goa’s economic 
development and elevate its status to that of an industry, making it eligible for benefits available to 
other industries. The plan relaxed the construction norms in coastal areas (from 500 to 200 meters 
of the high-tide level) and enabled revision of “conservation areas” such that resort developers were 
allowed construction rights; while peasant households, often petty tourism service providers, faced 
restrictions on commercial expansion. Investors used many tactics, including their influence with 
state representatives and intimidation of local residents in villages in various instances, to promote 




142  Trichur (2013) argues that this was a public relations strategy by then Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi to 
promote international tourism in the aftermath of the emergency that caused a significant loss of credibility for her 







providers included central (federal) subsidies for establishing resorts and laid the foundation for 
subsequent tourism development in the state. The Land Acquisition Act 1894 was frequently used to 
also acquire Comunidade143 commons and led to the massive destruction of bunds144 and exhaustion of 
water tables, reinforcing a downward spiral in agricultural productivity. As agricultural productivity 
went down, the pressure to convert lands into tourism related uses also increased for landed elites 
(who had enjoyed larger land concessions from the Portuguese). These developments created 
conflicts among the coastal peasant communities involved in tourism and those who were not; and 
between peasant communities and capitalist hoteliers. Official tourism promotion thus deliberately 
left out petty service providers and emphasized “high-end” tourism (ibid.). This subsequently paved 
the way for the development of Goa as an ideal real estate investment for those with growing 
disposable incomes. 
Since tourism has now long been the predominant economic activity along Goa’s coastal 
regions, environmentalists point out that state policy frequently reflects the interests of powerful 
pressure groups. The government machinery is rewarded for “non-enforcement” or 
“misinterpretation” of rules (Alvares 2002). Violations of regulations for coastal zones, building 
height, untreated sewage release in the sea and extraction of groundwater causing salinization of 
aquifers are frequent. As noted in chapter one, sand dunes are denuded or razed for unhindered 
“views;” khazan lands  neglected; and  land  increasingly converted for  beachfront  hotels, beach 
shacks, restaurants and other entertainment activities (Alvares 2002; Kazi and Siqueira 2006). Land 
conversions for real estate must be seen in this backdrop of ongoing accumulation processes of land 
and resource appropriation. 
The returns from real estate development similarly exert a pull on “green areas” (agricultural, 
 
khazan,  forest  and  slope  areas),  with  their  frequent  conversion  into  “settlement  areas”  with 
 
 
143 See next chapter for a discussion of local land use arrangements. 







construction permissions. The phenomenon of “second homes” or “holiday homes” for rich 
urbanites who come to Goa for vacations and lock their properties for most of the year is seen to 
drive property prices beyond the reach of local people. A recent government report puts the number 
of such holiday homes at 21.8 percent of the total houses in Goa (Firstpost 2013).145 During an April 
2012 interview with Putturaju, the Chief Town and Country Planner for Goa, he gave me with a 
 
copy of a chart the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) had created by collating 
demands by rural residents for conversions of agricultural and green lands to settlement areas (see 
Figure 7 below). While the chart does not mention the period in which these demands were made, 
the chart indicates that the TCPD had demands to convert 26.77 percent of Eco Sensitive Zone 1 
land (protected lands like forests, orchards, mangroves, khazans, paddy fields, coastal regulation 
zones, and slopes with gradient over 33 percent) to settlement and 20.69 percent of non-Eco 
Sensitive Zone land (plateaus and so-called “barren” lands). These figures however, were collated to 
demonstrate local demand for conversions as RP agitations demanding participatory planning 
processes from the villages were gathering steam again in 2012 and may also serve to counter 
protests.  Let us turn below to a discussion of the RP 2011 and the agitation against it, and 



















145 The methodology used to arrive at this figure is unclear. However, this figure has been used by the state government 
for demanding “Special Status” for Goa from the (federal) Government of India on account of its unique culture (it was 


















































Goa Bachao Abhiyan—RP 2011 to 2021 and back to 2001146 
 
After 1986, the process for a second Regional Plan 2011 was initiated in 1997-98. The GoG hired a 
private consulting firm from Delhi, Consulting Engineering Services that submitted the Revised 
Regional Plan Goa Perspective 2011 in September 2003. Even as the official plan drafting process was 
on, in October 2005 the state government introduced an urgent Ordinance (number 3) that 
fundamentally amended the Town and Country Planning Act of 1974. It vested powers of the town 




146 This account is largely constructed from interviews with GBA activists and supporters, architects and planner part of 
the RP 2021 drafting process, and accounts from The Hindu 2006; Couto 2007; Bose 2007; Aghor 2011. Also see 







amendments in plan and non-plan areas, local development plans and the overall Regional Plan.147 
 
This Ordinance thus allowed individuals and state agencies to convert lands without any reference to 
development  plan  documents  at  local  or  state  levels.  Following  public  protests  against  the 
Ordinance and a citizens’ court petition, the Ordinance was finally canceled and a revised draft RP 
was published in November 2005, with the public given three weeks to file objections. The Regional 
Plan 2011 was finally notified in August 2006 by the TCPD. Before that however, the GoG had 
issued a series of land acquisition notifications in June of that year for various projects invoking the 
urgency clause of the Land Acquisition Act 1894148 then in force. These notifications were based on 
the draft RP, which had not yet been officially notified! As it emerged in the course of the anti-RP 
2011 agitation to which I turn below, the GoG was clearly of a mind to ensure certain projects were 




a. The Anti-RP 2011 Agitation: 
 
When a resident of the popular tourist village Baga in North Goa district, Jamshed Madon, noticed 
construction on a local hill behind his house in late 2006 and made inquiries and discovered that the 
entire hill was demarcated as a “settlement” area in the final RP 2011 released earlier that year, even 
though it was in reality a “green” area. As he studied the plan along with architect Dean D’Cruz, 
they discovered that a large extent of green area was being shown as settlement in RP 2011. People 
in the villages had already borne the brunt of large-scale conversions of land to settlement for 
tourism and housing projects. Land and real estate prices had been rising and the burden on existing 
resources  like  water  and  infrastructure  was  high.  There  was  also  popular  awareness  of  the 
 
147 The Outlying Development Plan (or non-plan) areas are the five towns in Goa, Panajim, Margao, Vasco, Mapusa and 
the village of Taleigaon. These do not come under the Regional Plan, which covers the rural areas in the rest of the state. 
Local development plans refer to both village plans and municipality plans. Each of these planning exercises thus are 
supposed to be undertaken by the state. The local village and municipality development plans under the 73rd  and 74th 
Amendments to the Constitution empowering local bodies with several participatory governance functions have not ever 
been undertaken in Goa as the state rules for the Acts have not been drafted. 







innumerable legal violations in the state that previous agitations had highlighted and 
environmentalists had been painstakingly challenging for years through litigation. A comparison of 
the draft RP 2011 (of 2005) with the final RP 2011 revealed wide discrepancies in the settlement 
areas. Madon and D’Cruz raised the issue in village meetings and among wider circles of 
environmental activists. As word spread and interest grew, an initial informal meeting of a 
heterogeneous group of professionals, non-profits and interested persons was convened in 
December 2006 in Panajim to discuss the discrepancies of the RP 2011. 
During this meeting, an overall analysis of settlement land figures showed that 7,255 hectares 
of additional land had been converted into settlement between the 2005 draft and the 2006 notified 
RP 2011. Alarmed at the scale of conversions and their implications for housing, land, resources, 
infrastructure and the environment, the group galvanized quickly and spontaneously. Goa Bachao 
Abhiyan (Save Goa Campaign) was formed, campaign conveners were chosen, and participants 
divided responsibilities among themselves. A decision to undertake detailed comparative studies 
between the draft and notified plans across various villages to verify the reality on the ground was 
also taken. The group also decided to organize a Goa-wide public meeting in Panajim’s Azad Maidan 
(a central park in the capital for many collective actions historically) on the issue. They resolved to 
publicly display tehsil-wise discrepancies from the plan comparisons, and some detailed cases 
exemplifying arbitrary conversions. 
The spontaneous coalescence of the group was partly the result of the critical legacy of 
previous environmental struggles in the state (see also discussion in the Introduction), and partly of 
the deep frustration among people with endemic state corruption. 
D’Cruz’s team undertook more research to create the exhibition materials. According to 
 
architect Ritu Prasad, member of the GBA then and subsequently their representative on the Task 
 







Regulation Zone (CRZ) areas149 and green areas were shown as settlement to show the conversions 
more clearly. 
At the public meeting on December 18, 2006 the advocacy efforts of the GBA members 
bore fruit, and about 10,000 people from across the state turned up. These included peasants, 
professionals and others concerned about land conversions in their villages. The exhibition area at 
the meeting explained the regional plan and its policy relevance and implications were. Tehsil-level 
maps showing the conversions in the RP 2011 helped people visually identify the extent of the 
conversions in their own villages. 
The campaign took shape. Prasad says there were three things to follow up from the 
meeting: a) that people from each village become aware of the RP process and make local groups to 
examine details at their own level; b) to put the pressure on the GoG to revoke and stop conversion 
permissions granted on the basis of the notified plan; and c) to make sure a plan with public 
participation was drawn up. She adds, as the issue gathered steam and was taken up in different 
villages: 
the most amazing thing that really happened out of this… is people… had now started 
understanding, started reading maps, and plans. Initially I remember we used to go and 
people wouldn’t even... I mean, we were the only ones who could read them. And now, 
many people could read plans, and they could question, which was really… empowering 
(interview June 1, 2012). 
GBA members’ research revealed that the stakes were much higher and deeper than the new 
conversions in the notified RP 2011. Large scale conversions had begun in 1988, when the Town 




149  According to CRZ rules, no construction is allowed within 200 meters of the high tide line in Goa’s coastal areas 
although local residents and traditional users like the fisherfolk and peasants are allowed to undertake repairs or 







(TCPA) 1974 that did not allow changes in the RP 2001 (notified in 1986) for five years to enable 
plan stability. Once this clause was removed, changes to the plan and land conversions were noted 
through gazette notifications through weekly and bi-monthly notifications right until 2005. The RP 
2011 then, formalized the conversions that had taken place through the 1990s, while making room 
for more. The stakes of the RP 2011 were thus very high as it represented a lot of money already 
sunk into converted lands over nearly two decades. But this also revealed that laws were being 
changed and safeguards removed for facilitating further conversions and investments. It was not just 
real estate developers that were driving these conversions, but interests from within the state 
overseeing the growth of the Goan REE. 
At a subsequent public protest at Margao city in Lohia maidan on January 16, 2007 the 
demand for the cancellation of RP 2011 was raised. As advocacy efforts continued, on Republic Day 
in January 2007 then, several gram sabhas (village assemblies) took resolutions to scrap the RP 2011. 
However, according to the laws, conversions are under the purview of the TCPD in Goa, and the 
Pachanyati Raj Act (or the 73rd Amendment, see chapter two) rules have not been empowered with 
powers to prevent land from being converted. 
Nevertheless, the GoG, led by the Congress Party then (under Chief Minister Pratap Singh 
Rane), was under considerable public pressure with elections later that year, and eventually buckled 
under consistent popular pressure. The denotification of the RP 2011 was announced by February 
2007. The GBA demanded that it should be revoked retrospectively so that none of the conversions 
approved on the basis of the notified RP 2011 would hold. Some of the GBA members went to the 
sites where permissions had been given to check if construction work had been undertaken and to 
stop any such ongoing activity. By now the GBA was confronting the shadowy interests within the 







b. RP 2021: 
 
The Congress government was reelected to power that year under the leadership of CM Digambar 
Kamat (who would subsequently denotify the state’s SEZ policy) and constituted a “task force.” 
GBA representatives, builders, architects, an engineer, a planner and an industrialist, in addition to 
bureaucrats constituted the Task Force, which was initially mandated with designing a methodology 
for drafting a new RP. This mandate was subsequently changed however, to drafting the new RP 
2021 itself. The Task Force, Prasad points out, did not have any sociologists, environmentalists or 
representatives of peasants or other communities from villages. Not only was the Task Force not 
equipped to draw up a representative plan, a “bottom-up” planning process through village-level 
socio-economic plans faced stiff political opposition within the body. Instead of inviting village 
inputs and making the Plan a truly participatory democratic process, the Task Force asked for inputs 
from NGOs. The interests allied with the GBA campaign in the Task Force wanted to send base 
maps to villages for local land-use verification by gram sabhas, and a questionnaire asking inputs on 
local needs and development aspirations, but faced opposition. A village kit was eventually sent to all 
the villages with base maps (the Outlying Development Plan areas were kept out of this process), 
but there were other challenges with the maps which highlighted additional problems with the 
official decision-making processes for conversions. 
The TCPD had been using tehsil maps at 1:25,000 scale in RP 2011 to give development 
permissions; these maps had no village details, and were “all a big blob,” with no village boundaries, 
making the process “very ambiguous” (interview with Prasad, June 1, 2012). The Task Force tried to 
obtain more detailed maps from other departments, and realized that either 1:3,500,000 scale Goa- 
level maps or the tehsil maps were being used by various departments. A really significant challenge 
before the Task Force then was to draft the RP 2021 from village-level plans with boundaries and 







village-level verification of fields, water bodies and slopes (areas where no construction could be 
allowed). They finally used Survey of India (GoI body) toposheets (topographical maps) to make 
base plans for villages from scratch. 
As Professor Edgar Ribeiro, ex-Director of the School of Planning and Architecture in 
Delhi, and member of the Task Force residing in Socorro village in North Goa explained, for any 
planning process to be truly bottom-up, local mapping of existing land-use is critical (interview May 
31, 2012). People know the ground reality and can make informed decisions for desirable 
development planning based on land-use maps, he explained, adding, “You cannot cheat people 
with maps; you can cheat people with files!” 
While the Task Force was still drafting the RP, in April 2008, an amendment 16(16)a was 
 
made to the TCPA by the GoG. The GBA’s contention was that all local development must come 
under the new RP. The amendment made provisions for all projects, schemes and works of the 
central and state government to be kept out of the purview of the RP, asserting the power of 
eminent domain. No principles for exemption were laid out (the amendment is still in force). 
Undermining the Task Force’s efforts further, another committee was constituted by the GoG to 
take stock of 16(16)a projects, that ranged from community halls to tourism, sports and 
entertainment related projects. So while popular unrest was sought to be pacified through the 
constitution of the Task Force, its efforts for taking planning to the villages were being thwarted 
consistently. 
The Task Force finally submitted the Draft Regional Plan 2021 in September 2008, 
recommending clear demarcation of Eco-Sensitive Zones 1 (khazans, fields, forests and slopes) and 
2 (settlement, industrial and orchard zones where some construction with restricted FAR could be 
allowed) and other environmentally and locally desirable measures like reduced FARs to restrain 







villages had diligently prepared their own village land-use maps based on the kits sent to them, along 
with recommendations for specific development needs (see Figure 3 at the end for the map 
submitted by village Verna; also see http://www.goafiles.com/ for more map submissions by 
villages). 
After the Task force was disbanded and the Draft Plan was released, the GoG asked for 
public inputs within 90 days. A new State Level Committee was then constituted, retaining some 
task force members to take the RP process forward by collating these public inputs. As 176 villages 
(out of a total of 188) and eight out of nine municipal towns sent their inputs along with 8500 
individual comments, the input period was extended to eight months (GoG 2009b). 
The GoG finally released the Regional Plan for Goa-2021 in three releases from 2009 through 
 
2011 (GoG 2009b; GoG 2011a; GoG 2011b). In Release One, new policy decisions were introduced 
that included Eco Tourism Zones and Micro Industrial Zones that were not part of the draft plan 
and on which there was no public consultation. Even where villages had approved lower floor area 
ratios (FAR) as building norms, higher FARs were introduced. Resident committees from various 
villages had undertaken detailed land-use and demographic mapping exercises to determine locally 
desirable and environmentally and socially appropriate development plans for submission to the RP 
2021. In its final release in October 2011 however, the RP 2021 disregarded many of these 
recommendations, fueling controversy yet again. The three releases created immense confusion. 
There was a huge difference between the Draft RP 2021 and the final releases. The protective 
measures of Eco-Sensitive Zones had been diluted. Higher FAR status was given to villages that had 
expressly asked for lower FAR building norms (Village Panchayat 3 status; see also Table 5 below 
for a tabular presentation of some key differences). Moreover, there was more than a year’s gap 









with people’s inputs to the three Releases would be additionally prepared, fueling further confusion 
and frustration. 






Discrepancies in the 
Participatory Process 
What the Draft RP 2021 recommended What was actually done by the TCP 
1.1. Included the entire state in the participatory 
planning process. 
ODP areas of: Panaji, Margao, Mapuca, Vasco, Ponda 
and Taleigao left out of the participatory process. 
 
 
1.2. Draft Village Plans were sent to:  (1) verify 
zoning based on ground realities and (2) only 
suggest land-use changes which are in public interest. 
While VPs prepare their plans, SLC accepts and 
processes 8500 individual suggestions for land-use 
change. 
 
Note: List of these incorporations made in the Final 










VP Resolutions SLC’s Decisions 
2.1. VP’s pass resolutions deciding on their VP 
statuses. 
SLC disregards VP’s resolutions w.r.t. to VP Statuses 
and arbitrarily changes VP statuses. 
 
 
2.2. VPs submit their village plans protecting large 
areas of their villages. 
 
SLC disregards village 
plans and includes 
additional areas under 
settlement by including: 
Individual requests for land- 
use changes. 
Includes settlements from 
Satellite imagery. 
 
2.3. VP’s resolve that RP2021 should indicate 
roads widths as measured on site. 
SLC: (1) disregards resolutions of VPs on road widths 














by the SLC 
Draft RP2021 Final RP 2021 
 
 
3.1. Compared to Zoning categories and their 
respective percentages marked in the Draft 
RP2021... 
In Final RP2021: (1) New 
category of Natural 
Coverincluded (2) 
percentage ofOrchards has 
increased and (3) 




Further... Final RP2021 
(Release I) permits ECO- 
Tourism projects to come 
up in Natural Cover. 
 
3.2. Compared to Draft RP2021, where no 
recommendations regarding MIZs and GIs were 
made... 
In Final RP2021: Micro- 
Industrial Zones (MIZs) 
and General Industries 
(GIs) included in village 
plans. 
 
Further... this has been 
done without taking VPs into 
confidence over the 
locations of MIZs and GIs. 
 
3.3. Draft RP2021 specifically mentions that the 
present Industrial Estates are not fully utilised and 
other reports have shown that large number of 
plots are vacant. 
In Final RP2021: (1) 
Extensions of existing 
Industrial Estates and (2) 
new Industrial Estates 
have been included. 
 
Further... this has included 
cases of lands acquired by 




4.1. From the SLC minutes: no mention of 
decisions regarding the inclusion of: ECO- 
Tourism, MIZs, GIs, individual requests, etc. 
 
Begs the question on what basis were these 
incorporations made? Who authorised the same? 







 RP2021... from the recommendations of the Draft RP2021 and 
from the Inputs from VPs (2) Presently the correction 
process carried out without sending the plans back to 




Building up from village-level mapping to a state-wide RP was the critical intervention that 
of the anti-RP 2011agitation made. Indeed, a comparison of the Verna village panchayat and the 
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Vasco da Gama, retired clerk from GoG and resident of Verna, explained in an interview 
that the village panchayat had taken the decision to declare the plateaus in the village as Ecologically 
Sensitive Zone 1 as the plateaus serve as water catchment areas for fields and orchards around them 
and are also the source of the local river Sal. The notified plan however, showed a far greater area of 
the plateau for industrial and other uses like “open spaces” with construction permissions. Leone da 
Gama, Vasco da Gama’s son, who was part of the team that mapped all the survey plots in the 
Verna village, added that the Industrial Estate, for which the plateau land is being appropriated, is to 
put such land to public use. The Goa Industrial Development Corporation, he added, acquires such 
“barren” land cheaply from the Comunidade and gives it to industry for private use at higher rates, 
acting like a broker, and making revenue in the process (interviews June 11, 2012). 
As agitations and debates raged over scrapping the new RP 2021 or making corrections to it 
with village inputs, the 2012 Assembly elections for the state loomed. For a combination of reasons 
including the fierce anti-SEZ agitation in 2007 following on the heels of the anti-RP agitation, the 
opposition Hindu-right BJP subsequently came to power in Goa in April 2012. The review of the 
RP process was an important part of its election manifesto. The RP 2021 releases were not canceled, 
but put in abeyance by the new government. As controversy over rampant “illegal” mining absorbed 
state affairs from September 2012, the RP process was set aside and is yet to be resumed as of 
writing this chapter. 
As of now, the previous RP 2001 (that the RP 2011 sought to replace) is in place, but in the 
interim period between the suspension of the RP 2021 released in October 2011 and the 
reinstatement of RP 2001 in April 2012, several conversions had already been effected as builders 
and investors had anticipated the release of RP 2021. These conversions were allowed to remain in 







The initial energy of the GBA has somewhat dissipated, though it maintains an active 
“voice” on the issues related to the RP and land conversions. What the campaign has been up 
against are not just real estate developers and investors, but their allied interests within the state, 
which corrupted institutional legitimacy quite fundamentally. The anti-RP agitation shed light on the 
extent of this corrosion with regards to laws and law-making processes that allowed conversions 
with impunity. At the same time the agitation engendered hope and aspiration for locally determined 
development planning that was also environmentally appropriate. In enabling people in villages 
across the state to become map and policy literate, it also empowered them. Unlike the case of 
Kerala, where the push for decentralization from below was supported by a faction of the ruling 
party that also took advantage of the 73rd Amendment provisions (decentralizing power to the 
villages, see chapter two; Heller 2011), the Goan push for decentralization was not backed by state 
actors and hence developed into the current impasse after initial success. 
As we will see in the following chapter, the anti-RP 2011 agitation in 2006 however, also laid 
the ground for the anti-SEZ agitations in 2007. The baton was passed on. The focus of the anti-SEZ 
agitation  was  not  decentralized  planning  per  se,  but  locally  appropriate  determination  of 
development needs, rights to land and resources and environmental concerns formed critical frames 
of the agitation. Both agitations were overwhelmingly a response to what came to be considered a 
land and resource (largely water) grab for real estate.150 The Government of Goa (GoG) was seen as 
arbitrarily and illegally handing over local land and resources to developers for profit from tourism 
and residential colonies for rich metropolitans. As residents discovered the implications of the land 
conversions in RP 2011 and later SEZs for local agrarian livelihoods, resources, environment and 
infrastructure, they connected with each other and activists from existing and previous campaigns. 
The agitations comprised peasants (more so in the anti-SEZ agitation), professionals, politicians, 
 
 
150 Prominent realty firms like K. Raheja and Peninsula with established real estate projects in several Indian cities were 







media persons, lawyers and other interested persons who demonstrated on the streets, negotiated 
with government representatives and took legal action. Many became politicized in the course of the 
agitation, at once rights-bearing citizens asserting claims over the “rule of law” and “vocal” members 
of local communities. Goa’s rich history of environmental activism151 played a major role in forging 
this broad alliance of social forces. Indigenous religious values and practices for nature worship and 
conservation have fueled environmental concerns in Goa. Existing stresses in the state on the 
environment, infrastructure, resources and agriculture caused by tourism, mining, industry and real 
estate thus fomented resistance. 
As noted in the previous chapters, the acquisition of land through the exercise of eminent 
domain or through market transfers has seen intense and successful contestation across India. 
Outright resistance to forcible land acquisition for SEZs, DMIC and other projects facilitating real 
estate development has erupted in West Bengal, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, 
Goa, Maharashtra and Gujarat states while struggles for greater compensation for land have erupted 
in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. In this sense, the Goan agitations are also part of a wider ferment 
over land rights and agrarian livelihoods, ecological sustainability and development paradigms across 




The REE and Perilous Geographies of Indifference 
 
 
Many state governments have had to buckle under popular agitations over land and resources. 
Given electoral compulsions within a multi-party system152, popular dissent, especially over land and 
resources, has found more receptivity among the states and their ruling parties. Dissent against 




151 For a brief account of Goa’s history of environmental activism see the next chapter. 
152 After the decline of the power of the Congress Party since the 1970s, no one party could form a ruling majority and 







in the wake of the anti-RP and anti-SEZ agitations is another case in point) is sought to be 
accommodated, or negotiated, rather than outright suppressed (although suppression certainly 
continues, as in the infamous POSCO area in Odisha state or in the mining areas in the central 
Indian indigenous heartland). Especially as it begins to pose a serious threat to ruling parties (the 
debacle of the CPI(M) by Trinamool Congress after nearly 35 years over the issue of land and 
resources is worth recalling). An “inclusion problem” for capital in such conditions posits a limit to 
expansion, as radical challenges must be contained with concessions or outright deference. This is a 
significant development with respect to land acquisition in India that needs further interrogation 
because historically, the power of eminent domain has not been significantly challenged (see chapter 
two). However, resistance is often localized and project based, given paucity of resources. 
The rising cost of land has made real estate a high return investment. As more and more 
land gets diverted to real estate from agriculture, there is concomitant pauperization of especially 
small and marginal farmers unable to buy more land and cash payments received for land often 
spent over immediate consumption (see Kumar 2013). By one estimate, in 2007-11, the area of 
cultivable land in India shrank by 790,000 hectares, largely attributed to diversion for non- 
agricultural purposes like construction, industries and other development activities (Mohan 2013). 
Landless agricultural workers likely swell the ranks of construction and other migrant workers 
although official data for this is again hard to come by. 
Levien (2012) points out that in the wake of the MWC a process of agrarian involution 
amplifies caste and class inequalities and the marginalization of women. The local economy then is a 
matter of indifference to the MWC and its allied interests in the state he argues, and local labor is 
left to fend for itself even as the MWC brings in college-educated young graduates in SUVs from 







“development” that devalues their creative potential. Cross’ (2009) study of the politics of work in a 
 
SEZ is equally revealing of the “devaluation” experienced by educated young workers in the zone. 
 
Given the inequality-driven impetus for the real estate economy, environmental destruction 
related to it, labor exploitation in the sector and the shift in land use exacerbated by agrarian distress, 
claims that greater urbanization leads to “inclusive growth” or better development for all fly against 
evidence. On the other hand, allied politicians, bureaucrats and developers, driven by attractive 
returns to investment, form a powerful nexus driving policy. This nexus has been seen to historically 
support real estate developers in Mumbai and Delhi (see Nijman 2000; Kumar 1982). In Goa, its 
operations were particularly evident as a result of the anti-RP 2011 agitation’s efforts. While the 
push to decentralize could not be sustained, the agitation’s contribution in this regard is critical to 
future trajectories of accumulation and resistance and in forging ways out of the current impasse. 
The recent judgment passed in the Aldeia de Goa case in Goa is an instructive note to end 
the discussion with. Manipulating dated permissions and construction plans from 1995 for 18 
cottages in the CRZ area of the Curca-Bambolim-Talaulim panchayat, Grand Hyatt Goa (see figure 
10), property of the prominent DB Realty Group, opened as a luxury resort in 2011. The previous 
 
permissions had been granted in the small window that an amendment in the CRZ laws opened 
allowing for construction within the 100 meter tidal zone. This amendment was squashed by the 
Supreme Court within the year albeit allowing for any ongoing constructions to continue. The 18 
cottages were  never  completed however,  and  it  was  only  in  2006  when  local  residents were 
threatened with evictions and saw fences and private security in the area that the project’s 
development began and the residents filed a Public Interest Litigation at the High Court of Bombay 
at Goa.153  The active collusion by those in authorities, including the Chief Town Planner and the 











suddenly went “missing” and fabricated documents ad plans were presented in the court by the 
hotel. The verdict was split in the directions of the two judge bench even as they unanimously 
reprimanded the authorities and the respondents. While one judge held that the structure should be 
demolished, the other maintained that since the plinth area of three of the previously approved 18 
cottages had been constructed before their approval had lapsed, the party could have “resumed” 
construction in keeping with the “original” plans (see Siqueira 2014 and People’s Movement for 
Civic Action and others vs. Goa Coastal Zone Management Authority and others 2014). He thus 
directed the same authorities reprimanded for collusion with the hotelier to re-examine the project 
plans and see which part of the new construction was valid. 
Figure 10: An overview of the Grand Hyatt Goa from the Dona Paula-Bambolim road. 
 
 
“The high court judgement earlier this week in the Aldeia de Goa case is a huge victory for 
environment activists. It vindicates their stand that the luxury resort had been allowed to come up 
in “blatant breach of the rule of law”, as one of the judges put it. It also brought into the open the 
shameful complicity of government agencies and officials who facilitated the disappearance of 




The active resistance to the REE, while nascent in its recognition of the logics of the capitalist value 







capitalist logics. The creation of absolute surplus populations then is part of a “geography of 
indifference” that capital produces at its own peril. Massive transfers of lands, resources and people 
from agriculture and allied activities are envisaged to facilitate urbanization, intensifying the reach of 
“the market” and unleashing its “developmental” potential. 154 
When growth is premised or made possible on a chain of backward-forward illegalities and 
 
plunder (cf. Mattei and Nader 2008), the implications of assuming growth and urbanization ad 
inifinitum are significant. State actors and other rent-seeking elites actively collude in accumulation 
processes, and gain from violations of law and corruption. They often obscure information, and 
stonewall drives for decentralization. The Goan anti-RP 2011 offers lessons for how the 
urbanization-real estate assemblage might be brought to impasse. Despite entrenched interests that 
trump egalitarian processes, it establishes that “the state” is contested space and “rule of law” may 
be reshaped by a broad alliance of social forces drawing to an impasse, the plunder of land and 
resources (cf. Mattei and Nader 2008). It represents a toe-hold, towards transformation. To move 
beyond this impasse, indeed to secure and consolidate the gains over capital made in these agitations 
is a challenge that begs resolution. As I indicate in the next chapter, for such resolution to be 
brought about through egalitarian “restructuring from below,” programmatic social movements, 
rather than issue-based campaigns are required. What the RP agitations show is that this also 
requires the support of allied interests within the state backing processes of reconfiguration. 
 
Epilogue: The day after I arrived in Goa during a visit in December 2013, I went to Panjim from Taleigaon village 
where I was staying for some errands. As I waited on my (hired) scooter for what I initially thought was a red light on 
the ubiquitous M.G. (Mahatma Gandhi) Road found in every town and city center in India, I gradually noticed a 
procession with placards on the other side. The placards read, “Save Kulti Plateau,” “No More Vernas,” “Kulti is 
 
 
154 The DMIC and other infrastructure projects as well as 100 smart cities are all examples of the scale of transformation 







the home of Betal devta” (local deity), and other familiar messages decrying what appeared to be land acquisition on the 
Kulti plateau by the GIDC. As over a couple of hundred people filed by raising slogans in what was clearly a rally, I 
looked for familiar faces, surprisingly finding only one, and waved out to an environmentalist and organizer friend from 
South Goa. This seemed like a new alliance. Watching the rally go by in curious wonder as the traffic waited, I 
resolved to find out more, but for that brief moment things “integrated”: what I was doing; why I was doing it; and 































The Domain of Resistance 
 
 







“If so many people come to this land it will be polluted and our environment destroyed… We have small plots of 
land, if they get destroyed, where will we go? Put it up anywhere else, but not on our lands. Our cattle get fodder 
from that land. Where will we go if a project comes there? Night and day, we left our meals and affairs and took 
a lot of trouble to oppose the project. …If we give up this land, where will we go?” (Chinu Gawde of Kerim, 
peasant in her seventies and veteran protestor in Nylon 6,6 and SEZ agitations, interview July 5, 
2012; translated from Konkani.) 
 
On December 31 2007 the Chief Minister (CM) of Goa state in India Digambar Kamat, under 
tremendous pressure from peasants’ and citizens’ groups opposing Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
announced “a new year’s gift to the people of Goa” and scrapped all approved SEZs in the state. As 
the Government of India (GoI; federal) declined to honor this decision for three SEZs that had 
already been “notified,”155 Kamat declared that SEZ developers in Goa could go ahead “at their own 
risk.” Soon after, the Government of Goa (GoG) issued show-cause notices to SEZ developers 
regarding their land allotment cancellations. This took the conflict to the courts; five developers 
challenged  the  GoG’s  decision  in  the  High  Court  of  Bombay  at  Goa156  while  anti-SEZ 
campaigners appealed for accountability (punitive action) for irregularities in the approval and land- 
allotment processes. The court upheld the GoG’s decision and took note of procedural irregularities 
but stopped short of punishing responsible officials. The developers challenged the ruling in the 
Supreme Court (SC) of India as anti-SEZ campaigners appealed for accountability. The matter is 
currently sub-judice with the official status of the five SEZs and lands allotted to them unresolved. 
Until such time as the SC pronounces its verdict, there is an “impasse” on the ground. 
Politicians, bureaucrats and citizens groups openly acknowledge however, that this impasse 
is  more  in  the  nature  of  legal  procedure,  as  politically  it  seems  unlikely  that  SEZs  will  be 
reestablished in the state. De facto, the lands are under the watch and use of the local communities 
 
 
155 Notification is the final stage of approval given by the SEZ BoA after which the SEZ is free to start operations. 







since 2007. Even before the CM’s announcement scrapping SEZs, villagers threw out the 
construction crew in two SEZs where construction had begun and would not let company personnel 
enter the premises. In Kerim village at the time of fieldwork in 2012-13, dhangars157  freely grazed 
their cattle on the “SEZ lands.” 
How did this significant “reversal of power” come about in Goa? How was the alliance 
between the state and capital over SEZs sundered? What historical, political, economic and cultural 
specificities and strategies led to the success of Goa’s anti-SEZ campaign? What are the implications 
of the “Goan Impasse” for “rights to land- and resource-use for all”158  in Goa, and by extension in 
India? These questions form the fulcrum around which this chapter is organized. 
The first section explains what I term the “Goan Impasse.” The second section offers an 
account of the development of the anti-SEZ campaign, specifically by what came to be the SEZ 
Virodhi Manch (SVM; Anti-SEZ Front), a dynamic “alliance of forces” across caste, class, gender 
and community difference that proved critical to the campaign.159  The third section analyzes the 
factors enabling the campaign’s success. The final section discusses likely resolutions for the Goan 
Impasse, their resonance with struggles against dispossession in other parts of the country and the 




The Goan Impasse 
 
 
15 SEZs were given “in-principle approval” (first stage) in 2006-07. Of these, seven received the 
GoI’s “formal approval” (second stage) by 2007; five in the Verna Industrial Estate (VIE), one in 




157 Dhangars are a pastoral nomadic community now settled in different states in India. 
158 Albertina Almeida helped frame this as use-rights. 
159 Other mobilizations fueling the anti-SEZ environment in Goa are discussed later in the chapter. 
160  The ethnographic and archival materials used in this account were collected during five months of fieldwork from 







expected to attract investment worth approximately $1.048 billion and generate 242,000 jobs over 
five years (GoG 2007). A total of 613.41 acres were allotted to the five SEZs in VIE; 50 acres at 
SIE; and 304 acres at Bhutkhamb, from commons previously acquired by the Goa Industrial 
Development Corporation (GIDC) from Comunidades by using eminent domain. As such, they would 
not directly displace people and villages. While fresh acquisition of 1548.44 acres was initiated for 
four other proposed SEZs, final allotments for them never took place (Da Silva forthcoming). 
Towards the  end of  2007, three  of the  seven formally  approved  SEZs  were  “notified” (final 
approval) by the GoI: K. Raheja SEZ in the VIE over 263.51 acres; Peninsula Pharma SEZ in the 
SIE over 50 acres; and Meditab SEZ on the Bhutkhamb plateau over 304 acres.161 Construction 
had begun on two, K. Raheja and Meditab. Together the three were to generate 105,000 jobs in five 
years. 
The  anti-SEZ  agitation  in  Goa  was  overwhelmingly  a  response  to  what  came  to  be 
considered a land and resource (largely water) grab for real estate and industry. While the scale of 
SEZ-lands reflected in hectares was small, Goa’s relatively small size and existing burdens on land 
and  resources made these transfers controversial. The GoG was seen as  arbitrarily  and  illegally 
handing over local land and resources to developers for profit from industry and residential colonies 
for rich metropolitans. It was not just the “terms of inclusion” or exclusion (cf. White et al. 2012) of 
the people impacted by SEZs that constituted the heart of contention; SEZs were perceived as 
adversely impacting existing local livelihoods and relationships with land and resources. The anti- 
SEZ agitation was principally against the use that the land was being put to, against anticipated 
dispossession in the backdrop of accumulation processes already underway in the state. Forging a 
broad alliance of social forces, the agitation quickly gained momentum in eight months, successfully 
 
 
161  K. Raheja and Peninsula are both realty companies with projects in several Indian cities. CIPLA’s company profile 
describes it as one of the largest Indian exporters of pharmaceutical products with “a strong presence” in over 170 
countries and strategic arrangements for product registration, development, distribution and technological consultancy in 







sundering the state-capital alliance over SEZs and reshaping the rule of law in the ferment of 
dissent. 
The “Goan Impasse” over SEZs however, is not just an impasse for capital, domestic or 
otherwise; nor is it only an impasse for state policy promoting capital. While it establishes the role of 
“the state” as contested space working on behalf of particular social forces at particular conjunctures 
(cf. Abrams 1982), the Goan Impasse represents a deeper historical impasse over securing “rights to 
land- and resource-use for all” confronting peasants and citizens groups resisting dispossession in 
Goa, and elsewhere. Closer reading of the ethnographic material suggests that the resolution of this 
impasse requires a renewed political commitment to locally ecologically appropriate, egalitarian and 
democratically determined development processes. It requires an alliance of social forces that can 
oblige the state to secure rights to land- and resource-use for all. The Goan Impasse thus opens the 
possibilities for fundamental reconstitution of relations around and to land and resources. 
The significance of this impasse was driven home to me one overcast monsoon afternoon in 
 
2012 as I joined artist and activist Dilesh Hazare, whose lush watercolors evoke his verdant Western 
Ghat surroundings in Kerim, on a tour of historical, religious and spiritual places of significance in 
the area around the Bhutkhamb plateau. When we reached the entrance of the now under litigation 
Meditab SEZ, fenced with over 10-foot high barbed wire cut in several places, it was early evening. 
We saw cattle grazing on the fenced-in land. As I stopped to click photographs, a woman carrying a 
headload of fuel wood made her way out from the “SEZ land” through one of the cuts in the fence, 
with her herd of about 40 goats. As they came through, I called out a greeting to find out more. 
During the course of our conversation, Salu Kodekar, in her mid fifties, revealed that she grazed her 
cattle on the plateau everyday. When I asked her about the SEZ, she added: “…I have goats and 
cows, we have taken our animals to the plateau for grazing from the beginning… we will only allow 







land to take the animals… my knees hurt but this is my livelihood, I have to take the animals to 
graze for my stomach…” (interview July 7, 2012; translated from Konkani). 
About 50 meters from where we talked, just across the road from the SEZ entrance, lay the 
samadhi (square stone memorial typically six feet across) dedicated to Nilesh Naik, Scheduled Tribe162 
(ST) youth from Kerim “martyred” in a police confrontation over the successful Nylon 6,6 agitation 
in 1995 for the same plateau against a project of the transnational Du Pont (see discussion below). 
The settlement around the samadhi where Kodekar lives is a dhangar settlement. Given their pastoral 
origins, dhangars are not originally from Goa but some families settled here in the 1960s. Dhangars are 
typically not land owners and have no shares in Comunidades, generally subsisting as peasants and 
workers. Calls for a “Goan identity”163 may or may not resonate with equal valence for them as for 
others with deeper ancestral roots in the area. But they, along with other local communities, have 
clear stake in the local commons and political economy. 
Salu Kodekar and Nilesh Naik are at the crux of the Goan Impasse, mediated as it is by 
caste, community, gender and class inequalities. What happens to the SEZ lands once the SC verdict 
is out—to what end these lands and water resources are used and controlled and by whom— will 
reveal  possibilities  of  the  gains  made  over  SEZs.  Can  the  anti-SEZ  agitation  facilitate  the 
possibilities for programmatic social movements with ecologically appropriate egalitarian agendas 
that actively counter existing inequalities? Unless this deeper resolution is attained, the conflict over 
SEZs may return in another form, pitting the forces of capital, state and peasants and citizens in 
standoff, yet again. That evening, as Hazare and I turned a bend a few hundred meters from 







162 In Goa, as elsewhere, STs are predominantly peasants and among the state’s poorest communities. 
163 A discussion of the frame of “Goan identity” in the anti-SEZ is taken up later in the paper. See also discussion on 







from  iron  ore  mines dumped unceremoniously, calling witness to  the implications of  another 




Amka Naka SEZ! Amka Zai PEZ! The Anti-SEZ Agitation 
 
 
We don’t want SEZ! We want PEZ!164 
 
 
We had planned to take… ordinary dharna [sit-in] outside the police-station. Means assemble at Azad 
Maidan [public park in Panjim]. We had a crowd which came from everywhere. Kerim was very 
supportive, Verna, Sancoale also, Loutolim… We made placards... We were supposed to have a silent 
march... We came out from the Azad Maidan, we crossed the street, we came to the police headquarters 
and we were supposed to stand out and you know, put those placards… Then, we just started moving… 
We just walked towards the gate, the gate was open, we expected them to close or come and stop us… 
Nothing happened, we just proceeded… We walked inside, the crowd followed. Inside we are scared and we 
were worried something may happen to us… They might lathi-charge [baton-charge] or something… But 
the crowd just moved in… 100-150 people… They wanted to arrest us… But we put the ladies in front, 
the Kerim ladies in front and the way they shouted… I’m sorry to say we abused the Goa police over 
there… We shouted… Goa police chor hai! [Goa police are thieves!]… We went to that extent, in the 
police headquarters, and the first time in the history of Goa… Next day it was headlines… (Charles 













164 Pez is rice gruel in Konkani but as an acronym here also doubles as People’s Economic Zones. 







The following account of the anti-SEZ campaign in Goa is predominantly from the perspective of 
SVM members.
166 
Previous initiatives around SEZs included a communication inquiring about likely 
SEZs in Goa by John Pereira of Nagoa village to then Industries Minister in 2005 who responded in 
the negative; a symposium on SEZs by the Council for Social Justice and Peace (CSJP; the social 
work wing of the Archdiocese of Goa) in 2005 in which the Secretary, Industries Department 
responded to questions raised by the women’s group Bailancho Saad; a Roundtable on SEZs by 
newly formed SEZ Watch in 2006 that resolved to track SEZ developments and contact affected 
villages; and a gram sabha resolution opposing SEZs in Verna initiated by Peter Gama in January 
2007 after then CM Rane inaugurated the K. Raheja SEZ. But it was not until after Monteiro 
stumbled upon information regarding SEZs (see below) that a concerted campaign effort coalesced. 
Six of the approved SEZs, including the notified K. Raheja and Peninsula SEZs, were to 
come up in Salcete taluka (administrative block) in South Goa district, with the largest Christian 
population (57.4 percent, GoI 2001). The notified Meditab SEZ was to come up in Ponda taluka of 
North Goa district which has a high Hindu population (84.9 percent, GoI 2001). As a result the 
cultural idioms and repertoires that found resonance among activists from the two talukas also 
differed. In the narrative that follows I use the terms protesters, campaigners and local residents 
interchangeably but reserve the term activist for key organizers. However, it was over the course of 





People’s Movement Against SEZs 
 





166 The caste and community affiliations of the individuals mentioned in this narrative are not explicitly disclosed given 







Loutolim Comunidade got wind that a Twenty-point Program (TPP)167 was approved by the GIDC 
on land acquired from Loutolim and Verna Comunidades. He filed an RTI application (see note 12) 
and as the documents provided seemed inadequate, requested an inspection of relevant documents. 
It was during the inspection that he says: 
…I found this minutes of the 287 meeting of the [GIDC] board of 19th April [2006] which 
showed land being given for SEZ companies to the tune of around 22 lakhs of sq. mts., four 
companies, and it said it was for SEZs. Now to me at that time, SEZ, I did not even know 
what was SEZs… It seemed to be a very nice word, like Special Economic Zones. So… 
 
then I said let’s just find out what is SEZ… (Interview January 5, 2012). 
 
Monteiro first obtained relevant information …which company had asked [for] what, what 
was the date of the minutes, everything.” Figuring project details he said, he was shaken: “…I saw 
that they were supposed to be declared as autonomous bodies, out of the control of the local bodies 
as well as the state government. There were… no revenue for the local government where it was all 
supposed to be export-oriented… and they were supposed to be given uninterrupted water… and 
power supply, they were supposed to be having their own law and order… I said… this cannot 
happen here. I thought like if five SEZs, means there will be five enclosures doing whatever they 
want in there… and then… SEZs included commercial units, recreational centers, hotels, resorts 
everything. So I said this cannot be… (ibid.). 
With his neighbor and later Convener of the SVM Charles Fernandes, the village Sarpanch 
(elected head) Sejo Fernandes and several others, Monteiro began sharing information with residents 




167 The TPP is a contentious poverty alleviation scheme that has typically allotted Comunidade lands for housing low-wage 
migrant workers in slum-like conditions near industrial estates. These workers often form captive “vote-banks” for 
political patrons in return for favors like housing, access to water, electricity, etc. While class-bias is a likely factor in the 
opposition to TPPs, SEZs were to attract white collar immigrants, indicating an underlying issue of overburdened l ocal 







Documents revealed that land for seven SEZs had been allotted in April 2006, before the 
state’s SEZ policy was even notified. While Meditab at Kerim and Peninsula at Sancoale had already 
been notified by mid- 2007, K. Raheja initiated construction at Verna even before it was notified. A 
well-known realty firm from Mumbai, internet research revealed that K. Raheja’s SEZ was being 
promoted as a comprehensive township of 275 acres called “Mindspace” on the company’s 
website.168 Implications of the residential project for water, agriculture and infrastructure like 
transport and garbage disposal alarmed local residents. In July 2007, a meeting was arranged with 
residents from villages around the SEZ sites near the Verna and Sancoale plateaus. Subsequently at a 
meeting in Verna, People’s Movement Against SEZs (PMAS) was formed. 
In the meanwhile, Ramakrishna Zalmi, a schoolteacher from Kerim near Bhutkhamb had 
read a news report about SEZs in 2005. A seminar in Goa University on SEZs soon after piqued his 
interest and he sought information from a friend who worked in a SEZ in another state. A meeting 
organized by the non-profit Jagrut Goem in Panjim where members from PMAS were present 
sealed the interest of the few participants from Kerim. They sensed that the land lying “unused” 
since the Nylon 6,6 agitation might be used for a SEZ. There had been talk of CIPLA, a 
pharmaceutical industry, since 2006, when at an initial meeting organized by the company, a local 
youth group, Abhiyan, challenged its claims regarding local employment generation. Meditab SEZ, 
allotted land on the plateau, turned out to be a CIPLA project. 
Initially an informal group of concerned residents organized village meetings and screenings 
of a SEZ documentary film from Maharashtra made available by SEZ Watch. In village elections a 




168 After anti-SEZ campaigners raised issue over a real estate scam, the Mindspace SEZ advertisement disappeared from 
the company’s website. Campaigners however, had taken its printouts and subsequently furnished them as court 
evidence. The company’s website still advertises several Mindspace SEZs in different Indian cities. Fieldtrips to the 
Verna plateau reveal an area ideal for premium realty projects given its location atop the plateau, with sea breezes, 
pristine views of the Zuari river, proximity to the airport, the VIE and Margao and Panjim cities, and abundant ground - 







The Kerim Kriti Nagrik  Samiti (Kerim Citizens Action Committee; KKNS) was subsequently 
formed with about 80 registered members and Dr. Zalmi was strategically appointed its president. 
As the KKNS stepped up advocacy, the local Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from the 
MGP (Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party), whose trucks were contracted for SEZ construction, 
allegedly sent people, sometimes drunk, to disrupt KKNS meetings. 
In the meanwhile water tables were declining because of illegal bore-wells dug for SEZ 
construction, causing villagers to raise the issue. The private security refused KKNS members entry 
into the premises, so they invited the MLA for a joint inspection of illegal bore-wells. While the 
MLA went about inspecting in his car, KKNS members took the opportunity on foot and chased 
construction workers away from the premises.169 However, construction soon resumed; KKNS now 
organized a big public meeting in Kerim with support from PMAS and other GBA and Jagrut Goem 
activists. Meetings were subsequently held in surrounding villages to mobilize support, with veteran 
protesters from Nylon 6,6 adding forces. 
At the same time as PMAS stepped up its agitation, another outfit, the Goa Movement 
Against SEZs (GMAS), with the tacit support of the BJP, also began opposing SEZs. PMAS 
constituents wished to maintain a clear distance from GMAS, partly because of BJP’s religion-based 
communal politics and partly to keep at bay partisan political interests. By now, people from Kerim 
had joined forces with the PMAS and in late October 2007 a meeting was held in Panjim that had a 
pan-Goa presence from all the SEZ affected villages, other activist groups like the GBA, Jagrut 








169 Construction workers across India are generally extremely poor and vulnerable immigrants from other states 
dependent on contractors and local residents for livelihoods and stay. In Goa, they are generally from rural Bihar, 







SEZ Virodhi Manch 
 
From November 2007 to January 2008, SVM stepped up the agitation, organizing relentless protest 
actions and public meetings with regular press releases and media reports. On November 3, around 
200 SVM supporters stormed the K. Raheja SEZ raising slogans to halt construction immediately 
and chased construction crew away. Construction resumed soon, and to SVM’s ire, the SEZ was 
officially notified three days later. Not only was the construction undertaken prior to notification 
illegal, the Congress had promised to review the SEZ policy. Following protest rallies in Panjim, CM 
Kamat finally formed a Ministerial Committee to review SEZs, additionally directing the RP-2021 
Task Force to prepare a report on SEZs. The Goa State Congress Committee (GPCC) additionally 
 
set up a panel to study the implications of SEZs. 
 
In the wee hours of December 7, as Kerim residents were returning home from a ritual 
ceremony near Bhutkhamb, they witnessed an accident as a construction truck from the SEZ 
rammed  into  an  electricity  pole.  Simmering  frustration  from  having  been  unable  to  stop 
construction earlier resulted in a spontaneous decision to immediately throw out the construction 
crew  once and  for  all.  Overnight,  KKNS mobilized  support  from  surrounding  villages, SVM 
activists and supporters. Early that morning another minor accident as a car struck the stationary 
truck added to the already agitated atmosphere. Other SVM members, journalists and lawyers 
arrived by late morning, police platoons following soon after. In Zalmi’s words, 
We chased all the workers away. It was spontaneous as after the accident we got a chance to 
chase them. We went to Anna’s [local spice plantation owner] and planned for arrests etc. 
We called four advocates beforehand. Here people are disciplined and don’t get out of hand. 
The agitation was mature. We told the police we’ll set fire to the machines. Poornima [from 











The atmosphere was charged through the day but the police held restraint; reportedly no 
violence was used on either side. Activists even warned the police to stay away claiming the police 
had no jurisdiction inside SEZs as they were deemed foreign territories. By evening, the protesters 
managed to round up construction workers and in a sympathetic gesture of solidarity for their loss 
of wages and obvious poverty, transported them to the nearest bus terminal at their own cost. 
Machines were brought out of the premises and their owner was warned to take them by the next 
day or face damages. Construction never resumed on Bhutkhamb. 
Energized by their success in Kerim, SVM members once again stormed the K. Raheja site 
in Verna on December 11, chasing the construction crew away. Interestingly, the police response 
was again restrained. In interviews with activists and residents, two likely possibilities emerged for 
the relatively soft response of the police—the Nylon 6,6 and Meta-Strips agitation experiences had 
created apprehensions for the ramifications of violence; and that CM Kamat may have asked the 
police to go “soft” to avoid political escalation (see discussion below). 
A massive public meeting held in Margao city three days later gave a major signal of 
opposition with about 10,000 people in attendance from affected villages and across the state.170 By 
December 29, the GPCC released its critical evaluation of SEZs, declaring them unviable. On the 
same day, a White Paper on SEZs released by the Ministerial Committee echoed this sentiment but 
recommended six SEZs. The next day, the RP Task Force released its report, concluding SEZs were 
detrimental for Goa. About 1,000 people from villages around Verna and Sancoale walked in a 10- 
kilometer rally that day to the house of the local MLA and then Industries Minister, Alexio Sequeira, 
handing him a memorandum opposing SEZs. Sequeira was also the GIDC chair when the SEZs 
 
 
170 Soon after, at the peak of the Christmas-New Year tourist season, the GMAS announced that tourists should leave as 







were approved and allotted lands. They were greeted by a large police contingent but again, no 
physical violence was used. On the 31st, the CM announced his “New Year gift to the people of 
Goa,” scrapping all approved SEZs. 
Soon after, in early January of 2008, the SVM organized the demonstration at the Panjim 
police-station (see quote earlier) as police officials were repeatedly refusing to officially register cases 
against the GIDC and developers. Two days later the GoG issued stop-work orders to the notified 
SEZs. SEZ Watch soon called a round-table with SVM and GMAS to share experiences, and PEZ 
Watch was constituted to monitor developments, though the two groups remained independent. By 
April, while the BOA conceded to the withdrawal of all formally approved SEZs, in the matter of 
the three notified SEZs at Verna, Sancoale and Bhutkhamb, they urged the state government to 
come to an amicable settlement with the developers. That same month, the developers and SVM 
approached the courts. In August 2008, despite the ongoing court case and stop-work order, the 
SVM members noticed that construction had resumed in the K. Raheja SEZ. This time they 
stormed the premises and used physical intimidation to stop construction. No construction has 






Pereira filed the first court petition, followed by the five developers who challenged the revocation 
of the SEZ policy and the show-cause notices issued by the GIDC. SVM members filed public 
interest petitions against irregularities in due process with the support of a legal aid non-profit, 
Human Rights Lawyers Network, in July 2008. Around 50-200 residents from the SEZ affected 
villages attended each hearing to demonstrate continued opposition. 
The court finally gave its verdict in November 2010 upholding the GoG’s prerogative to 
 







notified SEZs, the court reserved comment as this was not specifically challenged by the petitioners. 
The judgment acknowledged gross irregularities, noting: “The allotment of lands to the companies 
has been made in undue haste and without proper scrutiny of their applications. The allotment of 
lands has been made arbitrarily. Procedure adopted in the allotment is not fair and transparent. The 
allotments made by the GIDC do not stand the test of reasonableness” (Franky Monteiro and four 
others vs. State of Goa and six others 2010). Disappointingly for the anti-SEZ activists however, no 
punitive action was taken against responsible officials. As noted, all parties are now in ongoing 
litigation in the Supreme Court. 
During the agitation and court proceedings the activists who were professionals, from all 
caste and religious backgrounds, bore responsibility for most monetary expenses (institutional 
donations were refused to retain independence) and RTI, media and legal tasks. Peasants formed the 
backbone of public meetings, protest demonstrations and presence at the court hearings. Activists 
reported receiving “offers” and indirect messages for peaceful settlement through “well wishers,” as 
well as threatening phone calls. Fernandes’ two dogs were mysteriously poisoned and killed one 
night. Faleiro and Monteiro faced bureaucratic delays and rejections for work related applications. 
Solidarity, conviction and an abiding sense of ethics and responsibility were cited as sources of 




Analyzing the Success of the Anti-SEZ Agitation 
 
 
An Alliance of Forces: Resources, Livelihoods, Migration  and the “Goan Identity” 
 
The Verna Industrial Estate has been a constant source of grievance in surrounding villages. 
Industries on the plateau pump ground water to meet their needs, impacting water levels in the area; 







notwithstanding)171   is particularly notorious. Waste from the industrial area finds its way into fields 
around the plateaus through canals. Many natural springs in the region, some said to be medicinal, 
have dried up. The source of the river Sal in the plateau has also been adversely affected, in turn 
affecting the fields along its banks. Activist Peter Gama of Verna, a civil contractor and Comunidade 
shareholder key to peasant mobilization in the area points out: “Sometimes people [would] grow three 
crops …[on] both the banks of river Sal. During my childhood, Utorda, Majorda [villages] was a famous place for 
watermelon; that time watermelons are not coming from outside Goa. Now due to scarcity of water this river Sal just 
dries up in… April… (interview July 19, 2012). Gawde from Kerim recounts: “…We harvest arecanut 
[beetle nut] and coconut in our orchard, but when they put a bore well and pumped ground water, 
we could not grow anything as water dried up… (interview July 5, 2012; translated from Konkani). 
Gama sums up, “I would say this Verna plateau, is the head of this village. When you carry some 
load, there’s a capacity, I can carry certain kilos of weight you know. So this plateau is like that… 
You can put some certain factory [if]… carrying capacity is there. So I would say there is no carrying 
capacity at all, as far as Verna is concerned. In spite of this they bring SEZs also (interview June 17, 
2012). 
 
SEZs in Goa promised the creation of 242,000 jobs, while the state’s official unemployment 
estimate is 80,000. The anti-SEZ agitators were not explicitly against industrialization. In Gama’s 
words again: 
Industry means they always promise 80% jobs to locals, but frankly speaking, or in practical, 
locals peoples does not even get 10% jobs in this industrial belt or area. And that’s why we 
say… migrants, workers are coming from neighboring states, even from Jharkhand and UP, 













factories on this plateau? Instead of bringing factories or industries in this plateau or area, 
 




…if they put up factories they will need technical expertise and such jobs are of no use to 
us… Using the land for cultivation will give us all work… Here we don’t have a hospital or 
facilities… There is no old age home, that will be of use to us…(interview July 5, 2012; 
translated from Konkani). 
Several bureaucrats, developers, activists and others I interviewed claimed that the native 
Goan population has grown by zero percent in recent decades; population increases are perceived as 
resulting from migration. In 2001, immigrants in Goa totaled 20 percent of the population while the 
latest 2011 census puts this figure at about 30 percent (cf. ToI 2012). A recent GoG report raises 
apprehensions that by 2021 the Goan population will be outnumbered by migrants. A recent 
delegation by CM Parrikar to the Prime Minister requested “special status” for Goa to prevent sale 
of land to non-Goans (Firstpost 2013). Shifting demographics have caused insecurity among some, 
exacerbated by growing resource constraints and rising property prices. Working-class migrants may 
be vilified as “criminals” and “drunks” and white-collar migrants resented with fears in  some 
quarters assuming xenophobic and nativist overtones. SEZs were seen as promoting white-collar 
immigration  to  a  scale  that  would  destroy  or  burden  existing  livelihoods,  resources  and 
infrastructure, raise real estate prices beyond local affordability and threaten local relationships with 
land and resources. Combined with the historical relationship of Goa to India, these concerns fueled 




“Our God was with us… and God means nature” 
 







campaign’s success was: “our God was with us...” In Kerim, with a high indigenous population, this 
was almost always followed by “…and God means nature.” Activists from Kerim recounted how 
they first took the blessing of the village-God Betal devta through ritual practice seeking divine will by 
the mediation of a priest, using flower petals as means of communication. The local campaign was 
initiated only after the divination of blessings. Borkar (2006) discusses natural worship practices in 
Goa that have helped conserve its rich biodiversity. Given that plateaus are the main source of water 
for orchards around them, it is possible that religious significance and “sacred presence” was 
historically attached to Bhutkhamb for preservation. Respondents of all communities recounted 
going to the plateau to offer prayers on special occasions and claimed that a project would prevent 
access to worship areas. 
The Church similarly is significant to the Goan Christian community, with parish sermons 
every morning and Sunday sermons in the main village churches that families diligently attend. 
Campaign members in Loutolim and Verna describe themselves as devout Catholics and participate 
in religious activities diligently. Post-sermon exchanges helped in the daily sharing and updating of 
information during the campaign. In Verna, Loutolim and Sancoale, parish priests also played key 
roles in mobilizing support against the SEZs. Fr. José Dias, Sancoale priest in 2007 with a personal 
history of environmental activism from the Konkan railway agitation, and Fr. Eremit Rebello, 
mobilized support around Sancoale and Verna. Fr. Dias notes a growing awareness of 
“environmental protection from destructive development” in the church (interview with Fr. Dias 
June 27, 2012). The CSJP’s participation was also key to the campaign. Local religious values 
informing and drawing from environmental preservation practices thus added a complementary 







Evidence of Irregularities 
 
The mandate of the GIDC is to encourage small and medium-scale industry. Export-oriented large 
enclaves violated this policy. Documents obtained through RTI applications revealed that the state’s 
SEZ policy was notified in July 2006, but land for seven SEZs was allotted (and fresh acquisition for 
one approved) in March-April 2006. All seven applications were incomplete when land was allotted, 
some missing even their company seals. The GIDC approved two of these applications within a day, 
four within a week and one in 12 days. The land was allotted at discounted rates (of approximately 
$14 per square meter172  in Verna, $1.9 in Bhutkhamb and $6.3 in Sancoale), on account of lack of 
 
infrastructure (see Da Silva forthcoming). GIDC’s rules mandated individual plots to industrial units 
whereas SEZs required contiguous large areas. Designated open spaces and roads were subsequently 
allotted to the SEZs (initially for free but after protests at discounted rate) to help fulfill contiguity 
requirements. K. Raheja SEZ’s status was changed from multi-purpose to service sector SEZ on the 
lease agreement to fulfill land criteria. Moreover, the GIDC’s approval for four additional SEZs 
(1,548.44 hectares) was greater than the total land acquired by it in five years. 
According to Goa’s Comptroller and Accountant General (CAG), the loss to the exchequer 
over SEZ land deals was over $20 million. The GIDC additionally took upon itself the responsibility 
to provide water, drainage and roads to SEZs. Rent concessions were also given with fixed rates for 
30-year leases. The Town and Country Planning Department was further requested to increase the 
Floor Area Ratio for new construction from 100 to 150 percent for Information Technology and 
other specified buildings, amounting to additional concessions.  All of this information was used 








172 Dollar figures are calculated at the then prevailing rate of approximately $1 to Rs. 43. 







Other Anti-SEZ Mobilizations 
 
The GMAS, led by late activist and UGDP (United Goan Democratic Party) politician Mathany 
Saldanha, shared its platform with Hindu-right political parties like the BJP and the Shiv Sena and 
was able to draw upon its network in all 40 state constituencies (Da Silva forthcoming). During the 
October 2007 bye-elections in South Goa, the BJP made SEZs a state-wide issue and helped 
pressure the Congress for a policy review. While initially GMAS and BJP were both in favor of 
scrapping all except the three notified SEZs, by November 2007 their demand was for wholesale 
scrapping of all SEZs. In December the GMAS held a massive public meeting in Panjim, issuing 
deadlines to the government and warning of a “Nandigram-like situation.”174 On Christmas Eve, at 
the height of the tourist season, GMAS declared that all tourists should leave the state by December 
28, as the agitation could take an “ugly turn” (ibid.). However, while both the GMAS and the BJP 
helped catalyze a state-wide campaign until December 2007, SVM activists point out that they 
refrained from taking the issue to the courts, revealing especially for the BJP its politically motivated 




Electoral Imperatives and Police Restraint 
 
Goa has 40 elected representatives in its Legislative Assembly. As such, a simple majority of over 50 
percent requires 21 MLAs. Opportunist defections among the Congress, the BJP, the MGP, the 
UGDP, the SGF (Save Goa Front) or the NCP (Nationalist Congress Party) are common and 
especially since the 1990s, cause of much political instability (cf. Rubinoff 1992). It is very easy for a 
ruling party to lose its majority as allegiance from coalition partners or ministers from within the 




174 Recall that Nandigram in West Bengal was the site of the Indonesian Salim group SEZ that witnessed mass violence 
through 2007 as local farmers, residents and opposition political parties resisted land acquisition by the state government 







receptive to popular pressures (cf. Heller 2005). During and after the 2007 by-elections, the coalition 
partners of the Congress had begun voicing opposition to SEZs (Da Silva forthcoming). As noted, 
the SEZ agitation came on the back of the RP-2011 agitation and the Congress likely felt unable to 
sustain another hostile state-wide agitation. 
Internal divisions within the Congress were reflected in senior politicians’ views. SEZs were 
promoted by a previous Congress CM Rane, and it is possible that CM Kamat was more receptive to 
popular pressure as he did not have a personal stake in them. In his interview, Kamat claimed: 
“SEZs in Goa were scrapped because the people of Goa did not want any SEZs. Although one SEZ 
could have been tried, but it became a serious political problem with 10,000 people on the street and 
work being stopped so that even under police protection work could not continue” (interview July 
20, 2012). Rane on the other hand favored one or two SEZs for the good of the state’s economy 
and alleged that the agitators were parochial and withdrawing into regionalism, but needed to have a 
broader view, not a “village mentality” (interview July 20, 2012). Another senior Congress politician 
who requested anonymity and was an ardent promoter of SEZs called Kamat a “weak” CM who 
should have lathi-charged (baton-charged) the agitators to teach them a lesson and implement the 
SEZs. 
That the police did not unleash violence despite demonstrations, storming of SEZ premises, 
chasing the construction crew and even a siege on the police-station is significant. The historically 
frequent and often successful negotiations by activists with the state may have impacted police 
response  in  the  face  of  massive  public  protest.  The  Goan  state’s  “repertoires  of  repression” 








Small State and Sympathetic Media 
 
The small size of the state worked to the advantage of the campaigners and helped focus media 
attention relatively quickly. People could congregate in meetings at short notice. As social distance is 
not acute, people often personally know politicians and bureaucrats and enjoy greater degrees of 
interaction with them. Frequent communication with the GoG representatives facilitated receptivity 
to campaign demands. As the agitation intensified, sympathetic media representatives also ensured 
prompt coverage of events and press releases. Local journalists from Loutolim, Verna and Kerim 
helped sustain attention on the issue and were reportedly even present during the storming of SEZ 
sites. 
A combination of contextual and contingent factors located in the historical and inter-related 
fields of capitalism-facilitating accumulation, environmental activism, religious practices and 
repertoires of protest and repression, thus contributed to the success of the anti-SEZ campaign in 
Goa. Such state-level policy reversal is rare, and was aided by the vitiated atmosphere around SEZs 





Determining Land Rights 
 
 
A representative of the K. Raheja SEZ I interviewed indicated unwillingness to give up on “sunk” 
investment. If lands are returned to SEZs however, activists may intensify the agitation again and 
this time it could assume a very different form from the previously non-violent one. If they are 
returned to the GIDC, their fate will depend on the next project sanctioned on them. Having fought 
long and hard, local residents and activists are unlikely to give up easily. At the same time, the 
irregularities in the approvals and land allotment processes render both outcomes unlikely. How the 







that it may not be favorably disposed. For instance, in Jagpal Singh vs. the State of Punjab and 
Others (2011), the SC noted that village commons have been “grabbed by unscrupulous persons 
using muscle power, money power or political clout, and in many States now there is not an inch of 
such land left for the common use of the people of the village, though it may exist on paper… This 
was done with active connivance of the State authorities and local powerful vested interests and 
goondas [thugs].” Dismissing acquisition in the particular instance the SC further directed all state 
governments  to  evict  “illegal/unauthorized  occupants  of  Gram  sabha/Panchayat/Poramboke 
[grazing lands]/Shamlat land” and restore these lands “to the Gram sabha/Gram Panchayat for the 
common use of villagers… Long duration of such illegal occupation or huge expenditure in making 
constructions thereon or political connections must not be treated as a justification for condoning 
this illegal act or for regularizing the illegal possession” (see also chapters three and five). 
The SVM activists in their appeal to the Supreme Court appealed for the land to be reverted 
to its original owners, the Comunidades. However, there is a difference in local perceptions with 
regard  to  Comunidades.  Verna  and  Loutolim  Comunidades  have  a  mixed  membership  from 
communities, with women also holding shares, and are perceived as conducting their affairs 
transparently. In Kerim the Comunidade is under the control of two Brahmin families who are not 
from the village and do not enjoy a relationship of trust with local residents. Activists from Kerim 
prefer that the land be brought under the control of the village Panchayat, circumventing the 
Comunidade altogether. 
Monteiro argues that combined control by the Comunidade and the gram sabha requiring 
minimum quorum of participation for decision-making, rather than a reversion to the village 
Panchayat or Comunidade exclusively is ideal as the decisions taken by the gram sabha are more 
transparent and hence accountable to local residents. Nevertheless, the fundamental questions of 







caste, class, gender and community inequalities remain central to locally appropriate development 
needs. 
Campaign activists have several suggestions for locally appropriate projects that will help 
conserve the environment and provide jobs to local youth, from agro-processing cooperatives to 
educational hubs. Existing and potential initiatives include farmers’ cooperatives, land rights for 
Dalit and ST communities and PEZs. A consolidation of the gains made over SEZs, indeed made 
historically over capital in  Goa,  requires a  renewed political commitment among  social forces 
engaged in struggle, including the SVM. It requires a fundamental “reconstitution from below” (cf. 
Barker et al. 2013) of relationships around and to land and resources. 
In this regard a distinction needs to be made between “issue-based campaigns” and 
“programmatic social movements” with explicit agendas for “democratically determined egalitarian 
and ecologically appropriate development.” SVM was successful as a broad-based campaign against 
SEZs. But a fundamental reconstitution of relationships around land and resources requires focusing 
on existing inequalities. Rights to land and resources are mediated by historically instituted social 
relations of power (cf. Verdery 2003). “Pro-poor” land reforms are likely to run aground if 
inadequately supported by social forces focused on existing social inequalities. 
How relevant are the questions of egalitarian organization that the Goan Impasse poses to 
struggles against dispossession in other states of India? While the specificities of Goa's history and 
small size of the state have shaped the success of the state-wide campaign against SEZs in Goa that 
indeed may be difficult to replicate, anti-SEZ agitations in other states have also similarly forged 
broad alliances of peasants’ and citizens’ groups, used a diversity of self-reliant mobilization based 
on voluntary contributions, and successfully blunted the state’s repertoires of repression. Electoral 
implications of popular protests against SEZs have riven the political consensus over SEZs in other 







Singur villages (the latter for an automobile factory, not a SEZ) became a catalytic force in routing 
of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) after nearly 35 years of rule in the 2009 state elections. 
While  other  states where  SEZs  became controversial may  not  have  revoked SEZ  policies  or 
canceled all SEZs, nor indeed witnessed concerted state-wide campaigns, several large SEZs have 
taken a beating across the country, and the model stands considerably derailed. The question of 
democratically determined egalitarian and ecologically appropriate right to land- and resource-use for 
all that the Goan Impasse pries open, finds resonance in other areas of “land-grabs” in India. 
The  anti-RP  2011  agitation  pointed  to  the  necessity  for  state  actors  backing  social 
movements and the anti-SEZ agitation points to the need for programmatic social movements going 
beyond specific issues and projects, if the recurring impasse over land and resources rights is to be 
resolved in democratically decentralized ways that ensure locally ecologically appropriate 
development and land- and resource-use rights for all. The lessons from Goan agitations for land 
and resources, despite their historical particularities, resonate with similar struggles across India, say 
in Raigad in Maharashtra (recall that MSEZ still shows up in the list of formally approved SEZs), or 
along the BMIC and the DMIC. 
The Goan Impasse demonstrates that “the state,” despite interests within it working actively 
to aid capital even as “land-broker,” (cf. Levien 2012), is not immune to popular pressure. This 
learning has also emerged in the course of successful resistance to SEZs in other Indian states. The 
broad alliance of social forces that came to oppose SEZs in Goa (and elsewhere) underlines how 
few have stood to gain and many to lose from them. If democracy remains quintessentially a class 
compromise (cf. Sandbrook et al. 2007), the Goan Impasse uncovers possibilities to push back the 
capitalist offensive. As the Indian economy and capital poise for “growth” through investments in 
industry, infrastructure and urbanization, the ethnographic material indicates that a deeper alliance 







egalitarian, ecologically appropriate and democratic rights to land- and resource-use for all, is critical. 
If the spirit of Goa's anti-SEZ campaigners walking through the gates of the police headquarters or 
grazing their cattle through the “SEZ fence” daily stands witness, the possibility of walking through 





































The checkered trajectory of SEZs in India is not specific to SEZs as export enclaves per se but to 
the dynamics of relationships with land and resources that SEZs set forth. This study suggests that 
processes of appropriation, resistance and impasse are consistently unfolding in the institution of 
other  growth  infrastructures  such  as  industrial  corridors,  and  urbanization  projects  in  India. 
Peasants’ and citizens’ groups threatened with dispossession are forming critical, if contingent 
alliances to protect their livelihoods and homes (social movement alliances against SEZs and the 
Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor are illustrative). To the extent that social movement alliances pose 
an effective “front” against capitalist appropriation of land and resources, they are waging campaigns 
against infrastructure and urbanization models. Their programmatic agendas for “reconstitution 
from below” are limited, but their articulation of “development needs” suggest possible 
reconfiguration of existing relationships. For such reconstitution to be effective for Salu Kodekar 
(see section on Goan Impasse in the previous chapter) and others like her who are dependent on 
commons for livelihoods but do not own any land, and are situated in the margins of class and 
identity privilege, programmatic social movements will need to focus on existing inequalities, and 
create conditions for egalitarian collective relationships with land and resources. Conditions of 
conflict  are  creating  openings  for  such  programmatic  agendas.  In  the  absence  of  clear  legal 
principles for egalitarian relationships with land and resources, “economic growth” agendas pose 
constant threat of dispossession (as the persistence the Mumbai SEZ in the SEZ approvals list 
suggests). A framework for “locally determined and egalitarian and ecologically appropriate land-use 
and resource-use for all” can be a potential tool towards fundamental “reconstitution from below.” I 
turn next to a preliminary exploration of the elements for a hopeful legal framework for “rights to 







Rights to Land- And Resource-Use for All175 
 
 
Admittedly, the Land Acquisition Act, a pre-Constitutional legislation of colonial vintage is a 
drastic law, being expropriatory in nature as it confers on the State a power which affects 
person’s property right. Even though right to property is no longer fundamental and was 
never a natural right, and is acquired on a concession by the State, it has to be accepted that 
without right to some property, other rights become illusory (Surendra Singh vs. State of 
U.P. 2011: 3). 
The imperative for land reforms derives firstly from the Constitutional mandate for equality 
before law and the primary duty of the state to ensure redistributive justice. It is reiterated 
nearly sixty years after Independence in the Common Minimum Programme of the UPA 
government, declared on 24 May 2004, that ‘landless families will be endowed with land 
through implementation of land ceiling and land redistribution legislation. No reversal of 
ceiling will be permitted (GoI 2009a: i). 
The Constitutional arrangements have devolved a responsibility upon the Union to oversee 
the fostering of economic and social justice in the States. Land Reforms remain a means of 
distributive justice to the marginalised and, therefore, a part of the Preamble to the 
Constitution (ibid: vi). 
To briefly recap, the right to property was initially a fundamental right under the Indian 
Constitution but later removed to facilitate redistributive land reforms. The right to compensation 
was also whittled down with some exceptions. The 2013 land acquisition law leaves out consent- 
based appropriation  for  land  and  resources for  state-led acquisition but introduces quotas for 





175  Thanks are due to Albertina Almeida for pointing out land- and resource-uses that are not recognized by law but 







Public Private Partnerships). It raises compensation rates by providing for annuities and in some 
locations, doubles the market rate for land. Its provisions are far from laying a consent-based 
“development” paradigm that is egalitarian, locally determined and ecologically appropriate. 
But this is not an argument for the reinstatement of the right to property as a fundamental 
right. What principles must rights to land- and resource-use for all need to draw upon and what 
elements need to be considered to move beyond a narrowly conceived individual right to property? 
Article 39 of the Directive Principles of State Policy in the constitution offers a relevant principle to 
develop a framework, stating that the ownership and control of the material resources of a 
community should be distributed to best serve the common good, and such that the operation of the 
economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production. Land reform legislation 
also flows from these principles and draws upon redistributive and economic justice and the right to 
life and liberty; a fuller treatment can help us get out of the bind of the dual nature of eminent 
domain where the temptation of its redistributive potential hangs in the long shadow of its historical 
abuse. 
Borras and Franco (2010) sum up key elements of “pro-poor land reforms” that help 
distinguish pro-poor land policies from Market Led Agrarian Reforms (MLARs): such policies 
ensure protection or transfer of land-based wealth and political power in favor of the poor; are class- 
conscious, historical, gender- and ethnic-sensitive; productivity increasing, livelihood enhancing and 
rights-securing. In  India  these need to  be complemented with robust  and  responsive agrarian 
policies that ensure food sovereignty176 and the sustainability of local agrarian economies. Identifying 
the plurality of landless and near-landless rural poor that include peasants, laborers, indigenous 
communities, artisanal fisher-folk-cum rural laborers, men and women Borras and Franco (ibid.) 
 
 
176 Food sovereignty commonly refers to locally ecologically appropriate and sustainable food, agriculture, livestock and 
fisheries systems and must not to be confused with state sovereignty. While the concept is fraught with ambiguity and 
regulatory challenges (see Edelman 2014) here I retain its use to complement locally determined egalitarian and 







argue that formal land ownership through reform can be by the state, community or private entity— 
 
individual or group, as long as the “bottom-line is about reforming land-based social relations. 
 
…[reforming] the terms under which land-based wealth is created, appropriated, disposed and 
consumed as well as the ways and means by which such processes are effectively controlled by 
different groups…” (emphasis in original, ibid: 10). 
A 2013 draft Declaration on the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas for the UN 
Human Rights Council, if adopted by the Council (and eventually the General Assembly), offers 
critical potential for the rights of peasants to “land and territory,” “tenure,” “land reform” and 
“equitable access to land” (UN 2013: 4). The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure 
of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (FAO 2012) endorsed by the UN 
Committee on World Food Security establish principles for securing the tenure of land, fisheries and 
forests (albeit not water and minerals) as a fundamental right: human dignity; non-discrimination; 
equity and justice; gender equality; holistic and sustainable approach to the management of natural 
resources; and consultation and participation. They call on states to provide legal recognition for 
legitimate tenure rights, particularly customary and informal tenure rights and their guaranteed legal 
protection  against  forced  evictions.  They  also  call  for  the  recognition  and  protection  of  the 
commons and their collective use and management and indicate the need for redistributive reforms 
(see Monsalve and Seufert 2012; FAO 2012). 
Land reforms in Brazil initiated by the Movement of Landless Workers (MST) offer a 
prescient caution for the Indian context as well. The MST used the constitutional provision that all 
land must be used for socially productive purposes to occupy unused land. It privileged usufruct 
rights to tillers to counter the dynamic of commodification under MLARs. However, usufruct rights 
were embedded in “land to the tiller” arguments and failed to clarify who a tiller was, creating 







variegated rights and access to land and resources for specific communities and people need to thus 
be specified. The FRA for example recognizes the claims of non-adivasi forest dwellers to forests 
and their resources but in practice, large numbers of such applications are denied recognition by 
officials, posing serious challenges for the rights of all forest dwellers (NFFPFW 2011). Many legally 
recognized rights also do not take into account informal arrangements for land and resource-use that 
exist locally and are not officially accounted for. Direct consultations with local communities are 
imperative and must be effectively developed into any legal framework.177 
The right to shelter also needs to be safeguarded. A recent judgment of the Constitutional 
 
Court of South Africa struck down the KwaZulu-Natal Slums Act after the movement “Abahlali 
base Mjondolo’s” (Zulu for “people of the shacks”) challenged the eviction of slum dwellers. The 
Slums Act empowered municipalities to evict “illegal” occupants from state-owned land and derelict 
buildings, and to force private landowners to do likewise or face fines or imprisonment. The Court 
struck down the legislation because of section 16 of the Act that gave provincial housing ministers 
untrammeled powers to instigate evictions of “illegal” occupiers, and held that the Act was in 
contravention with the Constitutional right of every South African for access to adequate housing 
and was inconsistent with several existing legal instruments (see Tolsi 2009). Historically, the 
constitutional provisions of the erstwhile USSR and China have guaranteed that the state cannot 
take away an individual’s dwelling house and similar personal property, even by legislation (Basu 
2008). 
The “right to property” needs to be viewed as wider than private property and rights to land- 
and resource-use must minimally guarantee rights to shelter and livelihood to all. The development 
of rights to land and resources through individual entitlements can lead to the creation of a bigger 
 
 
177 Consultation, like consent, is a significant challenge given class- and identity-based inequalities. It suffices to suggest 
here that multiple measures for consultation and consent are necessary, including gram sabha (village assembly) and ward 
sabha (assembly), Comunidade and other collective consultations and effective “redress mechanisms” at appropriate nodes 







market for them and their greater concentration. The proposed Land Titling Bill 2011 in India aims 
at updating land records for greater accuracy, and seeks to ease “encumbrances” and facilitate 
“saleability” in land markets (Ramanathan 2011). Struggles for land reforms led by NGOs have held 
national protests and rallies on the issue of land reforms in recent years but need to be attentive to 
demands that unwittingly enable commodification of land and resources through individual 
entitlements. At the same time, collective or usufruct rights insensitive to a mixed caste context 
would  lead  to  the  alienation  of  dalit  and  other  bahujan  communities  and  securing  private 
entitlements in such contexts may better safeguard rights. Legal recognition of complex and 
contextualized land- and resource-use rights arrived at with direct consultation with people and 
communities through state and non-state channels. The possibilities of private, collective, usufruct 
and other use rights to land and resources thus need to be considered contextually, sensitive to caste, 




“A Life of Contradictions” 
 
 
Harvey reminds us: 
 
 
The unconstrained growth of capitalism in new regions is an absolute necessity for the 
survival of capitalism. These are the fields where excess overaccumulated capitals can most 
easily be absorbed in ways which create new market openings and further opportunities for 
profitable investment (Harvey 2001: 303). 
A long dynamic history of popular struggles for social and economic justice, equity and legal 







agenda.178  As this study shows, “the state” itself is an arena open to contest and compelled to 
respond in the face of popular agitation. Despite clear bias in policy and corruption, alliances of 
peasants’ and citizens’ groups struggling against dispossession shore up legal strategies as critical 
“repertoires of protest,” challenging “legality” (or rule of law) and “state sovereignty” on the one 
hand and simultaneously petitioning “the legal system” for redress on the other, sometimes gaining 
important “concessions,” at other times more significantly, getting rid of the “offending project.” 
Capitalists, politicians and bureaucrats benefit in a wide nexus of corruption that defies “rule of law” 
with its own logic, as “economic growth” is conflated with “development” and “public purpose” is 
redefined to reflect “private interest.” 
To the extent that peasants’ and citizens’ groups challenge locally prevalent entrenched 
inequalities along caste, class, gender and community axes, and undertake to redress them, they 
engage egalitarian projects of “reconstitution from below.” Once a particular project or policy is 
successfully rid however, the work of painstaking (and  painful) social transformation  can lose 
priority and enthusiasm can peter into local status quo of entrenched inequalities, until another 
“project” comes along threatening dispossession. The Goan resistance against the RP 2011 and 
SEZs, and the successful resistance in the Mumbai SEZ area, in Nandigram in West Bengal, in 
Mangalore in Karnataka, in the Mandal-Becharji investment area in Gujarat and the Bangalore- 
Mysore industrial corridors (among others), are instances of successful “democratic assertions” over 
land  and  resources  keeping  capitalist  usurpation  of  land  and  resources  at  bay.  If  egalitarian 








178  See Gough and Sharma 1973; Omvedt 1980; Dreze and Sen 1991; Dhanagare 1992; Agarwal 1995; Zelliot 1996; 
Bakshi 1998; Rodrigues 2002; Fischer 2002; Jaffrelot 2003; Harriss et al 2004; Sampat and Dey 2005; Ray and 







This study has attempted to highlight the critical significance of and possibilities for 
contemporary egalitarian projects in India. Conflicts over land and resources are assuming a central 
dynamic in India’s “economic growth” with “capitalism-facilitating accumulation.” Peasants’ and 
citizens’ groups are posing significant non-negotiating “counterpolitics” to the appropriation of land 
and resources. “The state,” itself an arena of contestation and competing interests and ideologies, is 
compelled to “revise” and sometimes “reverse” policy. “Legality” is unsettled, and “rule of law,” in 
the absence of clear principles for egalitarian relationships with land and resources is confronted 
with conditions of impasse. These conditions of impasse confronting capital and legality are opening 
possibilities for locally determined, egalitarian and ecologically appropriate relationships with land 
and resources, “reconstituted from below.” I have offered a preliminary exploration for a legal 
framework enabling such reconstitution. For the framework for egalitarian relationships with land 
and resources to be effective, programmatic social movements need to focus on existing inequalities. 
I conclude below with a quotation from B. R. Ambedkar, the “architect” of the Indian 
Constitution as the Chair of the Constituent Assembly, and one of the most influential thinkers and 
anti-caste leaders in 20th-century Indian history, who was deeply trouble by issues of inequality: 
On the 26th of January 1950 [Indian Republic Day], we are going to enter into a life of 
contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have 
inequality. In politics we will be recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote 
one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic 
structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. [179] 
How long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions? 
 




179 This should not be viewed simplistically as promoting liberal conceptions of “possessive individualism;” Ambedkar 
here referenced oppressive caste, class and community inequalities, as well as the tension between “individual” and 







If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in 
peril. We must remove this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those who 
suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this Assembly 
has so laboriously built up (Speech made to the Constituent Assembly, November 25, 1949, 
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